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Black Sea and three musketeers

BY M. K. BHADRAKUMAR | INDIAN PUNCHLINE | JULY 26, 2022 

As the conflict in Ukraine slouches toward Odessa, the war gets elevated to the sphere of a romantic adventure. If Alexander Dumas was alive, the idea might have struck him to write a sequel to his Three Musketeers, the historical novel written in 1844, which has heroic, chivalrous swordsmen who fight for justice, highlighting the absurdities of the Ancient Régime in a setting when the debate in France between republicans and monarchists was still fierce. 

The absurdity of raking up a non-existent controversy over the Russian missile strike on Odessa on Friday casts Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the second time in a lead role with three swashbuckling musketeers —  US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, UN Secretary-General António Guterres and EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell. 

The first time was when Zelensky acted in a Russian musical film based on Dumas’ novel, with three beautiful Soviet actresses — Anna Ardova, Ruslana Pysanka and Alyona Sviridova — as musketeers, which was released in Moscow on New Year’s Eve in 2004.  

Coming back to time present, on Friday, it was a controversy waiting to happen when Russia fired four high precision Kalibr missiles and destroyed Ukrainian military infrastructure in Odessa Port just a day after the Russia-Ukraine grain deal was signed in Istanbul, which provides for the resumption of grain exports from the region. 

Zelensky promptly shouted that the missile strike was a “barbaric” act. And  Blinken came on the line to level charges against Russia; Guterres jumped into the fray “unequivocally” condemning the Russian strike; and, Borrell lazily wrote on Tweeter that the missile strike was “particularly reprehensible & again demonstrates Russia’s total disregard for international law & commitments.” 

As for the Russians, well, they slept over it — that is, until Sunday, when late in the afternoon, the Defence Ministry in Moscow inserted two tersely-worded sentences into its customary daily bulletin on the day’s operations in Ukraine:  

“Attack launched by high-precision long-range sea-based missiles has resulted in the elimination of Ukrainian military ship and a depot of Harpoon anti-ship missiles delivered by USA to the Kiev regime in the seaport of Odessa. The list of neutralised targets also includes the production facilities of an entity specialised in repairing and modernising the fleet of Ukrainian Navy.” 

Zelensky soon issued a clarification that the implementation of the grain deal from Odessa Port was not in doubt. Apparently, he hadn’t coordinated with the three musketeers sitting elsewhere who reacted prematurely. Blinken probably did the logical thing by distracting attention from the corruption concerns being revived in the Beltway regarding America’s gravy train to Ukraine. 

Fundamentally, the grain deal is an eyesore for the Biden administration, which in the first instance never expected an agreement could be negotiated that requires great flexibility on the Russian military’s side. Even more galling is that the deal is turning out to be a political victory for Russia. 

Moscow is getting good publicity over its pragmatism to lift its naval blockade for addressing the global food crisis. But  what is not obvious to most people is that the grain deal is also a back-to-back deal which commits the UN to get the restrictions being put by the EU and the US on Russia’s grain and fertiliser exports lifted. 

Besides, apart from the big income out of grain and fertiliser exports, there is that unquantifiable goodwill that Moscow earns from so many countries which critically depend on Russian wheat, especially in West Asia and Africa. Evidently, the itch to spoil the party in Moscow was found irresistible by Blinken & Co.  

Enter Sergey Lavrov. From Oyo, Republic of the Congo, deep in the heart of Africa, where he was travelling to follow up on the grain deal — Russia is the number 1 grain supplier to Africa — Foreign Minister Lavrov sensed immense potentials in the emergent situation. Lavrov made three points while flying out of Oyo in the direction of Kampala: 

  • The grain deal contains nothing “to bar us from continuing the special military operation and hit military infrastructure and other military targets. And the United Nations secretariat representatives… confirmed this interpretation of the documents yesterday.” (Guterres was apparently unaware.) 
  • The missile strike was aimed at “a separate part of the Odessa port, the so-called military part” and, therefore, “there are no obstacles for shipping grain to contractors under the Istanbul agreements and we have created none.” (Indeed, Zelensky himself is acknowledging it.) 
  • The missile strike was aimed at the depot where the Pentagon’s Harpoon anti-ship missiles were stored. “These missiles were delivered to pose threats to the Russian Black Sea Fleet. Now, they pose no threats.”

What Lavrov didn’t say but would have implied is that the Odessa war theatre has now become “kinetic” and Friday’s attack sets a precedent. The missile strike underscores that Moscow likely anticipated Pentagon’s antics to use the grain deal to shield its deployment of advanced Harpoon missiles in Odessa Port. 

Curiously, off Bulgaria, next door to Odessa, on July 14-25, the US took part in a multinational maritime exercise, Breeze 2022,  involving 24 warships, cutters, auxiliary vessels, five planes, and four helicopters manned by 1,390 naval personnel from eleven NATO member countries!  

The controversy over the missile strike highlights that Russia’s special military operations in Ukraine will remain incomplete and inconclusive until Moscow altogether cuts off the US’ and NATO’s access to Odessa Port and cripples the alliance’s capability in the Black Sea. Obviously, that’s still some way off. 

Meanwhile, the great game is accelerating in the Black Sea with Blinken doubling down to woo Azerbaijan. He spoke with President Aliyev on Monday to press Washington’s pending offer “in helping facilitate the opening of regional transportation and communication linkages.” Azerbaijan is the chosen bridgehead for NATO in southern Caucasus. (See my blog Ukraine’s Great Game surfaces in Transcaucasia.)

July 26, 2022 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , | Leave a comment

Romania and US to Hold Military Drills Near Ukrainian Border

Samizdat – 26.07.2022

CHISINAU – US troops stationed in Romania and the Romanian army will hold a joint demonstration exercise and an exhibition of military equipment at a location 125 miles south of the Ukrainian border on July 30, the Romanian defense ministry said on Tuesday.

“Members of the 2nd brigade of the combat group of the 101st US Airborne Division, stationed in Romania in accordance with the decisions of the Madrid Summit, will conduct demonstration exercises together with the soldiers of the 9th mechanized brigade ‘Marasesti,'” the ministry’s statement read.

The drills will take place at the Mihail Kogalniceanu military base in southeastern Romania, situated 200 kilometers (125 miles) from the border with Ukraine. Romania Chief of General Staff Daniel Petrescu and 101st US Airborne Division commander Joseph McGee will be present at the exercise.

Additionally, an exhibition of equipment will be organized, which will feature attack helicopters, tanks, armored amphibious transporters and artillery and anti-aircraft artillery machines, as well as special engineering and first aid equipment.

July 26, 2022 Posted by | Militarism | , | Leave a comment

New bill aims to make digital ID pervasive in the United States

By Ken Macon | Reclaim The Net | July 25, 2022

Rep. Bill Foster (D-IL) has reintroduced the “Improving Digital Identity Act,” a bipartisan bill that would increase the federal government’s involvement in the digital identity ecosystem. The bill is set to be approved by the House Committee on Oversight and Reform.

We obtained a copy of the bill for you here.

The bill seeks to require the federal government to use its authority to help citizens “prove who they are online” through the provision of optional ID validation services, which “augment private sector digital identity and authentication solutions.”

The bill would also require the creation of a task force on digital identity and a grant program at the DHS to support the development of interoperable identity verification systems at the local and state levels.

Expressing her support for the bill, Committee Chair Rep. Carolyn Maloney (D-NY) said, “a secure digital identity infrastructure is an essential foundation to American economic and national security.”

However, the committee’s ranking Republican Rep. James Comer (R-KY) opposed the grant program provision in the bill and the timeline of the bill (the task force has three years to release a final report.)

“Improved and expanded digital identity technologies may well play an important role in reducing fraud, but this bill would only give the appearance of action,” he said.

A similar bill was introduced in the Senate by Sens. Cynthia Lummis (R-WY) and Krysten Sinema (D-AZ).

In a press release, Lummis said that “it doesn’t make sense that Americans have to constantly overshare sensitive identity information with government agencies and businesses, which are honeypots all too often targeted by hackers and identity thieves.”

The bill in the Senate has a few differences from the original one introduced in the House. The one in the Senate insists that access to digital ID verification should be equitable.

“The effectiveness of existing government digital identity approaches presents causes for concern, particularly with the use of facial recognition technology in federal, state and local government contacts with private sector companies,” said Maloney.

