In recent days, videos of Europe’s chief diplomat, Kaja Kallas, have gone viral on social media, showing her making statements marked by disconnected reasoning, weak associations, and conclusions that do not logically follow from the premises presented. At the same time, she delivered yet another of her “unusual” speeches, declaring that Europe would demand a reduction in the size of the Russian Army – an assertion made without any reference to legal, logistical, or strategic foundations to support such a measure, making the inconsistency of her position evident.
This statement highlights not only the European diplomacy’s disconnect from geopolitical reality, but also the symbolic function of certain figures who maintain positions of international visibility. Kallas, whose political trajectory was consolidated in Estonia with a strongly anti-Russian discourse, has become a piece of ideological rhetoric: she plays the role of a “watchdog” of European Russophobia and does not seem to mind being seen as “foolish” for her irrational public statements.
Beyond this aspect, there is also a practical function in this dynamic. Domestically, Kallas faced considerable political wear in Estonia: her family circle maintained commercial ties with Russia, and nationalist sectors criticized her for economic policies that allegedly weakened the country’s economic stability. In this sense, her promotion to the head of European diplomacy served as a convenient solution – removing a worn-out figure from the domestic scene while at the same time making use of her “angry” stance toward Moscow to sustain the anti-Russian narrative at the continental level.
Kallas’s performance, however, does not represent strategic autonomy. The European Union’s foreign policy is centralized in the presidency of the European Commission, under the leadership of Ursula von der Leyen. In this context, Kallas essentially fulfills the role of spokesperson and executor of guidelines defined by the bloc’s hard core, which coordinates sanctions, defense policies, and alignment with NATO and the United States. The contrast between her performative statements and her real decision-making capacity reflects a strategy that prioritizes confrontational rhetoric over political pragmatism.
From a geopolitical perspective, the idea of unilaterally reducing Russian military personnel is unrealistic. Moscow interprets the current conflict as part of a structural dispute over NATO expansion and the strategic containment promoted by the West. Symbolic pressure or European public declarations, devoid of negotiation mechanisms or concrete coercive instruments, produce no practical effect and, on the contrary, tend to reinforce Russian defensive positions, consolidating the perception of permanent hostility.
Moreover, the recent tensions between Kallas and von der Leyen are telling. Kallas reportedly calls her a “dictator” for centralizing power in the Commission – as if the entire EU bureaucratic structure were not designed precisely to maintain that kind of centralization. It appears that von der Leyen represents the transnational elites that control Europe, while Kallas is merely a disposable piece on this chessboard – without any real right to opinion or participation in the bloc’s decision-making process.
Ultimately, Kallas remains, in the racist European view that she herself evokes, a “peripheral” figure of Soviet origins, with a Finno-Ugric native language – hardly “European” in the strict sense, no matter how much she tries to “Europeanize” herself by hating Russia. For Europeans, she is an uncomfortable figure who nonetheless serves a useful purpose: escalating tensions with Russia, which greatly benefits von der Leyen’s “anonymous bosses.”
In this scenario, Kallas embodies a structural tension: her peripheral origins and aggressive posture make her useful as a representative of a confrontational narrative, while also exposing the superficiality of certain European political decisions. The bloc maintains tough rhetoric and ideological mobilization but lacks a realistic strategy capable of dealing with the balance of power in Eurasia – where Europe is a weak and declining pole, not a “superpower,” as Kallas often claims.
If the EU truly intends to preserve its strategic autonomy and contribute to continental stability, it will need to abandon performative declarations and understand that any rearrangement of European security depends on direct negotiations with Moscow, recognition of military and geopolitical realities, and the formulation of measures that combine firmness with pragmatism. Unilateral demands – such as reducing Russian military personnel – are nothing more than symbolic rhetoric, incapable of altering the real dynamics of the conflict.
This dynamic also reveals the hidden side of European politics: the use of peripheral figures, often marginalized or viewed with prejudice, to materialize maximalist discourses that consolidate a narrative of confrontation, while decision-making remains concentrated in a small core of power, far removed from the media statements that go viral and capture public attention.
Romania’s 2024 presidential election was already one of the most controversial political episodes in the European Union in recent years. A candidate who won the first round was prevented from contesting the second. The vote was annulled. Claims of Russian interference were advanced without public evidence.
