Israeli regime’s only interest is ‘permanent war,’ Iran’s FM Araghchi says

Press TV – June 19, 2026
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has condemned provocative statements by senior Israeli ministers advocating intensified attacks on Lebanon, warning that the only interest of the genocidal Israeli regime is permanent war.
In a post on X on Friday, Araghchi denounced comments made by Israel’s far-right minister Itamar Ben-Gvir following the deaths of four Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon.
Ben-Gvir wrote on X that “all of Lebanon must burn,” and that “for every tear of an Israeli mother, a thousand Lebanese mothers must weep.”
“This is not a rant by a random genocidal lunatic,” Araghchi wrote. “It’s a public post by the national security minister of the Israeli regime.”
“The genocidal death cult headquartered in Tel Aviv is a threat to all of humanity. It threatens all humans,” he added.
Araghchi said that Tel Aviv’s “only interest is permanent war.”
Israeli finance minister Bezalel Smotrich also called for a harsher military aggression against Lebanon, writing on the social media platform that it was “time to speak with fire” and “open the gates of hell.”
Iranian officials have repeatedly warned that halting Israeli attacks in Lebanon is a key component of the memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the presidents of Iran and the United States on Thursday.
Israeli warplanes bombed residential areas in southern and eastern Lebanon before dawn Friday.
At least 31 Lebanese have been killed as Israel keeps attacking the country despite the US-Iran deal coming into force.
Lebanon’s National News Agency reported that strikes targeted inhabited homes in the towns of al-Sharqiyah, Harouf and Kfar Sir in the Nabatieh district.
In an earlier statement, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei underscored Washington’s direct responsibility under the current circumstances.
He said the Islamic Republic of Iran “will take all necessary measures to safeguard its interests, security and rights, as well as those of its allies.”
According to official Lebanese figures, the death toll from Israel’s military campaign in Lebanon has risen to 3,912.
More than 11,870 people have been wounded and over one million displaced, according to official figures.
Meanwhile, Reuters reported that a ceasefire has taken effect between Hezbollah and the Israeli regime as of 4 PM local time. However, Lebanese media outlet Al Mayadeen has reported Israeli strikes following the start of the reported ceasefire.
Syria, Lebanon, and the limits of power
By Bassam Abu Abdallah | The Cradle | June 19, 2026
Remarks by US President Donald Trump in an interview with NBC News earlier this month, in which he said he would like to see “a more precise surgical attack on Hezbollah” and suggested that Syria’s Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani) could play a role in reaching an agreement over the conflict in Lebanon, have revived a familiar question across the region.
Trump later escalated his rhetoric, saying that if Israel “can’t do the job without killing everyone else, Syria should do the job.” Describing the war on Lebanon as a secondary front, he suggested that Syria, in coordination with the US, could take on Hezbollah if Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not be reined in.
Whenever the region enters a period of major change, the same issue resurfaces. Can Syria once again play a direct security or military role in Lebanon, as it did in 1976?
The comparison is tempting on the surface. It invites parallels between the current leadership in Damascus and the late president Hafez al-Assad, who sent Syrian forces into Lebanon during the civil war. Yet even a brief look at the surrounding conditions suggests that the resemblance is largely superficial.
Trump himself did not clarify what form of assistance he had in mind. The possibilities range from border control and curbing smuggling routes to a broader attempt to pressure Hezbollah.
An old question returns
Similar ideas have surfaced before. In a July 2025 interview with The National, US envoy Tom Barrack warned that Lebanon faced an “existential threat” if it failed to address Hezbollah’s weapons, adding that “if Lebanon doesn’t move, it’s going to be Bilad Al Sham [Greater Syria] again.”
In March, Reuters reported that Washington had encouraged Syria to consider sending forces into eastern Lebanon to help disarm Hezbollah, a claim later denied by Barrack. The episode nevertheless fueled speculation about a possible Syrian role in Lebanon.
The responses from Sharaa’s government, however, have remained cautious and indirect. Sharaa has expressed support for Lebanese President Joseph Aoun’s efforts to consolidate arms under state authority, while recent exchanges with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have emphasized coordination between military and security institutions in both countries.
Syria’s self-appointed president and former Al-Qaeda chief Ahmad al-Sharaa dismissed reports that Syrian forces could enter Lebanon as “rumors.”
At the same time, periodic announcements from Syrian authorities about dismantling alleged Hezbollah-linked cells have been interpreted by some observers as signals aimed at Washington, suggesting readiness to engage if political backing is secured. Whether this reflects a concrete agreement or simply an attempt to keep options open remains unclear.
What is clear is that the renewed discussion comes at a moment when broader regional balances are in flux, particularly after the collapse of the previous Syrian order. The question is not whether Syria once intervened in Lebanon, but whether the conditions that made that intervention possible still exist.
1976 and the architecture of intervention
By the time Syrian forces entered Lebanon in 1976, the civil war had pushed the state to the brink. Importantly, the intervention took shape within a web of regional bargains and international understandings, rather than a unilateral move by Damascus.
The move was carried out at the request of the Lebanese president at the time, Suleiman Frangieh, and was supported by influential Lebanese actors who feared a decisive shift in the internal balance of power. It also aligned with broader concerns shared by regional and international players who were wary of Lebanon descending into total disorder.
Accounts in both western and Arab sources point to quiet understandings between the US, Saudi Arabia, and France that gave Syria space to act as a stabilizing force. The objective was about containing a crisis that risked spilling beyond Lebanon and unsettling the wider region.
The intervention was later formalized through the Arab Deterrent Forces (ADF), which provided a measure of regional legitimacy under the umbrella of the Arab League. This layer of political cover mattered as much as the military dimension.
Equally important was the nature of the Syrian state itself at the time. Syria in 1976 was a cohesive political entity with functioning institutions and a professional army that ranked among the largest in the region. Assad’s leadership carried both domestic and international recognition, reinforced by the aftermath of the 1973 war.
From Assad’s perspective, Lebanon was not a distant arena but an extension of its own security environment. The prospect of a hostile force dominating Lebanon was treated as a direct threat to Syrian national security.
