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IAEA inspectors cannot return to Iran amid US threats: Russia

Press TV – September 24, 2026

Russia’s permanent representative to international organizations in Vienna says the return of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to Iran is not possible amid continued US threats against the country.

Mikhail Ulyanov said the United States has never provided guarantees that it will halt missile attacks on Iranian territory. “On the contrary, they are practically issuing threats every day, and sometimes several times a day,” Ulyanov said, according to RIA Novosti.

“In such circumstances, what meaning can there be in talking about the presence of IAEA inspectors?” he added.

Ulyanov’s remarks come against the backdrop of a fundamental security problem surrounding the resumption of inspections. In June, Israeli and US strikes targeted Iranian nuclear facilities that had been under IAEA safeguards.

The US and Israel attacked Iran while nuclear negotiations were underway, using the talks as a cover for aggression under the illusion that the attack would eliminate Iran’s nuclear program and eventually topple the Islamic Republic.

The bombing has killed the bilateral framework for cooperation between Iran and the IAEA, which has so far refused to condemn the aggression, thus failing in its commitment and now demanding Iran to go out of its way and cooperate with aggressors—amounting to awarding the aggressors.

The attacks forced the Agency to halt its field verification activities and withdraw its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons. The IAEA itself reported that its inspectors had been withdrawn from the country by the end of June because of the security situation.

That history provides an important context for Tehran’s refusal to immediately restore unrestricted access. Iran is being asked to facilitate the return of international inspectors while the military threat that forced their withdrawal has not been conclusively removed.

From Tehran’s perspective, the question is therefore not simply whether inspectors should have access, but whether the conditions exist for them to operate safely and independently without their presence becoming entangled in an active military confrontation.

The IAEA has also acknowledged the exceptional circumstances created by the attacks. In its reporting, the Agency stated that attacks against nuclear facilities can have serious consequences for nuclear safety, security, safeguards and international peace and security, and recalled that nuclear facilities must not be attacked because of the risks to people and the environment.

This is particularly significant because the facilities targeted in the strikes were not outside the safeguards system. Russia has argued that the affected Iranian sites had been subject to regular Agency monitoring before the attacks.

In a 2025 statement, Ulyanov said the facilities at Fordow, Natanz, Isfahan and Arak had been regularly inspected and that the strikes damaged both nuclear infrastructure and IAEA equipment.

The attacks therefore created a difficult contradiction for the international verification system: facilities under international monitoring were struck militarily, inspectors were subsequently withdrawn for security reasons, and Iran then faced intensified demands to restore access under conditions in which it continues to regard itself as exposed to further attack.

The Agency has reported unresolved questions concerning uranium particles and has said that it requires further information from Iran before it can provide broader assurances about the exclusively peaceful nature of the country’s nuclear program.

At the same time, the current dispute cannot be separated from the security environment in which verification is being demanded. A sustainable inspection arrangement would require more than simply instructing Iran to open its facilities.

It would require credible security arrangements for inspectors, protection for safeguarded nuclear installations, and a mechanism that prevents inspections from becoming a source of additional military or political escalation.

Tehran’s position is that inspectors should not simply return under the same conditions that existed before the attacks. There are several concrete reasons for that position.

First, the safety of inspectors has become a direct issue. The IAEA withdrew its personnel because of the security situation after the attacks.

Without credible assurances that inspectors and their equipment will be protected from further military action, Iran can argue that an immediate return would expose Agency personnel to risks that are beyond the Agency’s ability to control.

Second, Iran’s nuclear facilities have themselves become potential military targets. The IAEA has repeatedly stressed the dangers of attacking nuclear installations.

Allowing inspectors to return without addressing the possibility of renewed strikes would leave them operating in an environment where the facilities they are monitoring could again come under attack.

Third, the previous monitoring framework was disrupted by military action rather than simply by a disagreement over access. The IAEA’s own records state that verification activities stopped following the attacks and that Iran subsequently enacted legislation suspending cooperation with the Agency.

Fourth, the dispute now involves a question of reciprocity and confidence. Iran maintains that it cannot be expected to provide extensive access while simultaneously facing threats of additional military action.

The dispute has intensified following a September resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors reporting Iran’s case to the United Nations Security Council.

Iran has rejected the move as politically motivated and has stressed that the military strikes and subsequent diplomatic pressure have fundamentally changed the circumstances surrounding the nuclear dispute.

Russia and China have opposed efforts to escalate the matter through the Security Council.

At the same time, Iranian officials have warned that continued military and political pressure could lead Tehran to reconsider its position within the nuclear non-proliferation framework.

Mohsen Rezaei, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, said Iran’s recent experience could encourage other countries to reconsider participation in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

September 24, 2026 - Posted by aletho | Wars for Israel | IAEA, Iran, Israel, Russia, United States, Zionism