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US Strategy and the shift to NATO 3.0

A shorter declaration masks deeper tensions, as Washington pushes to reshape NATO’s role from Europe to West Asia and Asia-Pacific.

By Mehmet Ali Guller | The Cradle | July 11, 2026

The six-point final declaration of the NATO Ankara Summit is among the shortest in recent years, similar to last year’s five-point declaration from The Hague. In contrast, the 2021 Brussels Summit declaration contained 79 points, Madrid in 2022 had 22, Vilnius in 2023 included 90, and Washington in 2024 featured 38.

The sharp reduction reflects ongoing tensions between the US and Europe. The declaration is brief because areas of agreement remain limited. The debate over NATO as a “paper tiger” has not been resolved, only set aside.

In the declaration, this issue is temporarily addressed through the slogan “a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO.”

Ankara Declaration targets Russia and Iran

The first article of the six-point Ankara declaration reaffirms commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, while the final article offers thanks to the host country.

The remaining four articles center on Russia, outline a $70 billion support package for Ukraine, expand defense spending, reference $50 billion in arms deals, and briefly touch on Iran.

The Donroe Doctrine and NATO 3.0

Washington is seeking to adapt NATO to what it frames as a new strategic phase, described here as NATO 3.0. The so-called Donroe Doctrine centers on consolidating dominance in the Western Hemisphere, shifting more responsibility onto allies in Europe and elsewhere, and encircling China in the Asia-Pacific through partnerships.

In practice, this takes three forms:

1. Europe assumes primary responsibility for its own security, including taking the lead in supporting Ukraine against Russia.
2. A new order is established in West Asia under Israeli hegemony, requiring normalization between NATO member Turkiye and Israel, as well as between Israel and Syria and the Gulf states, while weakening Iran as the principal obstacle.
3. NATO deepens cooperation with its Asia-Pacific partners—the IP4 countries: Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand—integrating them into its arms supply chain and gradually extending NATO’s reach into Asia.

The political economy of NATO 3.0

Washington views militarization as the lever for the transformation of NATO 3.0. It has two key objectives: raising NATO members’ defense spending to 5 percent of GDP and building a new arms production chain. The first step was initiated in The Hague last year, and the second advanced in Ankara.

Pushing defense spending to 5 percent would generate a vast financial pool within a few years. Including NATO partners such as Japan would further expand the scale, creating a market that draws broad interest. The US aims to distribute this pool in a way that sustains the NATO 3.0 framework.

Alongside this sits the effort to construct a new arms supply chain. The approach is to retain control over core components while distributing subcomponent production across allies, linking them to one another and ultimately to Washington.

The $50 billion arms deals referenced in the declaration mark an initial step. The $10 billion NATO–South Korea agreement, which grants Seoul access to NATO’s joint defense procurement market, fits within this model.

A new military-industrial economy

For the Erdogan government, securing a share of expanding defense spending has become a priority. Ankara sees this as an opening for its defense sector, particularly through the state firm ASELSAN and the private company BAYKAR.

The Defense Industry Forum, long held as a side event at NATO summits, was included in the official program in Ankara for the first time, reflecting that shift.

Countries seeking a share of this expanding market and Washington’s effort to allocate that share in line with its strategy have converged.

The idea of a NATO Defense Bank is also on the agenda. Nine countries laid its groundwork during the Ankara summit. If realized, it would tie a military-industrial model more closely to financial capital.

Turkiye 3.0: NATO’s central frontline state

For Turkiye, NATO 3.0 also signals a new phase.

NATO 1.0 covers the period from the alliance’s founding to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In that time, Turkiye was integrated into US strategy, diluting its founding emphasis on independence and anti-imperialism, eroding aspects of its secular character through the Green Belt project, and absorbing its human capital within anti-communist programs.

NATO 2.0 spans the period from 1991 to 2026. In these years, NATO expanded toward Russia, dismantled Yugoslavia, and intervened across West Asia. Turkiye’s role was again shaped within US strategy, this time through “moderate Islamism.”

NATO 3.0 is defined by Europe taking on security responsibility against Russia, the pursuit of a West Asian order under Israeli dominance, and a strategic shift toward the Asia-Pacific.

Within this framework, Turkiye is positioned as a security enforcer for Europe, encouraged to normalize relations with Tel Aviv to secure a place in the regional order, and drawn into efforts aimed at countering Iran.

In effect, Turkiye is being placed at the center of NATO’s frontline. The naval command under construction in the Bosphorus is directed toward Russia, while the new NATO Corps headquarters in Adana is oriented toward West Asia and Iran.

Washington’s ‘Asian NATO’ objective

NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte effectively represents US leadership within the alliance. His statements reflect Washington’s position rather than Europe’s.

His remarks before and during the summit pointed to a longer-term objective. Rutte argued that Russia was working closely with North Korea, China and Iran, adding that NATO “cannot be naive” and had to remain united.

At its core, NATO 3.0 reflects an effort to use the alliance first against Beijing’s partners—Russia and Iran—and, over time, against China itself. The push to reorient NATO toward Asia follows from this.

For the past four years, leaders of the IP4 countries have been invited to NATO summits. In Ankara, discussions with these states focused on expanding cooperation in defense industries and advanced technologies.

Washington is pressing these partners toward closer military alignment, at times resembling a sub-alliance—an “Asian NATO.” Proposals to open a NATO liaison office in Tokyo—though contested, notably by France—form part of this effort.

Washington, however, has continued to push for a broader NATO role in Asia. As Rutte put it, “The security of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific are closely interconnected,” reinforcing efforts to extend the alliance’s focus beyond its original geographic remit.

Expectations from NATO 3.0

Following the Ankara Summit, NATO 3.0 is expected to serve different priorities:

• For the US: aligning NATO with its Asia-Pacific strategy.
• For Europe: maintaining US involvement in European security even as direct support shifts.
• For Turkiye: expanding a military-industrial growth model.

For countries across the Global South, NATO is widely viewed as an outdated military alliance whose role has run its course.

 

July 11, 2026 - Posted by aletho | Militarism, Russophobia, Sinophobia, Wars for Israel | NATO, Turkey, United States, Zionism