Even so, the intervention was not without tension. The Soviet Union, Syria’s principal ally, expressed reservations, reflecting its own alignment with other forces inside Lebanon. Assad nevertheless proceeded, guided by his assessment of Syria’s strategic interests.
The ability to make such a decision rested on a combination of factors: a stable state, a centralized leadership, a disciplined army, regional acceptance, and working relationships with key Arab actors. Together, these elements created a framework that made intervention both possible and, for a time, sustainable.
A different Syria
None of these conditions applies in the same way today. The current leadership in Damascus operates from a transitional position, still seeking to consolidate authority within a country deeply affected by years of conflict.
There is no broad national consensus over the future political order, and the institutional framework remains incomplete. Legislative bodies and representative structures that might anchor political legitimacy are either absent or still in formation. External backing, whether from the US, Turkiye, Qatar, or others, does not substitute for internal acceptance.
Experience suggests that states cannot rely on external recognition alone to secure stability. Durable governance depends on a social contract that reflects a degree of consensus among citizens. In Syria’s case, that process is ongoing and far from settled.
The challenges facing the current authority are primarily internal. Rebuilding state institutions, addressing economic collapse, and managing the social consequences of prolonged conflict all demand sustained attention. Large segments of the population continue to face economic hardship, while public services and infrastructure remain under strain.
The divisions forged during the war have not receded. Political, social, and sectarian fault lines still cut across the country. In this context, the priority remains consolidation at home, not projection abroad.
A leadership still working to establish its authority is unlikely to commit to a regional role that would require resources, cohesion, and legitimacy it has yet to secure.
The question of the military
The structure and character of the military institution further complicate the picture. The Syrian army that entered Lebanon in 1976 was a regular force with a defined command structure and a coherent doctrine.
Today’s military formations are the product of a long, fragmented war. At their core are factions that once operated as distinct armed groups – among them elements that emerged from or overlapped with networks such as the Nusra Front and other Salafi extremist currents, alongside local militias and foreign fighters folded in over time. Efforts to weld these strands into a single national army remain partial and uneven.
Questions also persist regarding leadership structures, external affiliations, and the presence of foreign fighters within certain units. These factors have drawn scrutiny from international actors and have been reflected in sanctions targeting individuals linked to these formations.
Reports of violations during operations along Syria’s coast and in Suwayda have kept questions of accountability and discipline alive. That record complicates attempts to present these formations as a cohesive national army capable of assuming a wider regional role.
Without a unified command structure and broad public confidence, the military lacks the foundation required for sustained operations beyond Syria’s borders.
Lebanon without an invitation
The Lebanese context has also changed in fundamental ways. In 1976, Syria’s intervention was facilitated by internal Lebanese dynamics, including a formal request from the presidency and support from key political forces.
Today, there is no comparable call for Syrian involvement. Across the political spectrum, Lebanese actors tend to view the period of Syrian tutelage as a chapter they do not wish to revisit, regardless of their differing positions on Hezbollah or regional alignments.
The absence of a domestic Lebanese consensus is matched by a lack of regional endorsement. No major Arab state is advocating for a renewed Syrian military role in Lebanon, and the political environment offers little space for such a move.
Regional risks and the Turkish factor
Another variable that did not exist in 1976 is the extent of Turkish involvement in Syria. Ankara’s presence adds a layer of complexity to any potential Syrian move beyond its borders.
Any Syrian move into Lebanon would run straight into Turkish red lines, Iranian interests, and Hezbollah’s own calculations. What begins as a limited step risks quickly widening, pulling in actors who are already embedded across the same theater.
The prospect of Syrian forces entering Lebanon could also deepen sectarian tensions, extending beyond Lebanon into Syria and Iraq. In an already volatile environment, such a development would be difficult to contain.
If the equation shifts
The equation has already begun to shift. Washington and Tehran have signed an interim memorandum that freezes the conflict and opens the door to wider negotiations. Whether that process produces a lasting settlement or merely a temporary pause remains unclear, but the assumptions that governed the region before the agreement are already being tested.
Such a shift would likely alter priorities across multiple arenas, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq. The emphasis could move from confrontation to managing balances of influence, reducing the relevance of some of the initiatives that emerged during periods of heightened tension.
In that context, the role of actors such as Hezbollah would be recalibrated within a different strategic environment, one where stability takes precedence over escalation.
Limits of power
Comparisons between 1976 and the present miss how far the ground has shifted. That intervention rested on a particular convergence of internal strength, regional acceptance, and international cover.
Syria today sits in a different position. Questions of legitimacy, institutional reconstruction, economic recovery, and social cohesion remain unresolved. The regional environment has also changed, with little appetite for a renewed Syrian role in Lebanon.
The question of intervention is not about intent alone. It turns on power, resources, and the condition of the state itself.
From that perspective, the more pressing question is not whether Damascus can re-enter Lebanon, but whether it has fully reconstituted itself at home.
As the familiar political saying goes, those who have yet to put their own house in order are unlikely to reorganize the neighborhood around them.
The debate, in the end, returns to a simple constraint: power is bounded by geography.
How Multipolarity Forced Trump to Capitulate… For Now
By Eric Striker • Unz Review • June 19, 2026
When describing Donald Trump’s new Memorandum of Understanding with Iran, Foreign Policy magazine summarized the seeming end to the war as a “bigger defeat than Vietnam.”
This negation of American militarism has been felt strongest in Israel, where the Jewish state’s executors in Jerusalem and Washington/New York are throwing a fit. JD Vance, thrown in front of the cameras to own the administration’s retreat before their masters, is now openly telling the furious Jewish-American press “Trump is your [Israel] only ally left in the world.”
Has the White House had enough of Jewish domination of its policies? Is the pause in fighting Iran, which through Persian and Shia tenacity has significantly risen the bar for any continuation of hostilities, permanent?
Not so fast.