At the time, the affair raised urgent questions about democratic standards inside the EU. Newly disclosed documents reviewed by RT Investigations go further. They indicate that the annulment of the Romanian election was accompanied by sustained efforts to pressure social media platforms into suppressing political speech – efforts coordinated through mechanisms established under the EU’s Digital Services Act.
What appeared to be a national political crisis now looks increasingly like a test case for how far EU institutions are willing to go in intervening in the political processes of member states.
The Russian narrative. Again.
On February 3, the US House Judiciary Committee published a 160-page investigation into how the EU systematically pressures social media companies to alter internal guidelines and suppress content. It found Brussels orchestrated a “decade-long campaign” to censor political speech across the bloc. In many cases, this amounted to direct meddling in political processes and elections of members, often using EU-endorsed civil society organizations. The report features several case studies of this “campaign” in action in EU member states, the gravest example being Romania.
It was around the November 2024 Romanian presidential election, the committee found, that the European Commission“took its most aggressive censorship steps.” In the first round, anti-establishment outsider Calin Georgescu comfortably prevailed, and polls indicated he was en route to win the second by landslide. However, on December 6, Bucharest’s constitutional court overturned the results. While a court-ordered recount found no irregularities in the process, a new election was called, in which Georgescu was banned from running.
By contrast, Romania’s security service alleged Georgescu’s victory was attributable to a Russian-orchestrated TikTok campaign. The allegation was unsupported by any evidence whatsoever. Romanian President Klaus Iohannis went to the extent of claiming this deficit was inversely proof of Moscow’s culpability, as the Russians supposedly “hide perfectly in cyber space.” Despite the BBC reporting that even Romanians “who feared a president Georgescu” worried about the precedent set for their democracy by the move, that narrative has been endlessly reiterated ever since.
The US House Judiciary Committee report comprehensively disproves the charge of Russian meddling in the Romanian election. Documents and emails provided by TikTok expose how the platform not only consistently assessed Moscow “did not conduct a coordinated influence operation to boost Georgescu’s campaign,” but repeatedly shared these findings with the European Commission and Romanian authorities. This information was never shared by either party. But the contempt of Brussels and Bucharest for democracy and free speech went much further.
Digital Services Act in action
The committee found Romanian officials egregiously abused the EU’s controversial Digital Services Act before the 2024 election “to silence content supporting populist and nationalist candidates.” Bucharest also repeatedly lodged content takedown requests outside of the formal DSA process, using what committee investigators call “expansive interpretations of their own power to mandate removals of political content.” This amounted to a “global takedown order,” with authorities perversely arguing court demands to block certain content for local audiences were “mandatory not only in Romania.”
This was no doubt a ploy to prevent outsiders, in particular the country’s sizable diaspora, from accessing content featuring Georgescu. His “Romania First” agenda proved quite popular with emigres, numbering many millions due to mass depopulation since 1989. Perhaps not coincidentally, his diaspora supporters have been widely maligned by Western media as fascist enablers. Still, even critical mainstream reports admit they and the domestic population have legitimate grievances, due to Romania’s crushing economic decline in the same period.
Bucharest would clearly stop at nothing to ensure the ‘correct’ candidate prevailed in the first round. Removal demands were plentiful, and on the rare occasions that legal justification was provided, it was based on a “very broad interpretation” of the election authority’s power. For example, TikTok was ordered to remove content that was “‘disrespectful and insults the PSD party’” – a left-wing political faction that was part of the country’s ruling coalition at the time. TikTok twice sought further details of the grounds for this request, but none was forthcoming.
Once Georgescu prevailed, and before the election was annulled, Romanian orders became even more aggressive. Regulators told TikTok that “all materials containing Calin Georgescu images must be removed,” again without any legal basis whatsoever. This proved a step too far for the platform, which refused to remove the posts. It wasn’t just naked political pressure to which TikTok refused to bend. Brussels and Bucharest were assisted first in electoral fraud, then autocratic annulment of the vote’s legitimate result, by local EU-sponsored NGOs.
These were organizations “empowered by the European Commission to make priority censorship requests – either as [EU Digital Service Act] Trusted Flaggers or through the Commission’s Rapid Response System.” Despite their supposed neutrality, the NGOs “made politically biased content removal demands.” For example, the EU-funded Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media “sent TikTok spreadsheets containing hundreds of censorship requests in the days after the first round of the initial election.” The committee characterized much of the flagged content as “pro-Georgescu and anti-progressive political speech.”