July 25, 2022 Posted by | Civil Liberties | | Leave a comment

The Fake China Threat and Its Very Real Danger

By Joseph Solis-Mullen | The Libertarian Institute | July 25, 2022

From the front pages of The Washington Post and Wall Street Journal, Foreign Affairs, the Economist, to The New York Times’ Best Sellers List; from CNN and MSNBC to FOX and NEWSMAX; from think tanks to Pentagon planners, congressional testimonies and White House statements: CHINA! So singularly focused and omnipresent has the narrative of the China Threat become, one can be forgiven for forgetting that China is in fact a middle income country of modest capabilities and with no stated intention of doing any harm to Americans or the United States. Further, that China is not bent on world domination; and further still, as shall be clearly demonstrated, even if it secretly were there is a negligible chance of that coming to pass whatever Beijing’s efforts.

The reasons for this are many. From China’s own internal problems, including a lack of critical resources, dependence on external markets, lopsided demography, combative ethnic minorities, resentful elites, ongoing economic slowdown, and possible economic collapse—to China’s daunting external problems, including its lengthy borders and limited access to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, to the number of neighboring states that are either uneasy about an increasingly powerful China or seeking to outright counter or otherwise impede its rise. These include India, Japan, Australia, South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia. This is to say nothing of Taiwan, officially recognized by both the United Nations and Washington as a breakaway region of China, and which stands as the most serious point of transitional friction at present.

While China is growing more relatively powerful, much of the very real danger that exists in the region stems from attempts by its aforementioned neighbors to balance against a more assertive Beijing—which, as it has grown more relatively powerful, has begun to press its own interests more forcefully in dealing with its neighbors, as well as with more distant powers such as the United States. The latter is particularly important. For while planners in Beijing believe the gravitational pull of its enormous and still growing economy will eventually allow it to get what it wants from its neighbors, the United States stands alone as the one country that cannot be bought off or bullied in this way. Further, as will be detailed, much of China’s newfound assertiveness stems directly from the increased sense of threat it feels vis a vis the United States.

It is in its attempts to push back against the United States that Beijing has ultimately wound up thoroughly alarming many of its neighbors, prompting the formation of a still growing balancing coalition. Therefore, before detailing the myriad reasons China won’t be taking over the world, or even enjoying regional hegemony, and why Washington should be pursuing a policy of restraint in dealing with China, it is first necessary to appreciate the extent to which the United States has been involved for over a century in meddling in domestic Chinese affairs, and to understand how Washington’s broader policies toward China have negatively shaped Chinese perceptions of the United States and its intentions toward China; and further, how it is these actions that have created what few real dangers exist.

Western interventions in domestic Chinese affairs began in earnest in 1842, when the British Empire forced open the country following the end of the First Opium War. Access to trade, immunity for its nationals from Chinese law, and entry of Christian missionaries were forced on a faltering Qing dynasty. While it officially protested, successive U.S. administrations insisted on the same privileges for itself and its merchants as the other European empires. This was the so-called “open door” policy. Bostonian merchants in particular made good trade running Ottoman opium to China. The Second Opium War, which broke out in 1856, actually featured American forces fighting alongside the British at the battles of the Barrier and Taku Forts. Such U.S. military assistance to the European empires in their depredations of China would continue, helping to put down the Boxer Rebellion at the turn of the century, occupying Peking and extracting a large indemnity for itself.

With the fall of the Qing dynasty and the birth of the Republic of China (1912), there was hope on both the Chinese right and left that U.S. policy toward China might change. But despite having initially signaled support for the restoration of at least the German-occupied parts of China to the young Republican government in exchange for their dispatch of hundreds of thousands of Chinese laborers to assist the Allied war effort on the Western front, at Versailles President Woodrow Wilson abandoned the idealism of his vaunted Fourteen Points, instead granting the former German Imperial holdings to the Japanese. A nominal wartime ally, the rapidly expanding Japanese Empire had opportunistically occupied German possessions in Asia once hostilities in Europe commenced, and Wilson used the recognition of Tokyo’s claims as leverage to buy Japanese involvement in his League of Nations project.

As for fledgling Republican China’s other petitions, that the unequal treaties imposed following the Opium Wars be abolished and control of its revenue collection returned to Chinese authorities, these too were denied. This led a young Mao Zedong, formerly a rabid Wilsonian, to call the Americans “a bunch of robbers who only cynically champion self-determination.”1

The disillusion with America and its purported idealism continued into the 1920s, with Warren Harding’s administration declining to recognize the uneasy, cobbled together coalition of republican and communist forces under the loose leadership of Sun Yat-sen, opting instead to recognize a series of feuding warlords who happened to seize control of the capital, Peking.2

It was only with the defeat of the warlords and the subsequent split between the Chinese right and left, precipitated by the former under the new leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, that the familiar Cold War and present day alignments began to take shape—with Moscow and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on one side and Washington and the ROC on the other. The latter was particularly slow in developing, however, with the depression distracting and the American public disillusioned by the apparently pointless deaths of over 100,000 Americans in World War I. Content to let the warring Chinese and Japanese bleed one another through the 1930s and early 1940s, it wasn’t until near the conclusion of the U.S. Pacific theater campaign against the Japanese that real aid started to flow to the corrupt, ineffectual, and dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek and his nominally republican forces. Though the aid would continue in the years immediately following the Japanese surrender, it was clear, particularly to George Marshall, who visited China to encourage a reconciliation between the Kuomintang and the CCP, that good money was being thrown after bad.

With the triumph of the CCP in 1949, the so-called “loss of China,” and the retreat Chiang Kai-shek and his followers to the fortress island of Formosa (Taiwan), successive U.S. administrations beginning with Harry Truman effectively prevented the conclusion of the decades long Chinese Civil War by using American naval power to defend the Taiwan Straits, and further refused to recognize the communist government now in place in Beijing. These policies continued with little change over the following two decades, and included hot conflict between the two in Korea (1950-53), as well as proxy conflict in Vietnam (1955-75).

That is until President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger recognized that the apparently monolithic communist front in Eurasia was in fact split along sharply nationalist lines, with the Chinese refusing to follow Moscow’s directives by the late 1950s and openly competing for influence in the Third World by the mid-1960s. Nixon’s secret trip to Beijing, and the Three Communiques that followed, formed the basis for the eventual normalization of relations and the recognition of the Chinese Communist Party’s legitimacy by Jimmy Carter in 1978. The communiques were focused exclusively on U.S. respect for China’s sovereignty, and required the U.S. to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan, eliminate its military treaty with Taipei, and agree not to station U.S. forces on the island—now officially recognized by Washington, as well as the U.N., as part of China. While Beijing never renounced the potential use of force in the event that Taiwan ever declared independence, they were now committed with Washington to try to work with Taipei to bring about peaceful reunification.

Nixon’s opening to China had been premised on the idea of using Beijing to balance against the Soviet Union, a strategy followed by each of his successors all the way to the end of the first Cold War approximately a decade and a half later. With the death of Mao and the ensuing struggle for power having been won by the reformer Deng Xiaoping, China gradually opened up to foreign trade and investment and began to experiment with markets, prices, and private ownership of the means of production. So began the most incredible period of economic development the world has ever witnessed, with a billion Chinese eventually raised from the lowest levels of poverty to the position of an industrialized and rising middle income society by the late 2000s.

In the meantime, however, with the end of the first Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union a few years later, the logic of Nixon and Kissinger’s strategy of using China to balance the Soviet Union no longer held. U.S. policy makers had a new idea, however: integrating China into the U.S. created and dominated global institutional order would make it a “responsible stakeholder,” and with time, as the country grew wealthier and more integrated, would lead to the liberalization and democratization of China.

But this did not happen.

Instead, granting China most favored nation trading status and allowing it into the WTO, despite it never really following the rules, resulted in the loss of millions of American manufacturing jobs at the same time it granted the communists in Beijing legitimacy at home as a provider of material well-being. As China’s economic power increased, so too did its military capabilities. And rather than focusing on aircraft carriers and other power projection capabilities PLA planners instead focused on building up an area denial capability sufficient to deter any potential U.S. intervention in the event of a war between Taipei and Beijing: which the CCP leadership view as the final remnant of China’s “century of humiliations,” the last impediment to the full restoration of Chinese sovereignty.

Though open hostility between the two officially ceased with the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing (they even partnered to punish the Vietnamese for intervening to remove the murderous Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia [1979]), relations between the two were quickly complicated by continued U.S. interference in Chinese domestic affairs. This included congressional sanctions over Tiananmen (1989), to U.S. actions during the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1996), the gradual erosion by Washington of the Three Communiques3, to sanctions on Beijing for its treatment of ethnic minorities, such as the Tibetans and Uighurs.