Passengers pulling the emergency break on the runaway train should not be seen as a change of guard, but rather a hard check placed on the Jewish domination of Washington DC by the combined forces of several major regional actors the American empire relies on to project power on behalf of Israel.
Forcing America to halt a war it was clearly losing and go to the negotiating table took Turkey (NATO’s second largest army), Pakistan (a nuclear power), the Gulf States (hosts of US CENTCOM with $2 trillion dollars parked in American foreign direct investment) and Egypt to pool their immense lobbying and diplomatic resources together. They offered an ultimatum: America must pause to reconsider its pursuit of Israel’s maximalist objective of conquering Iran and breaking it up into multiple rump states or they will form a new power bloc of their own to deal with this problem. As the American empire declines, multipolarity — which is bringing about the genesis of regional power blocs beyond the familiar Chinese, Iranian and Russian alliance — flexed its bicep.
Even as the administration realized it had no choice but to cave under the pressure exerted by the united front of its growing list of disgruntled associates, Trump audaciously demanded they first sign the Abraham Accords embracing Israel before any Iran negotiations began. The exasperated Muslim states responded with a resounding “No!”
This reaction, equal parts panicked and assertive, is a consequence of Iran’s unorthodox decision to focus its strategy on taxing the collaborationist Gulf regimes. The war has so far cost Gulf Cooperation Council states $200 billion dollars worth of economic damage, prompting public threats from Arab monarchs being pummeled to pull their trillions of dollars currently helping keep American tech, real estate, and bonds afloat.
In other words, the Saudis, Qataris and Emiratis pay the American empire to protect them, in addition to offering their soil for US bases and playing nice with Israel.
Yet at the height of the conflict, Iran and its allies quickly destroyed the expensive and difficult to replace THAAD network integral to the air defenses of both the Gulf and Israel. During the commotion, America’s Middle East protectorates endured blow after blow from Iranian missiles and drones, and Washington’s response was to anger another one of its client states — South Korea — by hastily moving its THAAD defense systems from East Asia to Jordan in order to better protect Israel, an act of brazen Jewish favoritism.
Working with America used to make one untouchable, but today it paints a bullseye on your country. The United Arab Emirates thought it could hedge against potential Iranian retaliation by allowing Russian billionaires to use Dubai to skirt sanctions, only to be taken aback by the revelation that Putin doesn’t care what the oligarchs think, preferring to help the IRGC in acquiring Gulf targets, including hotels in its fragile and decadent cities where US soldiers thought they were hiding.
The US’ catastrophic failure to keep up its end of the bargain is forcing Gulf planners to begin considering concessions to Iran, such as paying Tehran not to spare them. The GCC has hitched itself to the US-Israeli wagon as a realist acknowledgement that neither Israel or America can be militarily or economically defeated. The Iranians, who have limitless ability to sustain damage and are constantly innovating in the realm of warfare, have now demonstrated that this assumption is false, which will inevitably force a change in calculation from cowardly and cynical regional actors down the road.
With now a year and a half worth of Barak Ravid’s fairy tales alleging that Trump has had enough of Israel and Netanyahu indexed at Axios, nobody believes it anymore. For this reason, the administration is now forced to make a public spectacle of condemning Israel. This is geared at making America’s Muslim friends and foes — who currently have all the leverage — think Washington has the whip hand, when the reality is that Israel and the Jewish-American elite do. This was proven for the umpteenth time when Trump’s recent command for Netanyahu to “stop!” was immediately met by Israeli strikes on Iran and Lebanon.
As expected, Iran has already made good on its side of the bargain. The Strait of Hormuz has been reopened and a global economic depression has been averted. On the other hand, the major concessions from America to Iran highlighted by commentators in the MOU have stipulations deferring them pending further negotiations, like a hundred-dollar bill being pulled by a fishing line. One of the MOU’s major promises, that Israel’s war in South Lebanon is to immediately cease, continues to be flagrantly violated even at the expense of enormous IDF casualties in recent days.
As for planned talks in Switzerland to actualize the terms of the agreement, they are already failing.
It is unclear whether Benjamin Netanyahu, whose post October 7th wars have largely failed to achieve any strategic objectives, will survive electorally, but favorites to replace him like former IDF chief Eisenkot are just as bloodthirsty.
As for Trump, Witkoff and Kushner’s latest “time out” on Iran, they have so far been lulls to recalibrate with the intent of continuing. There’s no reason to believe this time is any different.
Switzerland confirms US-Iran talks planned for Friday are cancelled
Al Mayadeen | June 19, 2026
Talks that had been planned for Friday between the United States and Iran at the Burgenstock mountaintop resort in Switzerland will not take place, according to a Swiss foreign ministry statement.
The announcement came after a White House spokesperson said overnight that US Vice President JD Vance had pulled out of a planned trip to meet Iranian negotiators in Switzerland on Friday to begin talks to implement an agreement struck between Tehran and Washington to end the war.
Vance had been expected to travel to Geneva on Friday to begin technical negotiations on implementing the 14-point agreement reached between Tehran and Washington. However, a White House spokesperson said the visit was called off because arrangements for the talks had not been finalized.
A White House statement detailed that Vance and the US delegation were prepared to depart once arrangements had been finalized. “But the logistics of these negotiations have never been simple or predictable,” the statement added.
Iran seeks implementation before new negotiations
The Iranian negotiating delegation had earlier postponed its trip to Switzerland due to the ongoing Israeli aggression on southern Lebanon, an informed source told Al Mayadeen on Thursday.
According to the source, the delegation had already been preparing to depart Iran and launch the first round of negotiations, scheduled to span 60 days, before the decision to suspend the trip was made.
Tehran had previously informed both Washington and the mediators that the Lebanon file remains a central component of the negotiations and will directly influence whether the talks proceed, the source stated, citing Iranian warnings that continued Israeli aggression extending up to 10 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory constitutes a clear violation of the first clause of the Memorandum of Understanding and the framework agreement.
What does the MoU include?
Iran revealed on Thursday the full text of the Memorandum of Understanding, which declares the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, with a final deal to be concluded within 60 days following continued talks.