This included posts related to “Georgescu’s positions on environmental issues and Romania’s membership in the Schengen Area, and the EU’s system of open borders.” In other words, this was content espousing standard, popular conservative viewpoints, which are absolute anathema to Brussels and Bucharest’s pro-EU elite. Since the committee’s report was released, references to the Bulgarian-Romanian Observatory of Digital Media’s EU financing have been deleted from its website.
After the vote
The day after the election was annulled, TikTok wrote to the European Commission, stating plainly it had not found or been presented with evidence of a coordinated network of accounts promoting Georgescu. Undeterred by TikTok’s denials and scarcely bothered by the lack of material evidence, the European Commission pressed forward and demanded information about TikTok’s political content moderation practices and enquired about “changes” to its “processes, controls, and systems for the monitoring and detection of any systemic risks.”
The European Commission also used the “still-unproven narrative” of Russian meddling “to pressure TikTok to engage in more aggressive political censorship.” In response, the platform informed the commission that it would censor content featuring the terms “coup” and “war” – clear references to the perception that democratic processes had been undermined in Romania – “for the next 60 days to mitigate the risk of harmful narratives.” But this was still insufficient for the censorship-crazed commission.
On December 17, 2004, the European Commission opened a formal investigation into TikTok over a “a suspected breach of the DSA” – in other words, failing to sufficiently censor content before and after the first round of Romania’s presidential election. The platform was accused of failing to uphold its “obligation to properly assess and mitigate systemic risks linked to election integrity” locally. EU efforts to bring the platform to heel didn’t end there, either.
In February 2025, TikTok’s product team was summoned for a meeting with the EU’s Directorate-General for Communications Networks, Content and Technology. There, they were lectured over the platform’s supposedly “deceptive behavior policies and enforcement” and “potential[ly] ineffective” DSA “mitigation” measures. The US House Judiciary Committee found that the European Commission’s decision to meet TikTok’s product team, “rather than the government affairs and compliance staff whose job it was to manage TikTok’s relationship with the Commission, indicates the European Commission sought deeper influence over the platform’s internal moderation processes.”
Georgescu and the many Romanians who wished to elect him president were punished even more severely. Two weeks after TikTok was threatened by the European Commission, the upstart hopeful was arrested in Bucharest en route to registering to run in the new election that May. Georgescu was charged with “incitement to actions against the constitutional order.” Since then, he has been accused by authorities of plotting a coup and involvement in a million-euro fraud.
When Georgescu’s case finally reached trial this February, these accusations were dropped. He is instead charged with peddling “far-right propaganda.” A report on his prosecution from English-language news website Romania Insider repeated the fiction he owed his first-round victory to a “targeted social media campaign,” managed by “entities linked to Russia.” In the meantime, establishment-preferred candidate Nicusor Dan won the presidency. No doubt satisfied with the integrity of the democratic process given Georgescu was barred from participating, Romania’s Constitutional Court quickly validated the result.
Beyond Romania
Per the US House Judiciary Committee, Romania’s stolen 2024 presidential election is the most extreme example of the EU and member state authorities conspiring to subvert democracy and trample on popular will. But it is just one of many. Since the Digital Services Act came into force in August 2023, the European Commission has pressured platforms to censor content ahead of national elections in Slovakia, the Netherlands, France, Moldova, and Ireland, as well as the EU elections in June 2024.
“In all of these cases… documents demonstrate a clear bias toward censoring conservative and populist parties,” the committee concluded. Ahead of the EU elections, TikTok was pressured into censoring over 45,000 pieces of purported “misinformation.” This included what the report deemed “clear political speech” on topics such as migration, climate change, security and defense, and LGBTQ rights. There is no indication Brussels has been deterred from its quest to prevent the ‘wrong’ candidates being elected to office in member states, or citizens expressing dissenting opinions.
In fact, we can expect these efforts to ramp up significantly. For one, the US committee’s bombshell report generated almost no mainstream interest, indicating Brussels can and will get away with it again. Even more urgently, in April, Hungary goes to the polls. Already, the narrative that ruling conservative Viktor Orban intends to rig the vote to secure victory is being widely perpetuated. And the EU’s censorship apparatus stands ready to validate that narrative, regardless of truth, and popular will.
Before we start. These platforms aren’t innocent. They’ve extracted billions from our attention, manipulated our children’s dopamine cycles, censored truth tellers, handed our data to surveillance capitalism and slept soundly every night. Hold that. And then read what follows anyway — because what’s happening right now is something else entirely.