The sense in Beijing of a China under threat was reflected in its reorientation of military planning in the 1990s, when its attention shifted away from preparing to fight its Eurasian neighbors to focusing first and foremost on a future conflict with the United States in southeast Asia. Again, this was particularly so with respect to Taiwan, which the U.S. never officially ruled out militarily intervening to defend under the tactic of “strategic ambiguity.”4 U.S. interventions in the post-Cold War era, from Iraq to Serbia, increased this sense of urgency for CCP planners. In the case of the first Iraq War, Operation Desert Storm, Washington’s demonstration of the so-called “revolution in military affairs” highlighted the gap between the two in military capabilities; while in Serbia, U.S. willingness to ignore the U.N. and act unilaterally was compounded by its attack on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, which Beijing to this day declines to acknowledge as an innocent error, and which killed multiple Chinese nationals.

But just as Beijing was ramping up its own capabilities, on the back of an ascendent economy resultant from its integration into the global capitalist system, Washington’s apparent “hyperpower” was dealt a series of serious, self-inflicted blows. Beginning with the second Iraq War and the invasion of Afghanistan, the façade of apparent U.S. military invincibility and political will was slowly eroded. At the same time, the illusion of U.S. economic unimpeachability was also shattered, with the Global Financial Crisis incubated in the United States paralyzing Western economies while China’s own less integrated capital markets and rapid fiscal interventions effectively insulated the Chinese economy and acted as a force for global stability during the period of ensuing related crises in Europe and elsewhere. As Washington dithered in the desert and Western economies floundered, the CCP leadership decided it was time to abandon the policy first articulated by Deng and followed by each Chinese leader since, to “hide our capabilities, keep a low profile, and bide our time.” Beijing’s opening moves in this regard began with its assertion of a sphere of influence in its immediate vicinity, not dissimilar, indeed derived directly from, the example of Washington’s own assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. While what Beijing sought was effective control over the waters directly adjoining the country, it prompted an immediate and alarmed response from Washington.

Obama’s 2011 “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia could hardly have been more transparent. While really the CCP was simply seeking to reconcile the difference between its newfound economic and military power with its existing, relatively lowly geopolitical station, in effect becoming what FDR and Truman had envisioned it becoming during the post-World War II period, one of the globe’s “four policeman” responsible for maintaining security and economic stability in its region, Washington, high on unipolarity, immediately set about trying to block China’s attempts at asserting its prerogatives in southeast Asia. Largely dormant since the 1950s, and only half-heartedly pursued since the end of the first Cold War, U.S. policymakers ramped up efforts at alliance building in southeast Asia. At the same time, it overtly sought to undermine attempts by Beijing to build alternative regional institutions to those constructed by the United States during the post-World War II period, such as the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank, while developing new institutional frameworks, like the Trans-Pacific Partnership and Quad, that would exclude Beijing. Along with Washington’s support for organizations advocating separation from China, such as the World Uighur Congress, and the construction of a new Cold War narrative pitting “democracy versus authoritarianism,” the Trump administration, filled with China hawks, made the new U.S. policy of weakening and containing China explicit in a series of documents formulated within a year of his taking the White House.5 This stance, inherited by Biden, has been fully embraced by his new administration.

Without irony, it is the United States, which since the end of the Cold War has invaded multiple countries without UN resolutions, run a secret network of black site torture facilities, helped topple or supported the toppling of multiple governments, and killed millions of civilians via economic warfare and covert drone campaigns, which accuses Beijing of threatening global peace and security. CCP planners now rightly believe that if China is to have its proper place at the table, one commensurate with its hard and soft power capabilities, it will have to fight the United States. While it has achieved a great deal, and may achieve still more, so far as its own dreamiest aspirations and the worst nightmares of Pengtagon planners, the reality is that China’s outlook is severely limited. For all the talk of China’s apparently inevitable rise and route to global domination, a closer look at its internal and external situation leaves significant room for doubt—including about the long-term durability of the Chinese state as presently constituted.

When it comes to China’s power projection capabilities, these doubts can be broken down into five basic categories: geographic impediments, resource constraints, demographic collapse, national cohesion, and economic slowdown.

China’s geography is frankly terrible in terms of potential power projection capability. Internally, it features endless flatlands to the north, abutting deserts and mountains running to the west, with more mountains and dense jungle to the south, while its eastern coast is ringed by states terrified of an expansionist China. And because of its vast population it is seriously strapped for foodstuffs. A shocking statistic: on a per capita basis it has less arable agricultural land than Saudi Arabia, making the fact that it has long been the world’s largest food importer unsurprising. Further, what farmland China does have requires enormous amounts of petrochemical fertilizers and laborers to keep even moderately productive. Further, lacking a confluence of natural and traversable interconnected east-west-flowing waterways, moving mass amounts of produce around internally is expensive and inefficient over the vast distances that locally produced foodstuffs must travel to arrive at the highly populated eastern seaboard provinces. Given these facts, as presently situated China is arguably the most globalization-dependent state on earth.

On pace to become the world’s largest consumer of oil in coming years, surpassing the United States, China itself holds less than 2% of all proven oil reserves. Little wonder the so-called “Malacca and Hormuz Dilemmas,” which could effectively shut down China’s entire economy overnight, have long been a central focus of CCP military planners. While it has plenty of coal (the fourth-most globally according to estimates), the already serious amount of environmental degradation wrought upon China by the CCP’s policy of breakneck industrialization, resulting in regular protests and serious widespread health problems, make use of it difficult to sustain socially and politically. In terms of natural gas, what little China has lies in the culturally distinct Sichuan and Xinjiang provinces, a potential source of myriad problems that may, along with the advanced technologies required to effectively exploit it, explain Beijing’s relative reluctance to embrace its development. Apart from the paucity of high-yield agricultural land, China is also plagued by water scarcity; its solutions, which cost an estimated $100 billion/annually, are causing increased desertification and displacement in the parts of the country from whence water is being diverted. An environmental disaster zone, lacking many of the basic necessities to sustain its enormous population, any serious disruption to the existing globalized order, created and sustained by the United States, would cause hundreds of millions of Chinese to famish if not starve to death.

The CCP’s former social engineering projects add their own complications to China’s already considerable domestic problems. From a combination of more or less forced mass urbanization, state-induced famine, and two-child, then one-child policies, the CCP faces demographic collapse. Specifically, it is going to run out of taxpayers, laborers, and consumers. Even worse, not only did changing to a one-child policy in the 1980s amplify the severity of the coming crisis, but it led to an epidemic of selective sex abortion. Basically, right about the time China’s economy collapses in on itself, it is going to have tens of millions of young men unable to find a job or a girlfriend—this while China by 2030 will have four retirees for every two workers and child.

Two additional things are worth pointing out here: first, that while it is true Xi reversed the CCP’s policies, it isn’t going to matter because the cost of raising children in China makes having more of them prohibitively expensive, while at the same time urbanization and industrialization naturally decrease birthrates anyway—see every other industrialized and post-industrial country in history; and second, this surfeit of single young males unable to find a job or wife is probably the U.S. hawks strongest argument for why China might pose a serious threat to one or more of its neighbors: unable to do anything else with such a potentially dangerous lot, Beijing may decide to throw them into a meatgrinder over Taiwan or in another border war with India, though both of these actions would likely have devasting additional consequences for the regime stemming from the economic consequences sure to follow.

Apart from the separatists holed up on Taiwan, large populations of Uighurs and Tibetans inconveniently located in strategic areas far from Beijing, as well as dozens of much smaller ethnic groups in the mountainous jungles to the south, mean the CCP leadership faces multiple permanent secessionist dangers far from its northeastern core. Such threats follow directly from the geography of the country, with wealthier eastern coastal provinces such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang wanting and having far more to do with wealthier Japan, South Korea, and the rest of the outside world than with the hinterlands of China’s western barrens. Such provinces have historically resisted Beijing’s control, and the CCP’s most recent moves against the Shanghai-centered tech sector and its billionaire class ought to be understood in this light. So, too, its decision not to try and duplicate the U.S. shale revolution because of the location of Chinese shale deposits in large, wealthy, and culturally distinct Sichuan province while its intense campaigns against the Uighurs and Tibetans already receive considerable international opprobrium. While force or the fear can keep them all in line, including Hong Kong’s recently suppressed population and internal party members who do not favor Xi’s policies, that ability to use force rests on the CCP’s claim to legitimacy and its ability to mobilize sufficient resources to effectively police these regions and put down any potential trouble—which is to say its state power.