The US agreed to remove its naval blockade within 30 days, end all sanctions on an agreed schedule, and issue waivers for Iranian oil exports and associated services.
The US also undertakes to release frozen Iranian funds and work with regional partners on a reconstruction plan worth at least $300 billion for Iran.
Iran reaffirmed it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons, with stockpiled enriched material to be resolved via a mutually agreed mechanism under IAEA supervision, while enrichment and other nuclear issues were expected to be discussed in final negotiations.
Israeli aggression continues against Lebanon despite MoU
Despite the agreement, the Israeli occupation has continued its aggression against southern Lebanon, while Hezbollah resistance fighters continue to engage Israeli forces in the town of Kfar Tibnit.
Today at dawn, Israeli bombing on residential areas in southern Lebanon killed and wounded civilians, with casualties reported across several villages in the Nabatieh district.
According to preliminary reports, Israeli airstrikes targeted inhabited homes in the towns of Harouf, Kfar Sir, and al-Sharqiyeh, resulting in several martyrs, injuries, and several missing persons trapped beneath the rubble.
In a separate attack, two civilians were martyred and two others wounded after an Israeli strike targeted the southern town of Qatrani.
The latest attacks come as Israeli occupation forces continue targeting civilians, medical crews, and residential areas across southern Lebanon despite the ceasefire agreement and ongoing diplomatic efforts aimed at ending hostilities on all fronts.
Resistance confronts Israeli advance toward Kfar Tibnit
For its part, the Lebanese Resistance confronted an attempted advance by Israeli occupation forces toward the town of Kfar Tibnit overnight Thursday.
Resistance fighters targeted Israeli military vehicles attempting to move toward the town using anti-tank guided missiles and previously prepared ambushes. Several Israeli vehicles were struck during the confrontation, with flames seen rising from some of the targeted vehicles on the outskirts of Kfar Tibnit.
The Resistance affirmed that the Kfar Tibnit–Ali al-Taher area would remain impervious to Israeli incursions and vowed to continue defending Lebanon and its people.
Iran Beat Back The Greater Israel Project
By Justin K.P. | The Dissident | June 18, 2026
Donald Trump has officially signed the memorandum of understanding with Iran in the Palace of Versailles in France, and Israel and its American lobbyists are having a meltdown.
This is because the war with Iran, according to Israel and its neoconservative allies in the U.S., was indeed to be the linchpin for the Greater Israel Project, and the final phase of the Clean Break plan drawn up by Israel and the Bush administration.
For context, professor Jeffery Sachs explained :
In 1996, Netanyahu and his American advisors devised a “Clean Break” strategy. They advocated that Israel would not withdraw from the Palestinian lands captured in the 1967 war in exchange for regional peace. Instead, Israel would reshape the Middle East to its liking. Crucially, the strategy envisioned the US as the main force to achieve these aims—waging wars in the region to dismantle governments opposed to Israel’s dominance over Palestine. The US was called upon to fight wars on Israel’s behalf.
The Clean Break strategy was effectively carried out by the US and Israel after 9/11. As NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark revealed, soon after 9/11, the US planned to “attack and destroy the governments in seven countries in five years—starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.”
The first of the wars, in early 2003, was to topple the Iraqi government. Plans for further wars were delayed as the US became mired in Iraq. Still, the US supported Sudan’s split in 2005, Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 2006, and Ethiopia’s incursion into Somalia that same year. In 2011, the Obama administration launched CIA operation Timber Sycamore against Syria and, with the UK and France, overthrew Libya’s government through a 2011 bombing campaign. Today, these countries lie in ruins, and many are now embroiled in civil wars.
Netanyahu was a cheerleader of these wars of choice–either in public or behind the scenes–together with his neocon allies in the U.S. Government including Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, Victoria Nuland, Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, Richard Perle, Elliott Abrams, and others.
As he explained, war with Iran was intended to be the final phase of this roadmap to Greater Israel. “In September 2023, Netanyahu presented at the UN General Assembly a map of the ‘New Middle East’ completely erasing a Palestinian state. In September 2024, he elaborated on this plan by showing two maps: one part of the Middle East a ‘blessing,’ and the other–including Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Iran–a curse, as he advocated regime change in the latter countries. Israel’s war on Iran is the final move in a decades-old strategy. We are witnessing the culmination of decades of extremist Zionist manipulation of US foreign policy.”
The Zionists and Neo-Cons believed that by destroying Iran, it would cut off support to resistance groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah and Ansar Allah, destroy the axis of resistance and create an American/Israeli dominated Middle East, and Israeli expansion into Gaza, the West Bank, Syria and Lebanon.
Daniel Levy, former Israeli negotiator explaining why Benjamin Netanyahu so desperately wanted a U.S. war with Iran, explained, “Israel sees us in an era of what I would call a Pax Greater Israel. This is about how far Israel can extend its dominion, how much of a hard-power, dominant hegemon it can be in the region, seizing parts of Syria or of Lebanon, trying to finish an eradicationist approach to the Palestinians. And crucially, to do that, you have to weaken Iran militarily, to remove some kind of deterrent. You can only do that with the U.S., so you need to pull the U.S. into this war. If that means further accelerating American decline and even accelerating Israel’s loss of support in America, then it’s a price to pay. It’s kind of ‘use it or lose it,’ because those things are happening anyway.”
He added, “that’s what Netanyahu is trying to achieve, to achieve Greater Israel, domination in the region, including the weakening of the Gulf, which is intentional, at the expense of America bleeding further reputational, political, economic assets in this war”.
This was outright admitted by Lindsay Graham, the neoconservative South Carolina senator who was a key architect of the war, who reportedly “spoke with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, coaching him on how to lobby the president for action” in Iran.
The real goal of the Iran war was laid out by Graham at the Zionist Tzedek conference, who said referring to war with Iran, “If we can pull this off, it would be the biggest change in the Mid East in a thousand years: Hamas, Hezbollah gone, the Houthis gone, the Iranian people an ally not an enemy, the Arab world moving towards Israel without fear, Saudi-Israel normalize, no more October the 7th”.