Let’s start with the money. Because the money never lies.
€1.2 billion. Ireland’s Data Protection Commission. Meta. May 2023. The largest GDPR fine in history, for routing EU citizen data to the United States without adequate protection. A record that lasted about five minutes.
€530 million. TikTok. May 2025. Same Irish authority. For sending European user data to China and then, this is the part they buried in the press release — lying about it during the inquiry. TikTok told regulators throughout the investigation it wasn’t storing EEA data on Chinese servers. In February 2025, they quietly admitted it had been. All along.
€345 million. TikTok again. 2023. Children’s data. €14.5 million from the UK’s Information Commissioner’s Office on top of that, same year, same issue. €91 million to Meta Ireland in September 2024 — they stored hundreds of millions of user passwords in plaintext. Just sitting there. No encryption. Exposed. €390 million to Meta the year before, for forcing users to accept personalised advertising as a condition of accessing their own accounts.
And then December 5th, 2025. The European Commission handed X — formerly Twitter, now Elon Musk’s megaphone and the primary target of every European leader who’s discovered that their citizens can organise against them online — a €120 million fine. First ever penalty under the Digital Services Act. For misleading users about the blue verification badge, concealing advertiser identities, and blocking government-approved researchers from accessing algorithmic data.
Over €2.5 billion. Just the verdicts. Just the ones that made it to conclusion. Fourteen active DSA proceedings still grinding through the machinery, with Meta and TikTok each facing potential fines of 6% of global revenue. That’s €9.9 billion for Meta. €9.3 billion for ByteDance. Numbers large enough to restructure companies. Numbers designed to make platforms obedient.
So when Pedro Sanchez walked out this morning and announced that Spain’s Council of Ministers would invoke Article 8 of the Organic Statute of the Public Prosecution Service — sic prosecutors onto X, Meta and TikTok for “crimes they may be committing” through AI-generated child pornography — understand what you’re looking at.
This isn’t a regulator at the end of its rope. This is a political class that has already built the machine, tested the machine, extracted billions through the machine — and is now deciding what else the machine can reach.
“May Be Committing”
That’s the phrase. Not “has committed.” Not “is committing.” May be. Sanchez posted it on X — the very platform he’s threatening to prosecute — and the media swallowed it whole, no questions about evidence or methodology or whether a public prosecutor’s office is the right instrument for making technical judgements about AI image generation pipelines.
The Spanish government claims Grok produced three million sexualised images in eleven days, including over 23,000 involving minors. Strong numbers. Specific numbers. Precise to the point of being designed to prevent challenge — because you can’t interrogate evidence you haven’t been shown, and asking to see it means you’re defending the indefensible. Not one published source. Not one independent methodology. They arrived complete, ready-made for outrage.
That’s the genius of it. The children gambit works precisely because you cannot question it without becoming the villain of the story.
Pavel Durov said it plainly — and look, nobody should hold Durov up as a civic virtue. But he’s spent years watching governments use platform regulation as a control mechanism, and when he says Sanchez’s moves aren’t safeguards but steps toward total control, he’s speaking from operational experience. He’s seen this architecture before. From the inside.
Here’s what this moment actually is, in the longer register. Every time a Western liberal government needs to consolidate control over the information environment, it finds a victim group whose protection cannot be questioned. In the 20th century they used communists, terrorists, drug dealers. The 21st century discovered something more powerful — children. Unimpeachable. Unchallengeable. A shield so morally absolute that any surveillance infrastructure built behind it arrives pre-legitimised. Sanchez didn’t invent this playbook. He’s just the current page.
Here’s the question nobody in any press conference asked today. If you actually wanted to protect children from AI-generated abuse material — if that were the genuine, singular, burning priority — what would you do?
You’d hunt the producers. Fund specialist cyber units with the resources and legal powers to identify, locate and prosecute the people who generate and distribute child sexual abuse material. Build better reporting pipelines so victims and witnesses have direct, fast routes to enforcement. Nail the distribution networks — the forums, the channels, the file-sharing infrastructure where this material moves — with targeted operations and international cooperation. Invest in takedown technology that works at scale. These are the unglamorous tools of actual child protection. Forensic. Technical. Expensive. Slow. Not suited to a press conference.
None of that is what Sanchez announced today. What he announced was prosecution of three of the most visible American technology platforms, with unverified statistics, under a legal mechanism designed for emergency government intervention in the public interest — on the same morning Keir Starmer in London announced restrictions on the last tool of genuine online privacy.