Since state power ultimately rests on economic power, it is worth appreciating the myriad problems China’s hitherto racing economy faces, both on the domestic and foreign fronts. Because of its unique position over the past thirty years as a mass global exporter, the CCP has managed to stave off any potential economic slowdowns with boundless state credit, industry subsidies, and dumping, thereby maintaining near-full employment. However, decreasing returns on additional debt and continued overproduction, combined with domestic underconsumption and low-cost labor competition in its region and around the world, mean the bill is about to come due. It’s going to be enormous. Total debt is now three times the output of the Chinese economy annually, and the expansion of debt and credit has accelerated in recent years. Until the past year, the Chinese financial system was creating five times the money supply of the never shy Federal Reserve System per month. According to Citigroup, for example, in 2018 alone, the Chinese financial system accounted for 80 percent of all private credit creation globally. Because of centrally directed malinvestment, these nonperforming loans total an estimated $7 trillion. For some perspective, the subprime crisis that crippled Western financial markets was saddled with less than a trillion dollars of such bad loans. Further, much of the debt is short term, meaning it is frequently rolled over with new debt. This ongoing practice is yielding ever-decreasing returns. According to The Economist, fully three-quarters of new loans in China simply go toward paying the interest on existing debt. Meanwhile, total factory productivity, which had soared during the first decade of the new century, has flatlined since then—with its billion citizens still producing nowhere near what the industrialized Western economies do per capita—and Xi’s own insistence on reasserting state control over the private sector, which is responsible for most of the productivity gains over the past two decades, is likely to continue this already worrying trend.

Abroad, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is only making things worse; spawning even more Renminbi (or Yuan), which are lent and spent on projects of questionable economic value and equally dubious means of repayment. Again, however, CCP policies that privilege employment and state stability over efficiency and productivity mean China’s industrial overproduction has to have somewhere to go, even if it means lending to countries like Venezuela, that quickly default, or like Sri Lanka, which when forced to sign over its principal port resulted in a wave of anti-Chinese sentiment within the country and bad press for so-called “debt-trap development” around the globe. This is to say nothing of problems in places like Pakistan, one of the BRI’s key nodes, which has featured repeated setbacks and disturbances, particularly in violently separatist Baluchistan.

The project, a geopolitical brainchild of Xi, is now subject to regular, if polite, criticism within Chinese academic and policy circles, with increasing numbers of critics coming to recognize the project for what it is: a boondoggle aimed at increasing Chinese power and influence abroad rather than doing anything to increase the welfare of the still relatively poor Chinese people domestically, whose income per capita is 79th globally. In fact, alienating the United States and broader West by challenging its development models has resulted in damage to its trade relationships and is only likely to reverse the gains made in the country since it was allowed into the WTO in 2001.

Though it brought China quickly up the ranks of the developing economies, the CCP’s relationship of mutual economic interdependence on the collective West, and the United States in particular, now hangs ominously over its head. The U.S. and China’s economic interdependence was part of the Clintonite strategy of integrating China into the world economy as a means of ensuring its passivity as regarded U.S. prerogatives. As the relationship deepened, both sides came to recognize that they were now locked into a situation of mutually assured economic destruction—as evidenced by Beijing’s unwillingness to pounce on the United States during its prolonged economic crisis just over a decade ago. However, there exists a key asymmetry within the relationship, and every U.S. security strategist knows it: in the event of a massive economic crash, in a democracy there is another election, while in an authoritarian state there is a revolution. This danger has been highlighted by the U.S.-coordinated Western response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in March. China, whose domestic economy is far more tied into world trade, has just seen what a coordinated response from the richer Western nations can do. While Russia will be able to outlast U.S. sanctions by shifting commodity exports to a willing developing world, were a similar situation to occur over Taiwan China would not have any such outlet for its abundance of manufactured goods, and its internal market, while growing, is still too underdeveloped to absorb the surpluses.

As though these multi-front problems and looming disasters weren’t enough, China, unlike the United States, has the further misfortune of being surrounded on all sides. While a detailed analysis of each of China’s fourteen neighbors is beyond the scope of this essay, a summary of the major players, their domestic incentive structures, and their perception of a rising China as a threat to its own security and wider interests is vital to understanding why China is unlikely to attain even regional hegemony regardless of Washington’s own policies aimed at preventing that outcome.

Despite its history of non-alignment, Washington set out to cultivate India as a future balancer against China beginning with George W. Bush. Creating a legal loophole that allowed Delhi to proceed with its nuclear program without fear of U.S. sanctions—the so-called 123 Agreement—Washington simultaneously played on Indian fears of Pakistan and its relationship with China. Not eager to be seen overtly choosing sides, Delhi mostly kept its head down through the 2000s, focusing on growing their economy, military, and increasingly its overall state power.

Never doing anything contrary to its own perceived interests, whatever Washington might have preferred, it was Beijing’s growing assertiveness in the 2010s that finally pushed Delhi into embracing Washington’s increasingly overt attempts at containing China, including joining the re-formed Quad in 2017. Following a series of standoffs over disputed regions on the border between China and India, these finally erupted in a series of skirmishes between Chinese and Indian troops in 2020. These were a “turning point,” according to Delhi, which realized the possibility of 1960s style full-out conflict between it and its larger neighbor was indeed a distinct possibility. With a population almost as large as China’s, an economy already the fifth largest in the world as measured by GDP, ideal geography for power projection in the Indian Ocean, and growing naval power to match, China’s loss of India to the side of the growing balancing coalition was huge and totally self-inflicted.

Along with India, Japan was the most significant of China’s neighbor’s never likely to partake in band-wagoning with a rising Beijing. The historical animosities, both ancient and recent, are deep, and Japan’s capacities to resist, like India’s, were too considerable to make that a desirable or palatable option. Still the third largest economy in the world despite decades of government mismanagement, Japan has long had the ability to quickly remilitarize and even nuclearize, the latter likely within the span of months rather than years. Like Delhi, Tokyo has outstanding border disputes with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dao Islands, and was one of the first to sound the alarm over growing Chinese assertiveness in the South and East China Seas. Unlike India, whose vital natural resource imports would not even be threatened by Chinese regional hegemony given its open access to the Indian Ocean and Middle East, under such conditions Tokyo could find itself on the receiving end of a Malacca Straits-style dilemma. Home to multiple U.S. Army and Navy installations, and playing host to nearly 60,000 U.S. troops, Japan is happy to foot the bill for anyone that wants to contain China. Before his recent assassination, former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe was not so quietly shaping policy behind the scenes in a more hawkish direction.

Yet another neighbor with outstanding border disputes with Beijing, the Philippines aren’t eager for confrontation with China but recognize their own strategic interests are threatened by their increasingly assertive larger neighbor. If there was any doubt following the confrontation over the Scarborough Shoals in 2012, this was made clear when Beijing waved aside the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling in Manila’s favor over the issue of China’s so-called “nine-dash line.” Even Rodrigo Duterte, who came to office openly pursuing partnership with Beijing, eventually backtracked and reverted to the side of the growing balancing coalition, moving to restore prior defense agreements, supporting AUKUS, and expanding joint military exercises. Again, this was largely the product of Chinese belligerence over disputed islands and reefs, as well as under-delivery on Chinese promises of the economic benefits that would flow to the Philippines were it to align with Beijing. Along with Japan, Taiwan, Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia, the Philippines forms part of a dense thicket impeding Chinese access to the Pacific and Indian oceans. While still dwarfed by China economically, and alone standing no chance against China in an economic or kinetic conflict, together they have a large population to draw on, considerable resources, and not irrelevant economic heft, while their disparate thousands of islands and jungle geographies make the idea of an all-out military campaign against them a hopeless endeavor.

South Korea’s interest in balancing against a rising China is perhaps the most obvious of any state detailed thus far. While its own territorial dispute with Beijing is relatively negligible, that of Socotra Rock, without outside help its highly militarized northern neighbor with its million man army, nuclear weapons, and backing by China looks formidable—and, of course, the war between north and south still hasn’t officially ended. Like the territory of modern Vietnam the Korean Peninsula was also for centuries part of the Chinese sphere of influence. South Korea’s interests, therefore, while complicated like everyone else’s in the region by economic ties with China, are solidly with any balancing coalition. Were one not to form (unlikely given the incentives of the other major states already detailed) it is conceivable Seoul would turn to Beijing for protection from Pyongyang, but this is a stretch. In terms of its values, economy, politics, and world outlook, it is solidly opposed to Chinese regional hegemony. With the tenth largest economy in the world, South Korea brings a rich consumer market, loads of cutting edge industry, and strategic location to a balancing coalition, as well as providing willing basing to any allies on offer to go with its own considerable naval power, eighth largest in the world in total tonnage.