In other words, the Zionists and Neo-cons believed that if Iran was destroyed, it would therefore destroy Hamas, Hezbollah and Ansar Allah (Houthis) and pave the way for Arab states to normalise with Israel, isolating the Palestinians and paving the way for unopposed Israeli expansion.
But contrary to the hopes of Israel and its allies in the U.S. like Lindsay Graham, the U.S. did not “pull this off”, failing to destroy Iran or do regime change, eventually being forced to sign a deal after Iranian victory.
But for Israel and its American lobbyists, this is a nightmare; the lynchpin of their Greater Israel Project has now become a fantasy.
Along with pushing back the Greater Israel Project, Iran has successfully created a rift between Israel and its main patron, the United States.
Responding to reports that Israel was , angry with the Trump administration over signing the deal, Vice President JD Vance said, Trump was, “the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time” adding, “The problem for Israel is not Donald J. Trump and anybody in Israel who thinks their biggest problem is the President of the United States needs to wake up and smell the reality of the situation that the country is in”.
Trump similarly lashed out at Israel before signing the deal, saying, “If it weren’t for the United States of America, with me… Israel would not exist right now. Israel would have been blown off the face of the earth, one hundred percent — and every smart person in Israel knows that.”
Iran has forced the Trump administration to acknowledge that Israel’s plans are delusional, that it is despised by the world and that the only entity in the world propping it up is the Trump administration.
By forcing the U.S. to agree to the MOU, Iran not only defeated the plan to destroy Iran for Greater Israel, but for the first time, created an actual rift between a Trump administration desperate to end the losing war, and Israel, desperate to have their Greater Israel Project plan completed.
Strategic Ambiguity (If We Must)
By Joseph Solis-Mullen | The Libertarian Institute | June 18, 2026
In recent years, critics on both sides of the aisle have taken aim at the longstanding policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan. They argue that Washington should abandon ambiguity and embrace “strategic clarity,” explicitly pledging to fight China over Taiwan. Others, such as Hoover Institute Fellow Eyck Freymann, have offered more sophisticated sounding alternatives like “structured ambiguity,” attempting to codify precisely what America would and would not do in various contingencies, particularly involving gray zone activities.
But abandoning a long-established policy that, whatever its faults, has prevented a major war between great powers for over half a century, in favor of a new policy, would be a serious mistake.
To understand why, let’s start with strategic ambiguity. Its origins lay in Richard Nixon’s opening to China. Years of increasing Sino-Soviet tensions opened the door to this diplomatic revolution of the early 1970s. With Washington and Beijing both seeing value in balancing against Moscow, efforts at normalizing diplomatic relations between the two began in earnest.
Taiwan was the major sticking point.
The resulting framework for normalization, the only one possible, was a carefully constructed kicking of the can down the road. In the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué, the United States acknowledged that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintained there was but one China and that Taiwan was part of China. Importantly, Washington did not itself endorse Beijing’s sovereignty claim. Instead, it merely acknowledged the Chinese position.
This balancing act became even more delicate in 1979 when the Jimmy Carter administration formally completed the recognition of the People’s Republic of China while severing official diplomatic relations with Taipei. Congress, in response, passed the Taiwan Relations Act, which established an unofficial relationship with the island and authorized the sale of defensive arms.
With the prior mutual defense treaty of 1954 now gone, a new policy evolved: strategic ambiguity.
The genius, if one can use the term, of strategic ambiguity was that it created uncertainty for everyone involved.
Beijing could not know with certainty whether an invasion of Taiwan would provoke American military intervention. Taipei could not know with certainty that Washington would ride to its rescue if it formally declared independence. Both sides therefore had incentives to avoid unilateral changes to the status quo.
The arrangement was intentionally awkward. It was also remarkably successful.
For decades, the Taiwan Strait remained relatively stable. Taiwan developed into a prosperous democracy. China experienced its meteoric economic rise. The United States maintained productive, if often contentious, relations with both. Trade flourished across the strait even as political disagreements persisted.
The policy’s success rested on a simple but often overlooked reality: ambiguity restrained both Beijing and Taipei.
Today, however, a growing chorus in Washington insists that ambiguity itself invites aggression. Drawing heavily on analogies to the war in Ukraine, advocates of strategic clarity argue that the United States should make an explicit commitment to Taiwan’s defense.
The theory is straightforward. If Beijing knows with absolute certainty that America will intervene, deterrence will be strengthened.
The problem is that deterrence is a two-way street.
An explicit American security guarantee could just as easily embolden Taiwanese politicians inclined toward formal independence, believing that the United States had effectively removed the military risks associated with such a declaration. From Beijing’s perspective, strategic clarity might appear less like deterrence than a gradual abandonment of the understandings that have governed Sino-American relations since the 1970s, crossing a clearly delineated “red line” and provoking the very conflict it purported to prevent.
A somewhat more cautious proposal is “structured ambiguity,” which seeks to clarify certain commitments while preserving flexibility elsewhere. Specifically, its advocates hope to eliminate misunderstandings by clearly outlining what actions would precipitate what responses, including gray zone activities, while avoiding the rigidity of strategic clarity vis a vis U.S. military intervention in the event of an unprovoked invasion from the mainland.
But one suspects that this is merely ambiguity with additional paperwork, and a landscape filled with potential tripwires and chances for uncontrollable escalation.
For one of the central problems of diplomacy is that it is to a great extent a contest of perceptions. The more policymakers attempt to specify precisely where every line is drawn, the more opportunities arise for those lines to be tested.
A more restrained foreign policy would seek to reduce the risk of entanglement rather than refine the conditions under which American forces might eventually be committed to war.
Of course, from the non-interventionist perspective the entire debate is misguided. The United States has no treaty obligation to defend Taiwan—and needs none. American taxpayers have little interest in another potentially catastrophic conflict halfway around the globe; the American and world economy has everything to lose from such a confrontation; and there is little reason to think Washington would “win” such a conflict 90 miles from China’s coast in any event.