That’s not child protection. That’s the political class treating every ordinary user as a pre-suspect, building infrastructure that watches everyone in order to catch a tiny minority — and using the minority as the justification.
When someone says “think of the children,” look at what they’re actually building. Because what they’re building right now, across Europe and Britain, is an internet where you need permission to speak.
The Network They Actually Protected
Let’s be precise about who’s invoking children to demand your identity.
Jeffrey Epstein ran an international child trafficking operation for decades. Not speculation. Court and DOJ documents. Thirty-five girls identified by Palm Beach police in 2005. FBI reports going back to 1996. Federal prosecutors in Florida prepared a 60-count draft indictment in 2007 — conspiracy, sex trafficking of minors, enticement — charging Epstein and three co-conspirators described as employees who “persuaded, induced, and enticed individuals who had not attained the age of 18 years to engage in prostitution.”
The names of those three co-conspirators were in the indictment. Then US Attorney Alexander Acosta gave Epstein 13 months in county jail with work release six days a week and immunity for “any potential co-conspirators” — in direct violation of federal victims’ rights law. The investigation was shut down. Epstein walked. The network persisted.
Fast forward. January 2026. Department of Justice releases 3 million pages (a mere 2% of what they have in possession) under a law Congress passed unanimously demanding transparency. Victims’ names exposed. Driver’s licenses published. Witness statements naming perpetrators? Redacted. Draft indictment naming co-conspirators? Still redacted. Attorneys for over 200 victims called it “the single most egregious violation of victim privacy in one day in United States history” and accused DOJ of “hiding the names of perpetrators while exposing survivors.”
Congressmen like Thomas Massie had to read names aloud on the House floor before DOJ would release them. Rep. Ro Khanna: “The survivor statements to the FBI naming rich and powerful men who went to Epstein’s island, his ranch, his home — who raped and abused underage girls — they were all hidden.”
Now look at who’s demanding you hand over your identity to speak online.
Keir Starmer — the man proposing VPN bans and bypassing Parliament to regulate your thumbs on a screen — appointed Peter Mandelson as UK Ambassador to the United States in December 2024. Mandelson called himself Epstein’s “best pal” in Epstein’s 50th birthday book. Their friendship continued after Epstein’s 2008 conviction. Emails released in the January 2026 DOJ files show Mandelson received £75,000 in payments from Epstein between 2003-2004, leaked classified government information to him while serving as Business Secretary in 2009-2010, and sent messages suggesting Epstein was wrongfully convicted.
Starmer knew about the Epstein connection when he made the appointment. Mandelson had already resigned from government twice before — conflicts of interest, financial misconduct — and the Epstein relationship was public record. Starmer appointed him anyway. Made him Britain’s top diplomat. Gave him the US ambassador post. When the files dropped and the depth of the relationship became undeniable, Starmer’s chief of staff Morgan McSweeney — who recommended Mandelson — resigned. Then Starmer’s communications director. Then his cabinet secretary. Three senior aides gone in days.
Mandelson is now under criminal investigation by the Metropolitan Police for misconduct in public office. US Congress has requested he submit to interview as part of its investigation into Epstein’s co-conspirators and enablers.
And Starmer — whose government just had VPN downloads surge 1,800% because British citizens don’t trust him with their browsing data — is the man now lecturing the public about online child safety.
This isn’t hypocrisy. It’s consistency. The same political class that gave Epstein’s network immunity and protected co-conspirators for two decades is now demanding total visibility over your identity. The same Department of Justice that hid perpetrators and exposed survivors is the one telling you encryption backdoors are necessary to protect children. The same institutions that shut down the Epstein investigation in 2008 and buried the names in 2026 are building the Digital Identity Wallet, the fact-checker networks, the 24-hour removal mandates.
When they say this is about protecting children, look at the Epstein files. Look at who they protected. Look at who they prosecuted. Look at who they gave immunity. Look at whose names are still redacted while survivors’ information gets published.
Then ask yourself why these exact same people need to know who you are before you’re allowed to speak.
What This Actually Is — Unelected, Unaccountable, and Expanding
Here’s what nobody in the mainstream coverage will say: the regulatory apparatus now targeting these platforms was not built by people you voted for.