While their interests often conflict in many areas, from trade to natural resource rights to human rights, on the issue of balancing against Beijing the interests of each of the above countries, as well as Vietnam, Australia, Malaysia, and Indonesia (to say nothing of Taiwan) almost perfectly coincide. Those of China’s neighbors variously willing to brook increasing Chinese dominance, such as Cambodia, Myanmar, and Thailand, are unreliable, impoverished, and in each case suffering multiple armed insurgencies and secessionist groups that receive various levels of outside aid. Coupled with China’s own internal problems already outlined, Beijing’s daunting perimeter of rival states means the threat of Chinese regional hegemony is a distant, if totally unrealizable, prospect. For all the CCP’s propaganda, fragmentation rather than unity has defined Chinese history. Spanning approximately two millennia, for only three hundred of those years were the borders of more or less today’s China united under a Han-dominated central political authority. Left to itself, locked in the South and East China seas, it would likely face the threat of serious collapse and fragmentation by the late 2030s.

While China is far from a paper-tiger, the real danger when it comes to U.S.-China relations isn’t any direct threat Beijing poses to the United States or to the interests of the American people. But, rather, the real danger is that increasing belligerence emanating from Washington provokes a disastrous conflict over what Beijing considers core Chinese interests. Particularly with its shift in posture over the past decade, from Obama’s more geoeconomic approach to Trump and now Biden’s increasing militarization of relations between the two, Washington risks provoking a conflict over Taiwan, or in the South or East China Seas.

Knowing there are certain red-lines Beijing would have to respond to if crossed, like over Taiwan, it may be, as Robert Kagen argued this past year in Foreign Affairs, that U.S. policymakers think they should push China into a confrontation now, when it is more likely to lose than later when they believe Beijing’s relative position will be even stronger. Such a loss would destroy the CCP’s credibility, they argue, opening up the possibility of a change in political regimes at the same time it diminished China in the eyes of its neighbors and the world.

This is a questionable assumption, however. While it would probably mean the end of Xi’s time as leader, the institution of the CCP has weathered significant tumult before and could likely do so again. In fact, in the event of a conflict with the United States over one of its core interests, it is just as easy to imagine the opposite occurring. Afterall, the sense of a state under siege strengthens, rather than weakens, the hand of an authoritarian regime. In this sense, both the Trump and Biden administrations’ actions and rhetoric are playing right into the CCP’s grateful lap. Facing imminent multifront disasters, the now openly confrontational U.S. attitude is likely to give the CCP its best chance of staying in power as these crises all come to a collective head: by arguing that only it, the CCP, has been able to make China great again and prevent its exploitation by looming foreign imperialists, and that only it can protect China from a United States newly determined to subvert and dominate it.

Troublingly, though a conflict between the two could easily escalate to the point of a humanity-ending nuclear exchange, as well as the fact that China is unlikely to ever pose a serious threat to core American interests, there are many domestic forces here in the United States that are pressing just such an escalatory dynamic. From entrenched institutional interests within the military and security bureaucracies determined to hold on to their positions and power, to weapons manufacturers who want to see their contracts continually renewed or expanded, to think-tankers determined to avoid getting real jobs and a corporate media that has never seen a potential war it doesn’t like, to a high-tech industry that would rather insource critical components from places like Taiwan in the name of saving a few bucks, as well as domestic manufacturing industries seeking insulation from Chinese competition, and Republicans and Democrats seeking to score cheap points by trading insults over who is “softer” on China.

The situation is exceedingly dangerous, though completely unnecessary. The “China Threat” is a clear canard, and an extension of what the late Justin Raimondo described as “all foreign policy being domestic policy.” Unfortunately, none of the existing dynamics in play are likely to change—no matter how valid the criticism. And the American people, as well as the rest of the world, will have to just hold their breath and hope for the best.

July 25, 2022 Posted by | Economics, Militarism, Progressive Hypocrite, Timeless or most popular | , | Leave a comment

A Gratuitous Insult in Jeddah

By John Whitbeck | CounterPunch | July 21, 2022

The most quoted words from the speech which President Biden read on July 16 while seated at a table in Jeddah with the leaders of eight autocracies (the six GCC monarchies, Egypt and Jordan) and the interim prime minister of one dysfunctional remnant of American regime change (Iraq) was: “We will not walk away and leave a vacuum to be filled by China, Russia or Iran. And we’ll seek to build on this moment with active, principled American leadership. The United States is not going anywhere.”

In light of all the chaos, death and destruction which the United States has wreaked on the region over the past two decades, many in the region — and even at the table — might have wondered whether this pronouncement should be viewed as a promise or a threat.

More importantly, it is remarkable that whoever wrote these words (presumably Tony Blinken and/or Jake Sullivan) did not grasp how insulting they were to the nine leaders to whom they were, at least formally, addressed and to their countries.

The first clear implication of these words is that the countries of the region do not possess either the capacity or the right to stand on their own feet and determine their own destinies but are destined always to be dominated by some outside greater power — in the recent past, the Ottomans, British and French and more recently the Americans — and that the Americans fully intend to maintain their current position of dominance.

The second clear implication of these words is that the countries of the region are not of interest to the United States for any reason inherent in their peoples, their societies or their histories but purely as pawns on the great geopolitical game board on which the United States competes for power and influence against its own demonized adversaries.

Such is the state of American “diplomacy” today.

In their defense, the speechwriters may not actually have been addressing those words to the people in the room but, rather, through the media, to Americans who were questioning why Biden was making this trip at all, and they may also have assumed that no one in the room would take anything that Biden said seriously.

The words with which Biden ended his speech were no doubt not written in the paper text in his hands: “And God protect our troops.”

These are the ritual words with which Biden concludes virtually all of his political speeches on home territory. When he uttered them at the end of his famous “Putin must go!” speech in Warsaw, they were not inappropriate, since he was promising more war. However, at the end of his speech in Jeddah, in which he was professing to be interested in peace and stability in the region, they were simply bizarre.

July 25, 2022 Posted by | Aletho News | , , , | Leave a comment

Washington is the problem, not the solution, so why is Abbas seeking new ‘powerful’ sponsors?

By Ramzy Baroud | MEMO | July 25, 2022

To describe US President Joe Biden’s recent visit to Israel and Palestine as a “failure” in terms of activating the dormant “peace process” is to use a misnomer. For this statement to be accurate, Washington would have had to indicate that it had even a nominal desire to push for negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian leadership.

Political and diplomatic platitudes aside, the current US administration has done the exact opposite, as indicated by Biden’s words and actions. Alleging that the US commitment to a two-state solution “has not changed”, Biden dismissed his administration’s interest in trying to achieve such a goal by declaring that the “ground is not ripe” for negotiations.

Given that the Palestinian Authority led by Mahmoud Abbas has repeatedly announced its readiness to return to negotiations, one can only assume that the process is being stalled due to Israel’s intransigence. Indeed, none of Israel’s top leaders or major parties champion negotiations — the so-called peace process — as a strategic objective.

However, Israel is not the only one to blame. The Americans have also made it clear that they have moved on from that political sham altogether, one which they invented and then sustained for decades. In fact, the final nail in the “negotiated solution” coffin was hammered in by the Donald Trump administration, which has simply backed every Israeli claim and shunned all legitimate Palestinian demands.

The Biden administration has been blamed habitually by Palestinians, Arabs and progressive voices within the Democratic Party for failing to reverse Trump’s prejudiced moves in favour of Israel: moving the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, for example; shutting down the US Consulate in East Jerusalem; and accepting the unfounded Israeli claims regarding its jurisdiction over illegal Jewish settlements built on occupied Palestinian land. The list goes on.

Even if one assumes that the Biden administration is capable of reversing some or all of Trump’s unlawful actions, what good would that be in the greater scheme of things? Washington was, and remains, Israel’s greatest benefactor, funding its military occupation of Palestine with an annual gift of $4 billion, in addition to many other schemes, including a massive and growing budget allocated just for Israel’s Iron Dome missile defence system.

As horrific as Trump’s years were in terms of undermining a just resolution to the Israeli occupation of Palestine, Biden’s policies are but a continuation of an existing pro-Israel American legacy that surpasses that of Trump by decades.

For Israel, the “peace process” has served its purpose, which explains the infamous declaration by the CEO of the Jewish settlement council, Yesha, in the occupied West Bank in 2018: “I don’t want to brag that we’ve won… Others would say it appears that we’re winning.”