Unfortunately, that option receives little consideration in establishment circles. The debate instead centers on how Washington can more effectively manage a rivalry with Beijing while maintaining its existing commitments.
If those are the available choices, prudence suggests preserving the arrangement that has kept the peace.
Strategic ambiguity is imperfect. It frustrates politicians, pundits, and think tank analysts precisely because it lacks the satisfying certainty of a formal guarantee. But diplomacy is often successful because it leaves room for uncertainty. Not every problem requires a definitive answer. As my undergraduate professor used to say, paraphrasing Bismarck: diplomacy is the art of the possible.
The greatest danger to peace in the Taiwan Strait at this point may not be ambiguity itself but the temptation in Washington to move beyond it. History is filled with policymakers who believed they could engineer a more stable international order through greater precision and firmer commitments.
History is also filled with the unintended consequences of those efforts.
Syria ‘unwilling, unprepared’ to attack Lebanon despite US pressure: Report
Damascus is reportedly prepared to reconsider its position if Tel Aviv were to withdraw its occupation troops from Syria
The Cradle | June 17, 2026
Syrian President and former Al-Qaeda chief Ahmad al-Sharaa is “unprepared and unwilling” to launch a military offensive against Lebanon despite growing US pressure, Israel’s Broadcasting Corporation (KAN) reported on 16 June.
KAN cited an informed Syrian source who said that Sharaa is “concerned” that an attack by Damascus against Hezbollah will be seen across the region as “serving” Israel’s interests.
This could negatively impact Damascus’s “legitimacy.”
For now, the self-appointed Syrian president is ruling out an attack against Lebanon and its resistance forces unless Israel decides to pull its forces out of Syria, the report states.
Israel has rejected withdrawal from both Syria and Lebanon.
KAN also said that Turkiye – a longtime backer of Sharaa since his days as Abu Muhammad al-Julani, founder and leader of Al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front – has urged Damascus against such an incursion.
Ankara is reportedly concerned that a Syrian assault on Lebanon would “embolden” Tel Aviv and “strengthen” its position.
“Trump proposed a framework in which the Syrian military would play a central role in a future effort to disarm Hezbollah,” i24 reported on Wednesday.
Lebanese authorities reportedly felt uneasy about the idea during recent US-backed direct talks with Israeli officials, which have taken place despite Lebanon’s legal restrictions.
Additionally, Israeli authorities are reportedly concerned about the effectiveness of a Syrian attack on Hezbollah.
“Some of the arrangements currently under discussion could ultimately strengthen Hezbollah politically and militarily rather than diminish its influence,” i24 reported.
Sharaa said earlier this week that talk of a Syrian incursion into Lebanon was a “rumor.” “Syria’s approach aims to end the war in Lebanon, not to expand it or get involved,” he stressed.
US President Donald Trump has repeatedly called on Syria to attack Hezbollah.
Iraqi resistance groups allied with Hezbollah have cautioned the Syrian government and its forces that they will act if Damascus initiates an attack on Lebanon.
Syria experienced a significant geopolitical change following the fall of former President Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, as Sharaa’s government aligned with Washington and engaged in discussions with Israel.
The US has largely lifted sanctions on Syria and called Damascus a “partner” in the global fight against ISIS — overlooking Sharaa’s past as an Al-Qaeda leader and earlier as deputy to ISIS founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
Hezbollah fought in Syria for years with the former government, helping recapture areas from extremist groups like Al-Qaeda’s Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and others considered by the west as the “Syrian opposition.”
The Nusra Front, led by Sharaa, was rebranded into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and ended up toppling Assad’s government in 2024.
HTS and other extremist factions with links to ISIS currently dominate what has become the new Syrian Defense Ministry and military.
Tom Barrack, US special envoy to Syria and Iraq, threatened Lebanon last year with a Syrian incursion, and said Damascus would “actively assist us in confronting and dismantling … Hezbollah.”
He also said Syria viewed Lebanon as its “beach resort” and would carry out an assault against the country unless Hezbollah is disarmed.
The final war or final deal: Why the MoU?
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | June 18, 2026
The Israeli-US plot to inflict “regime change” upon Iran has been turned into a strategic failure of historic proportions – in the end, Washington and Tel Aviv were forced to confront the reality. The newly signed Memorandum of Understanding is either a gateway to a final deal or simply another strategy to buy time.
Forty days of all-out war, followed by two months of dead-end negotiations, led to two final options: Submit to a deal that works heavily in Iran’s favour or keep on fighting until the end. What ultimately comes of this equation will completely reshape West Asia and perhaps geopolitics globally.
US President Donald Trump had tried every single avenue to pressure the Islamic Republic of Iran into surrender. He suddenly found himself in a new phase where the walls were closing in and decided to make a diplomatic move. The Iranians managed to reunite their allied fronts across the region, taking de facto ownership of the Strait of Hormuz, while proving they can fight the world’s top military superpower to a standstill.
If you were to listen to the rhetoric coming from the White House, it was like hearing a radio broadcast from a parallel universe. According to Trump, Iran was defeated all the way back in March, its military is destroyed, nobody knows who is running the country, it has no air defenses, no missiles left, no navy, and is on the verge of collapse. But quite frankly, nobody bought his nonsensical ramblings.
Beneath the egotistical exterior is a system that was running out of gas and whose operator was in panic.
In order to accurately assess the situation, we have to factor in precisely why the US leader is managing this war so incredibly poorly. The Trump administration is not composed of competent and experienced individuals; it’s a who’s who of Israeli Lobby shills and hardline ideological fanatics – a tech billionaire’s dream administration. While the Israeli Lobby and other lobby groups have for long had sway over American presidents and foreign policy, it has never been this severe.
Donald Trump exemplifies this through his total incompetence and constant inability to say no to the Israelis when it matters the most. There is, after all, a reason why no other US president agreed to go to war with the Islamic Republic upon the request of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, even when Iran was far less prepared for it militarily.
Finding out the hard way, the US president found himself caught in a quagmire– if he escalated the war, then the entire region would go up in flames, but if he backed out, he would face the wrath of the same billionaire class that put him in power to begin with.