However, Israel’s supposed “victory” following three decades of a fraudulent “peace process” cannot be credited to Trump alone. Biden and other top US officials have also been quite useful. While it is understood widely that US politicians support Israel out of self-interest — they need, for example, to appease the influential pro-Israel lobby in Washington — Biden’s support for Israel has an ideological foundation. The US president was less than bashful when he repeated his famous statement at Israel’s Ben Gurion airport on 13 July: “You need not be a Jew to be Zionist.”

Consequently, it may appear puzzling to hear Palestinian officials call on the US — and Biden specifically — to put pressure on Tel Aviv to end its 55-year occupation of East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Mohannad Al-Aklouk, the Palestinian representative at the Arab League, is just one who has repeated the same clichéd and unrealistic language of expecting the US to “exert practical pressure on Israel”, “set the stage for a fair political process based on international law”, and “meet its role as a fair sponsor of the peace process”. Strangely, Al-Aklouk truly believes that Washington, with its dismal track record of pro-Israel bias, can be the saviour of the Palestinians.

Another Palestinian official told the New Arab that PA President Abbas was “disappointed with the results of Biden’s visit” as, apparently, the Palestinian leader “expected that the US president would make progress in the peace process.” The same source added that Abbas’s authority is holding meetings with representatives from “powerful countries” to replace the US as sponsors of the negotiations.

Abbas’s political stance is confusing. The “peace process” is, after all, an American invention. It was a unique, self-serving style of diplomacy that was formulated to ensure Israel’s priorities remain centre stage of US foreign policy in the Middle East. In the Palestinian case, the “peace process” served only to entrench Israel’s colonisation of Palestine, while degrading, or completely sidelining, legitimate Palestinian demands. This “process” was also constructed with the aim of marginalising international law as a political and legal frame of reference for the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

Instead of questioning the entire “peace process” apparatus and apologising for the strategic blunder of pursuing American mirages at the expense of Palestinian rights, the Palestinian Authority is still clutching desperately to the same old fantasy, even when the US and Israel have long abandoned the political farce that they created.

Even if China, Russia or India, for example, would agree to be the new sponsors of the “peace process”, there is no reason for Tel Aviv to engage in future negotiations when it is able to achieve its colonial objectives with full support from the US. Moreover, none of these countries have, for now, much leverage over Israel, and so are unable to sustain any kind of meaningful pressure on Tel Aviv to respect international law.

Yet, the PA is still holding on, simply because the “peace process” has proved to be greatly beneficial in terms of funds, power and prestige enjoyed by a small but powerful class of Palestinians that was formulated largely after the Oslo Accords in 1993.

It is time for Palestinians to stop investing their political capital in the Biden or any other administration. What they need is not a new “powerful” sponsor of the “peace process”, but a grassroots-based struggle for freedom and liberation starting at home, one that galvanises the energies of the Palestinian people themselves. Alas, this new paradigm cannot be achieved when the priorities of the Palestinian leadership remain fixated on the financial handouts and political validation of Washington and its Western allies.

July 25, 2022 Posted by | Corruption, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , | Leave a comment

Get Ready For The 100 Year Long Climate “Emergency”

By Francis Menton | Manhattan Contrarian | July 22, 2022

On March 13, 2020, then President Trump declared a “national emergency” due to the newly-arising outbreak of the Covid-19 virus. Three days later, on March 16, Trump set forth a program of “15 Days to Slow the Spread.” The program included strong recommendations for anyone who felt sick, or had tested positive for the disease, to stay at home during the two-week emergency window.

Here we are now some two years and four months later. The supposed Covid-19 15 day “emergency” has been repeatedly extended, first by Trump through the last ten months of his term, and then for the additional 18 months since January 2021 by President Biden. It’s been two-plus long years of lockdowns, work from home, business closures, school closures, mask mandates, vaccine mandates, and on and on, with little to no evidence that any of it ever did any good.

On Monday July 18 (2022) President Biden extended the Covid-19 “emergency” for yet another 90 days to mid-October. You might think that the whole concept of an “emergency” has lost all meaning if it can somehow persist for more than two and a half years, well past the point where normal people have stopped paying any attention to it whatsoever. “Emergency” used to mean something immediate, like a hurricane or a tornado wrecking a town, or someone having a heart attack, or a shooter actively firing. By any reasonable view of the word “emergency,” things connected with Covid-19 that might have fallen under that term ended months if not years ago. But for a bureaucracy, what the term “emergency” means is the opportunity to issue orders that you could not otherwise issue, and pass out money that you could not otherwise pass out. Now that you have gotten a taste of the heady drug of “emergency” powers, why would you ever give them up if you could avoid it? Years later, it’s still an “emergency” if the bureaucrats want it to be. Or at least, that’s their view.

Which brings us to the so-called “climate emergency.” Since the Supreme Court’s decision in West Virginia v. EPA on June 30, the bureaucracies in the “climate” space, together with all the environmental activists, have been thrown into a tizzy. The Supreme Court just declared that the bureaucracies have no power to fundamentally transform the use of energy in the economy without a clear direction from Congress, which on the climate issue cannot be found in existing statutes. And it has become clear that no further such statutory direction is likely to emerge from Congress before the mid-term elections in November. After November, changes in the make-up of Congress will probably make further such legislation even less likely, if not completely off the table for years if not decades. So what is a self-respecting climate alarmist to do?

To those over there on the left, the answer seems obvious: Demand declaration of a “climate emergency.” With that declaration, the statutory gap could perhaps be filled by another whole category of laws providing special powers in the event of a declaration of “emergency.” The calls for President Biden to make such a declaration have been everywhere since the Supreme Court’s decision at the end of June. In the politician category, a collection of Democratic Senators (Edward Markey and Elizabeth Warren of Massachusetts, Cory Booker of New Jersey, Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island, Brian Schatz of Hawaii, Martin Heinrich of New Mexico, Alex Padilla of California, Jeff Merkley of Oregon and Bernie Sanders of Vermont) sent a strong letter to Biden on July 20 making the demand:

Declaring the climate crisis a national emergency under the NEA would unlock powers to rebuild a better economy with significant, concrete actions. . . . Under the NEA, you could redirect spending to build out renewable energy systems on military bases, implement large-scale clean transportation solutions and finance distributed energy projects to boost climate resiliency. All of these actions would employ Americans in new and emerging industries while securing American leadership in global markets.

Environmental groups were out even ahead of the Senators with the same demand. Here is Greenpeace on July 8:

Congress and the Courts are failing to protect our communities from the climate crisis and it’s time for President Biden to be the leader we need. By declaring a climate emergency, President Biden unlocks an expanded set of powers under the National Emergencies Act and other federal laws.

There are many, many more examples of the same demand from all the usual suspects.

Indeed, there was lots of talk that Biden was going to make the big declaration on Wednesday, when he went to Massachusetts to give a speech at a closed coal-fired power plant. He somehow stopped just short of the formal “emergency” declaration, but took the occasion to emit the usual clichés about the impending climate apocalypse, including liberal use of the term “emergency” itself. Excerpt:

“Climate change is literally an existential threat to our nation and to the world,” Mr. Biden said. . . . “This is an emergency, an emergency, and I will look at it that way.”

It’s entirely possible that the climate “emergency” declaration could issue literally any day now.

What would declaration of an “emergency” mean? The idea is that there are plenty of existing statutes out there granting the Executive powers of various sorts in the event of such an “emergency,” provided that there had been a formal declaration of it. Thus arguably there would be a way around the lack of clear statutory authority that sank the EPA’s power plant regulations in the West Virginia case. The Nation on July 21 gives a rundown of some of the powers that the Executive could purport to exercise in the event of such a declaration with respect to the climate:

[S]uch a declaration would enable the Biden administration to access funding from the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities program for combating the impacts of heat waves, extreme weather events, and natural disasters and could enable faster implementation of critical mitigation strategies. An official climate emergency announcement could also allow the Biden administration to curtail crude oil exports and stop offshore drilling through laws and exemptions related to national security and energy development. The Biden administration could access financial support for clean energy infrastructure through FEMA and the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, and it could cut energy costs for families by supporting domestic offshore wind projects, helping to facilitate an affordable clean energy transition.

Here’s the problem. There is no sense in which the climate is an “emergency” within the ordinary meaning of that word in the English language. Predictions by climate models of a few degrees of temperature rise over the next century are the opposite of an “emergency.” Indeed, the statutes granting various “emergency” powers to the Executive all deal with the question of time periods too short to give the Congress time to enact legislation appropriate to the situation at hand. That circumstance is the opposite of what we have with the climate.

But if you are on the left, or a climate activist, this situation is just too important to wait for Congressional action that may never come. An “emergency” must be declared, to last for — how long? A hundred years? During which time, the bureaucrats can issue whatever orders they want, and spend whatever funds they want, all in the name of saving the planet. None of which will or can have any effect on the 85% (and growing) of world carbon emissions that come from outside the U.S. and which the U.S. government cannot affect in any way.

It’s all a huge insult to the intelligence of the American people. I doubt that the courts will be fooled, most particularly the Supreme Court.

July 24, 2022 Posted by | Corruption, Deception, Malthusian Ideology, Phony Scarcity, Science and Pseudo-Science, Timeless or most popular | | Leave a comment

An idea about stopping this mess

By Meryl Nass | July 24, 2022

Let’s create a pledge, and ask everyone who agrees to sign it. We have a nearly identical pledge that citizens then ask ALL candidates for elected office to sign, or we note that they refused.

The concept is to get millions of signatures against all the emergency rules and mandated vaccines that have destroyed economies, jobs, kept people from home and work, mandated useless masks and 6 foot distancing, initiated vaccine passports and numerous other restrictions, and have maintained the emergency way beyond any rational need.

If enough people sign, the candidates will be forced to sign or be publicly exposed as in favor of the emergency regs and mandatory shots, possibly forever… basically in favor of the Great Reset.

Here is an initial version of the sort of pledge I envision:

  1. I support laws to revoke all emergency laws, declarations, rules and regulations immediately (examples include: PREP Act, Bioshield Act, PAHPRA, Emergency State Health Power Acts, International Health Regulations of the WHO that transfer authority for pandemic management and/or declare public health emergencies).
  2. If I am a candidate, I pledge to introduce and support such legislation as my highest priority.
  3. I support laws explicitly protecting bodily autonomy and preventing the imposition of vaccine or other medical mandates.
  4. If I am a candidate, I pledge to support such legislation as my next higest priority.

Who agrees? Who has a better idea? Who can help craft the best language? Who will collect signatures?

Meryl

July 24, 2022 Posted by | Civil Liberties | , , , | Leave a comment

Biden Is Extending The Covid Emergency And Prolonging The War On Doctors

By Pierre Kory, MD | The Federalist | July 22, 2022

A recent New York Times/Siena College poll showing 64 percent of Democrats preferring a new standard-bearer in 2024 rocked the White House and the political landscape, but it should not have come as a big surprise. After all, President Joe Biden continues to fall short of the promises that drew many Democrats, including myself, to his candidacy in 2020: his pledge for a new strategy combatting Covid-19.

Consider the Food and Drug Administration’s recent decision allowing pharmacists to play doctor and prescribe Pfizer’s anti-viral treatment Paxlovid, which Biden himself, having contracted Covid-19, is now taking. The agency claims this is meant to increase access to the medicine, which must be taken as soon as symptoms arise. But the drug’s fact sheet is a tangled web of restrictions that will make it impractical for most pharmacies to take the risk. Why is the FDA encouraging this?

The answer is plain to anyone who has been following the plight of independent doctors during the pandemic. Our public health agencies — heavily influenced by the pharmaceutical industry and beholden to Biden’s “vaccine first” approach — are committed to diminishing the medical profession and centralizing authority with bureaucrats in Washington, D.C. They have prosecuted a relentless campaign to reduce physicians to cogs in a health care system that is aggressively transforming all medical professionals from providers to prescribers.

The problems with Paxlovid are no secret. FDA granted Pfizer emergency use authorization for the drug after a single trial with questionable results. The medicine has many contraindications, meaning it can’t be taken by someone who simultaneously would be taking certain anti-depressants, anti-seizure, anti-psychotic, cholesterol, or blood pressure medications. Furthermore, many Americans cannot take Paxlovid, given that nearly half of adults have cardiovascular disease.

The risks are plain to see in FDA’s guidance, which recommends referring the patient to a doctor if “sufficient information is not available to assess renal and hepatic function” or “potential drug interactions.” Numerous contraindications are listed, and caution is advised throughout. The burden is on the patient to furnish medical records to prove that he or she doesn’t have any significant kidney or liver disease, drug sensitivities, or other medications that could cause serious adverse events.

Nevertheless, pharmacies have spent months and millions of dollars lobbying for the right to play doctor and prescribe Paxlovid. The economic motives of such a move are clearly in their favor, as, unlike doctors, they profit directly from dispensing drugs. It’s no surprise the National Community Pharmacists Association celebrated the win as a “course correction.” Its CEO said, “Pharmacists are the drug therapy and drug interaction experts. This move opening up their ability to assess the need for and prescribe Paxlovid will improve patients’ timely access to treatments that will help keep them out of the hospital and alive.”

This may be as absurd a statement by a health organization as any I have heard in the pandemic. No pharmacist could ever safely dispense a novel medicine with an unprecedented amount of drug interactions without in-depth knowledge of the severity of the patient’s medical problems or the critical necessity of each of their other medicines. This fact was not lost on the American Medical Association, which temporarily snapped out of its woke-activist-induced coma to offer qualified criticism.

“While the majority of COVID-19 positive patients will benefit from Paxlovid, it is not for everyone, and prescribing it requires knowledge of a patient’s medical history, as well as clinical monitoring for side effects and follow-up care to determine whether a patient is improving—requirements far beyond a pharmacist’s scope and training,” American Medical Association President Jack Resneck Jr. said in a statement.

The tell is right there, though. The AMA is fine with Paxlovid as long as physicians are doing the prescribing. Ceding authority is the problem, which is why the agency previously called the idea “dangerous in practice and precedent” when the Biden administration first proposed it in the Test to Treat initiative.

Covid cases and deaths are down massively from their last peak in January. Most states have lifted restrictions and returned to normal. Yet just days after the FDA made this announcement, the Biden administration again extended the Covid public health emergency — because the president can’t lose the specter of Covid as a political tool.

Vaccination rates have leveled off, and Paxlovid sales bottomed out in April due to a combination of supply problems and sinking demand. Pfizer pushed expectations for the drug sky high, and now it needs to deliver on that promise. The FDA’s move shows how deftly the company has used the pandemic to influence government and public health agencies to serve its shareholders.

The pharmaceutical industry, led by Pfizer and in league with the Biden administration, is waging war against independent doctors who refuse to cede control over patient well-being — and they are winning. If there is any hope for change, it will come in November.

The red wave forming off our political shores is a culmination of many factors. Inflation and gas prices are hitting all-time highs, and just 13 percent of Americans believe the country is heading in the right direction. But relying on scare tactics to distract voters back to Biden is a strategy not supported by medical conditions on the ground.

Let’s hope whoever rides into Washington on that red wave will take on this fight with integrity.


Pierre Kory, MD, is president and chief medical officer of the Front-Line COVID-19 Critical Care Alliance.

July 23, 2022 Posted by | Corruption | , , | Leave a comment

US is Trying to Drive Erdogan into a Corner – but Without Success

By Vladimir Platov – New Eastern Outlook – 23.07.2022

Joe Biden’s administration is currently losing on all its foreign policy fronts, but he is still hoping for success, if nowhere else, in his confrontation with the Turkish leader Recep Erdoğan, so that he can demonstrate to the world and the US public, that there is still some “gunpowder left in the barrel.” This consideration took on a special importance for Joe Biden and his team in the days leading up to the US President’s Middle East trip, which promised little chance of victory for the White House. Joe Biden’s trip to Saudi Arabia did, in fact, turn out to be a total failure – it did nothing to improve his image and yielded no positive results either in terms of oil deals or in terms of reining in Russia’s influence in the region. In view of this failure, Washington needed to find a scapegoat, and picked on Recep Erdoğan.

The White House has realized that getting rid of the Turkish president, as it had hoped, is not going to be an easy matter, and has therefore stepped up its machinations in a bid to entrap him. One of its tactics was to inflame tensions between Turkey and Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean. Relations between the two countries are not easy at the moment, given Turkey’s demands for Athens to demilitarize certain Aegean islands near the Turkish border and its challenges to Greece’s sovereignty over these islands. At the end of June Recep Erdoğan took the rather undiplomatic approach of publishing threatening tweets in Greek, demanding that Greece give up its territorial claims in the Aegean Sea, and referring to the 1919-1922 war between the two countries: “We warn Greece once more to avoid dreams, statements and actions that will lead to regret, as it did a century ago… .” He also warned Turkey will “not hesitate to enact rights recognized by international agreements on the demilitarization of the islands.” In a later tweet he accused Greece of “oppressing” the Turkish minorities in Western Thrace, Rhodes, and Kos, and supporting international terrorism, a reference to Athens’ relations with the Kurds. Greece, in turn, accuses Turkey of violating Greek airspace, and of carrying out illegal hydrocarbon exploration activities off the coast of Cyprus – a region that, Greece claims, falls within its exclusive economic area.