The Zionist regime can’t defeat the Iranians alone, nor does it believe that the US will defeat Tehran conventionally. Yet, the Israeli leadership does not want to give up, for if they fail, then the Iranians will become the dominant regional power and the “Greater Israel Project” will not be able to succeed.
Therefore, they are only really left with two actual options, both involving the United States: The first is a fight to the death that could go so far that nuclear weapons become involved; the second is a large-scale attack on Iranian infrastructure.
The second option is more likely to be favoured by the Israelis than the first, and its goal will be to continue battering Iranian civilian infrastructure until the Israelis can’t take the punishment coming back its way any longer. For the US, this would represent a catastrophe, because the Iranians have long pledged to wipe out the entire region’s oil and gas infrastructure, even going after water desalination and power plants if it comes down to it.
For Washington, this means their Gulf allies will be destroyed. Keep in mind that the Trump administration previously bragged about the alleged Trillion that the Gulf Arab States had pledged to invest in the United States. All of that is gone overnight, and a global economic meltdown would be underway. Trump personally has a lot of investments in the Gulf, which means sacrificing this too.
The Israelis, on the other hand, want the Arab Gulf States weakened. This is for the very same reason they threaten Turkiye constantly – they do not want any potential competitors. Tel Aviv doesn’t even like other regional nations, who are their allies, to get the latest US fighter jets. So, the hypothetical annihilation of rich Gulf States doesn’t likely bother them at all.
As long as the primary goal is achieved, they will be happy. They want a weakened and battered Iran, an Islamic Republic that is susceptible to future color revolutions, one that can no longer impose deterrence equations. But the Americans were facing an economic tidal wave and had no good options in front of them.
If a deal is signed on the terms of the Iranians as a result of the MoU, the Israelis have been strategically defeated. The war that began on October 7, 2023, would have been completely lost for them, and they will only have two options available to them: try to linger on and delay the inevitable implosion of their expansionist project, or sign a deal with the Palestinians in order to allow for a State of Palestine to come into existence. Realistically, the so-called “Two-State solution” is their only hope of long-term survival. All of this assumes they won’t simply blow the deal up before it can come to fruition.
Iran declares victory over US
RT | June 18, 2026
Iranian officials have portrayed the newly signed memorandum of understanding with the US as a diplomatic victory achieved through strength and as evidence that Washington failed to achieve any of its objectives militarily.
The 14-point document was signed remotely by President Donald Trump and his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, late Wednesday and immediately entered force, according to the Pakistani mediators.
The US side has been unusually muted in its public response. The White House has also yet to publish the final text of the memorandum, although an unnamed senior US official read out the 14-point document to journalists after days of criticism over the secrecy surrounding the deal.
Meanwhile, Iran’s parliament speaker and chief negotiator in the talks, Mohammad Ghalibaf, described the memorandum as proof of US surrender.
“The agreement is a record of US failure,” Ghalibaf said in a televised interview on Wednesday. “People will see it and judge.”
Tehran has argued that the document reflects a series of concessions by Washington, including the lifting of the US naval blockade, sanctions waivers for Iranian oil exports, access to frozen Iranian funds, and a US-backed economic reconstruction plan worth at least $300 billion. Washington has also agreed not to impose new sanctions or deploy additional forces in the region while the sides negotiate a final agreement.
In response, Iran “will make arrangements” to restore freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz – something that had not been an issue before the US-Israeli attack. However, Tehran has signaled that the key waterway will not simply return to prewar conditions.
“I emphasize again that the Strait of Hormuz will never return to the previous conditions,” Ghalibaf said. “Iran has the right to sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, and of course, we will receive a fee for services.”
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei added that a framework was being developed to manage the key waterway, with consultations already held with Oman, as outlined in the MOU.
Tehran has also highlighted the memorandum’s language on Lebanon. “If the Israeli regime’s attacks on Lebanon continue, it will be considered a violation of the other party’s commitments under the memorandum of understanding,” Baghaei said.
The memorandum is not a final peace agreement, but launches a 60-day negotiation period during which Washington and Tehran are expected to discuss Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief, frozen assets, the future administration of the Strait of Hormuz, and a final settlement to be endorsed by the UN Security Council.
The nuclear language in the document states that Iran “reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons” – something Tehran has been stating for years, including during both previous US-Israeli attacks. The MOU adds that the sides will work out a mechanism for the disposition of stockpiled enriched material, with the minimum methodology being down-blending on site under IAEA supervision.
Trump made multiple unrelated posts on Truth Social hours after signing but said nothing about the deal. Earlier in the day, he defended the memorandum, threatening to “bomb the hell out of” Iran if it failed to comply.
Iran reveals full text of war-ending MoU signed with US
Al Mayadeen | June 18, 2026
Iran and the United States have signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) aimed at launching expanded negotiations and ending the war across all fronts in the region.
The text of the agreement, published by Tasnim News Agency, outlines a framework for a permanent cessation of hostilities, sanctions relief, maritime security arrangements, nuclear negotiations, and a roadmap toward a final agreement to be concluded within 60 days.
The full text of the Iran-US MoU
Below is the full text of the MoU as reported by Tasnim News Agency :
Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding between the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran
- The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran and their allies in the current war by signing this MoU, declare the immediate and permanent termination of military operations on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and undertake from now on not to initiate any war or any military operation against each other, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against each other, and ensuring the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Lebanon. Final deal will confirm the permanent termination of the war on all fronts, including in Lebanon, and other provisions of this paragraph.
- The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran undertake to respect each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and to refrain from interfering in each other’s internal affairs.
- The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran commit to negotiating and achieving the final deal in maximum 60 days, extendable with mutual consent.
- Immediately upon the signing of this MoU, the United States of America will begin the removal of its naval blockade and any disturbances or impediments against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and will fully end the naval blockade within 30 days. During this period, the traffic of vessels will be in proportion to the numbers of pre-war traffic being restored by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America further undertakes to remove its forces from the proximity of the Islamic Republic of Iran within 30 days after the final deal.