Over the last 200 years there have been numerous wars between Greece and Turkey – the Greek War of Independence in 1821-1829, and subsequent conflicts in 1897, 1912–1913, 1919–1922, and, in Cyprus, 1974. But Greece was only able to win with support from powerful allies, including Russia. Currently, however, as one of the key supporters of the West’s sanctions against Russia, Greece cannot rely on support from Moscow. Athens is unlikely to get much support from the US either, as recent years have seen a marked shift in Washington’s attitude to its vassal states and even to its obligations under international agreements. Washington’s recent decision to support Greece rather than Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean region is a striking example of such a change.

As for the relative strengths of the Greek and Turkish militaries, here Athens clearly lags behind Istanbul – the Greek army may be large, but due to lack of funding its weaponry is very out of date and its troops are poorly trained. Turkey, on the other hand, has the second most powerful military in NATO, after the US.

The standoff between Greece and Turkey, both members of NATO, has been going on for a long time, but it has intensified in recent years as relations between Washington and Turkey have deteriorated and Greece has replaced Turkey as the main US ally in the region. The new military alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean was recently formalized by an agreement between the two countries on long-term military support, under which Greece will host additional four US military bases.

Washington was perhaps hoping that the heightened tensions with Greece will encourage domestic opposition to Recep Erdoğan’s policies, but the effect has in fact been quite the opposite – the Turkish public have rallied round their president. On June 20 the Turkish opposition newspaper Cumhuriyet published an article by Mehmet Ali Guler, calling on Turkey to “sever ties with NATO” and looking at how its departure from the alliance might affect the balance of powers in the region. And, according to the Greek newspaper Vima, citing an interview with the commentator Erdoğan Karakuş for the Turkish television channel Haber Global, there have even been belligerent calls within Turkey for the country to “attack the US” if the latter were to provide assistance to Greece.

Well aware of Turkey’s need to update its Air Force, Washington is making use of the situation to put pressure on Ankara. Thus, even though following the meeting between Joe Biden and Recep Erdoğan in Madrid earlier this year Congress approved the supply of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey, Washington has recently made the supply conditional on Turkey demonstrating its willingness to toe the White House policy line. First, a group of US Congressmen signed a statement objecting to the sale of the jets to Turkey. And then Washington required Ankara to break off its relations with Russia as a precondition for the supply of the jets. It appears that the US is only ready to sell its military hardware to countries that share its values. According to a report from the Greek press agency AMNA, that was the stance taken by Senator Robert Menendez, Chair of the US Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee.

The US House of Representatives has also obstructed the sale, by approving an amendment to the defense budget preventing the US from transferring the jets to Turkey unless the Turkish government guarantees that they will not be used in order to violate Greek airspace.

In response to these moves, Turkey reiterated its support for Recep Erdoğan’s policies, making no secret of the fact that anti-American sentiments are growing in the country. For example, according to the Turkish newspaper Aydınlık, Doğu Perinçek, President of the Vatan Partisi, or Patriotic Party, called on the Turkish government to cancel its order for the F-16s on national security grounds.

Given the above background, it is interesting to speculate about the content of the private meeting between Recep Erdoğan and Russian President Vladimir Putin on July 19. Especially since Russian military aircraft have demonstrated their clear superiority of US jets both in Syria and in Ukraine. Moreover, Turkey and Russia have in recent months been stepping up their cooperation on defense industry projects, and, in an interview published in Turkey’s Milliyet newspaper last December, Ismail Demir, President of Turkey’s Defense Industries, stated that the two countries may work together on the development of Turkish TF-X jets. Unlike the US, Russia will not impose any conditions on Turkey that go against its interests, nor will it push the Turkish Air Force into a corner by refusing to service its aircraft when Turkey most needs them, as the US is quite capable of doing should its strategic interests so require.

July 23, 2022 Posted by | Militarism | , , , | Leave a comment

Orban: Sanctions Made No Change in Moscow’s Course, Europe Lost Four Governments

Samizdat – 23.07.2022

Russia-related sanctions have not shattered Moscow’s resolve, while Europe has already lost four governments amid economic and political crises, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Saturday.

“The West’s strategy is like a car with flat tires on all four wheels… The sanctions did not destabilize Moscow. Europe is in trouble, economically and politically, and four governments have become victims: UK, Bulgarian, Italian and Estonian… People will face a sharp increase in prices. And the better part of the world deliberately did not support us as well — China, India, Brazil, South Africa, the Arab world, Africa — everybody is aloof from this conflict, they are interested in their own affairs,” Orban said, delivering a speech in the Romanian city of Baile Tusnad.

Orban further noted that the Ukrainian conflict is likely to “put an end to the Western hegemony, which could unite the world against someone,” and that a “multipolar global order will knock on the door.”

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Saturday that Europe needs a new strategy aimed at peace in the Ukrainian conflict.

“Hungary should not be under the illusion that we can influence the strategy of the West. Nevertheless, it is a matter of honor and morality for us to state our position that a new strategy is needed, the goal of which would be peace and the formulation of a good proposal for peace. The task of the European Union is not to take sides, but to stand between Russia and Ukraine,” Orban said in the Romanian city of Baile Tusnad.

Orban noted that for the first time since World War II, Europe again has no say in important security issues as decisions are made by the United States and Russia.

Peace in Ukraine may be established only after the negotiations between Russia and the United States, and Europe has lost its chance at mediation since it failed to ensure the fulfillment of the Minsk agreements, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban said on Saturday.

“When we are talking about the war, it begs the question: what should we do? Peace talks between Russia and Ukraine will not take place. People who are waiting for them, they are waiting in vain. Russia wants security guarantees, that is why only the talks between Russia and the US can end this war. Until Russian-American negotiations take place, there will be no peace,” Orban said, delivering a speech in the Romanian city of Baile Tusnad.

Orban noted that Europeans cannot mediate the process anymore as Moscow is not willing to listen to the EU after the failure of the Minsk agreements.

“We lost it after 2014 when we could not ensure the fulfillment of the Minsk agreements containing the guarantees from France and Germany. And the Russians do not want to conduct talks with us anymore,” he added.

On February 24, Russia began a military operation in Ukraine responding to calls for help from the breakaway republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. The United States and its allies responded by imposing comprehensive sanctions against Russia while also ramping up their military support for Ukraine.

July 23, 2022 Posted by | Economics | , , , | Leave a comment

The Korean War May Never End

Tales of the American Empire | July 21, 2022

The Korean War that began in 1950 is technically ongoing because only an armistice was signed in 1953, rather than a peace treaty. American warmongers argue the United States must spend $8 billion a year to keep 30,000 troops there at a dozen bases until the war ends. This is only because the United States refuses to even discuss an end to the war because it will lose control of South Korea’s military if American Generals leave. In addition, part of the justification for the Pentagon’s massive annual budget is to defend South Korea, and those who profit off the perpetual American presence spend millions of dollars each year to lobby American congressmen to keep their racket going. The South Korean military is five times stronger than the North Korean military, and there are no Russian or Chinese soldiers based in North Korea. South Korea has twice the population and forty times the GDP of decrepit North Korea and has fortified its mountainous border. American troops are not needed there but powerful interests protect the status quo. Withdrawing just half the American troops would save the United States over three billion dollars a year and may allow a formal peace treaty to be signed.

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Related Tale: “The Mythical North Korean Threat”; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oG1b-…

Related Tale: “All Nuclear Weapons are Illegal”; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7tod8…

“Withdraw from DMZ Bases”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2013; https://www.g2mil.com/casey.htm

“Thirty-five House Republicans are ‘gravely concerned’ about formally ending the Korean War”; David Choi; Stars and Stripes; December 9, 2021; https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia…

“The unknown oligarch fighting for an endless Korean War”; Eli Clifton; Responsible Statecraft; March 8, 2022; https://responsiblestatecraft.org/202…

“Cut Army Fat in Korea”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2011; https://www.g2mil.com/daegu.htm

“Pull Airmen and Aircraft out of Osan”; Carlton Meyer; G2mil; 2011; https://www.g2mil.com/osan.htm

July 23, 2022 Posted by | Militarism, Timeless or most popular, Video | , | Leave a comment