- Upon the signing of this MoU, the Islamic Republic of Iran will make arrangements using its best efforts for the safe passage of commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days only from the Persian Gulf to the Sea of Oman and vice versa. The traffic of commercial vessels will immediately start, and considering the need for removing the technical and military obstacles and demining by the Islamic Republic of Iran, will be instated within 30 days. The Islamic Republic of Iran will conduct dialogue with the Sultanate of Oman to define the future administration and maritime services in the Strait of Hormuz in discussion with other Persian Gulf littoral states in line with the applicable international law and the sovereign rights of coastal states of the Strait of Hormuz.
- The United States of America undertakes with regional partners to develop a definitive, mutually agreed plan with at least $300 billion for the reconstruction and economic development of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The mechanism for the implementation of this plan will be finalized as part of a final deal within 60 days. All required licenses, waivers and permissions needed for the relevant financial transactions will be granted by the United States of America.
- The United States of America undertakes to terminate all types of sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, including the United Nations Security Council resolutions, i.e. IAEA Board of Governors resolutions and all unilateral US sanctions, primary and secondary, in an agreed-upon schedule as part of the final deal. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America acknowledge the critical importance of the sanctions-termination issue abovementioned, and expressed their intentions to immediately address these issues in the negotiations, in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
- The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms that it shall not procure or develop nuclear weapons. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran have agreed to resolve the disposition of stockpiled enriched material, pursuant to a mechanism that will be mutually agreed upon in accordance with the schedule mentioned in Paragraph Seven, with the minimum methodology to be downblending on site under the supervision of the IAEA. The two parties also agreed to discuss the issue of enrichment and other mutually agreed matters related to the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear needs based on a satisfactory framework being agreed upon in the final deal. The final deal will confirm the provisions of this paragraph. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran acknowledge the critical importance of the nuclear issues abovementioned and express their intention to immediately address these issues in the negotiations in order to achieve mutual agreement on them.
- Pending the final deal, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree to maintain the status quo. The Islamic Republic of Iran will maintain the current status quo of its nuclear program, and the United States of America will not impose any new sanctions and will not deploy additional forces in the region.
- The United States of America undertakes that immediately upon the signing of this MoU until the termination of sanctions, the US Department of Treasury will issue waivers for the export of Iranian crude oil, petroleum products and derivatives, and all associated services, including banking transactions, insurances, transportation, etc.
- The United States of America undertakes to make fully available for use the frozen or restricted funds and assets of the Islamic Republic of Iran upon the implementation of this MoU. The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will mutually agree on the procedures related to the release of these funds during the negotiations. Such funds, either retained in the original account or transferred, shall be made fully usable for payment to any ultimate beneficiary designated by the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The United States of America undertakes to issue all necessary licenses and authorizations accordingly.
- The United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran agree that an executive mechanism will be established to monitor the successful implementation of this MoU and the future compliance of the final deal.
- After signing this MoU and subject to the beginning of the implementation of Paragraphs 1, 4, 5, 10 and 11 of this MoU and the continuing implementation of these measures, the United States of America and the Islamic Republic of Iran will start negotiations regarding the final deal exclusively on the other paragraphs.
- The final deal will be endorsed by a binding UN Security Council resolution.
US, EU authorize production of ‘deep strike’ missiles inside Ukraine
Western allies are using the diplomatic progress from a possible Iran peace deal to intensify an economic blockade against Russia
The Cradle | June 17, 2026
On 17 June, G7 leaders announced that US and EU arms makers will start manufacturing advanced long-range weaponry “under license” in Ukraine, as western stockpiles dwindle, aiming to industrialize the frontline and sustain pressure on Russia.
A diplomatic source at the summit in Evian-les-Bains clarified that the push involves “not just air defense systems, but deep strike capabilities,” allowing Ukraine to threaten targets much deeper into Russian territory, Le Parisien reported.
The official noted that local production is essential as Ukrainian forces currently deploy approximately 20 Patriot missiles to counter every massive Russian offensive, straining global stocks.
The move effectively entrenches a permanent industrial infrastructure for offensive warfare capabilities within Ukrainian territory.
In a joint statement, G7 leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, and the EU expressed their “readiness to grant Ukraine licenses enabling it to increase its military production.”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz explained that US firms will grant these licenses to European and Ukrainian manufacturers to address current industrial shortages.
Merz stated he was “grateful to [US] President [Donald] Trump for this great willingness to cooperate,” adding, “We are all currently producing too little, and this can be compensated for by granting licenses to companies that have these production capacities, including European and Ukrainian companies.”
This military support coincides with a G7 agreement to escalate economic pressure on Moscow by tightening sanctions on the Russian oil and gas sectors, with leaders citing the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz following the Iran–US memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the catalyst for these measures.
“We consider this the right moment to proceed with additional measures, as President Trump has delivered a deal that we support in reopening the Strait of Hormuz,” the leaders declared.
The move follows the US reinstatement on Tuesday of oil sanctions that had been temporarily suspended during the war on Iran, which now may end with the signing of the MoU on Friday in Switzerland.
The summit highlighted a shift in US foreign policy. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described the new US stance as “harder toward Russia and more realistic, in our view, of the situation on the ground of the war.”
Trump, who told assembled leaders “I’m the boss,” pledged to “do everything” to help end the conflict.
While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed the “important results” regarding the military contracts, he remained cautious following a February 2025 meeting with US Vice President JD Vance and a demand that Ukraine provide resources as “compensation” for aid.
French diplomatic sources added that G7 members now “acknowledge that there is momentum on the ground” in Ukraine’s favor.
The new western military push comes after the EU had approved an approximately $105 billion loan for Ukraine on 22 April to fund critical defense needs and financial assistance.
The funding was released following a months-long deadlock after Ukraine resumed Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia.
Hungary had vetoed the loan, accusing Kiev of using “technical repairs” from a drone strike as a pretext to weaponize energy and exert political pressure.