Picture what happens when a flag arrives. It’s 2am. A compliance officer at a major platform — a 26-year-old in Dublin or Amsterdam with a policy degree and a quota — opens an alert. A Brussels-appointed body has flagged a post as potentially harmful. The DSA gives the platform 24 hours to act or face fines of up to 6% of global revenue. There’s no named accuser. No court order. No adversarial process. Just a designation, a deadline, and a number so large that hesitation is financially irrational. The post gets removed. The writer wakes up to find their words gone. The politician whose opponents wrote it points elsewhere. The regulator points at the law. The compliance officer points at the process.
Nobody elected any of them.
The European Commission is not elected. Its commissioners are appointed by governments, approved by a parliament most Europeans couldn’t name the composition of — and its enforcement apparatus, the officials running fourteen DSA proceedings and handing out nine-figure fines, operates at a distance from democratic accountability that is not incidental but structural. The “trusted flaggers” embedded in the DSA framework, deputised to mark content for priority removal, are appointed bodies. Ofcom in the UK is a regulator, not an elected chamber. The European Board for Digital Services, coordinating enforcement across 27 countries, answers to no electorate anywhere on earth.
Sanchez and Starmer announce the intention. The technocrats execute it. And when it goes wrong — when the journalist’s article vanishes into a compliance process with no appeal, when the civil servant’s flagging of “migrant hotel” videos turns out to be political interference dressed as child protection — there is no one to vote out. The politician points at the regulator. The regulator points at the law. The law was written in workshops whose attendees you’ll never know. Democratic majorities change. Regulatory architecture doesn’t.
That’s not a flaw in the system. It’s the system working exactly as it was designed.
Britain and the VPN — The Moment the Mask Slipped
The week before Sanchez made his announcement, Keir Starmer was in London saying “no platform gets a free pass.” New powers to restrict social media. AI chatbots brought under the Online Safety Act. Infinite scrolling — the physical act of moving your thumb down a screen — to be regulated. Action in “months, not years.” And crucially, explicitly, openly: bypassing the parliamentary scrutiny that would normally apply to legislation this significant. He said it out loud. The urgency is too great for debate.
But the detail that should stop every person who cares about liberty cold is the VPN proposal.
Let’s be clear about what a VPN actually is, because the political class is clearly hoping you don’t know and don’t care to find out.
A Virtual Private Network encrypts your internet connection and masks your IP address — your digital location, the identifying tag that follows you across every website you visit, that your internet service provider logs, that governments can and do compel ISPs to hand over. When you use a VPN, your traffic passes through an encrypted tunnel. Your ISP sees that you’re connected to a VPN server. That’s it. They cannot see where you go. They cannot see what you say. They cannot read your communications.
This is the tool that domestic abuse survivors use to hide their location from abusers. That investigative journalists use to protect their sources. That activists use to organise without government surveillance. VPNs aren’t a loophole. They’re a lifeline.
After the UK Online Safety Act came into force, VPN downloads in Britain surged by 1,800%. Half the top ten apps in British app stores became VPN services. Ordinary British citizens — not criminals, not paedophiles, not terrorists — reached for the exact same tool that people under authoritarian regimes use to avoid state surveillance, because they didn’t want to submit government-verified identity just to browse normally.
Starmer’s response to that 1,800% signal was to propose restricting VPNs.
Not to reconsider whether the surveillance infrastructure was too invasive. Not to ask why a free people felt the need for anonymity tools in a democracy. No — the tool of privacy is the problem. The loophole to be closed.
And here’s the thing that proves this was never about children. Ban commercial VPNs tomorrow and any determined teenager circumvents it within hours — cheap cloud servers, open proxies, custom tunnels for less than a dollar a month. The only people genuinely impacted are the ones relying on them for legitimate safety: the abuse survivor hiding their location, the journalist protecting a source, the person who simply doesn’t want their ISP building a commercial profile of their private reading habits. A VPN ban doesn’t protect children. It closes the last gap in the surveillance infrastructure — means that when the DSA triggers an investigation into your political commentary, when the Brussels-appointed fact-checker flags your article, there’s nowhere left to go. No tunnel. No private space. Just a 1984 dystopian, digitally enhanced.
The Wallet Nobody’s Talking About
Beneath all of this — quieter, slower, more permanent than any headline — is the piece of architecture that makes everything else irrelevant to debate once it’s in place.
By December 2026, every EU member state is legally required to provide its citizens with a European Digital Identity Wallet. Not a proposal. Law — Regulation EU 2024/1183, in force since May 2024. Major platforms will be required to accept it as a login mechanism. The private sector — banks, retailers, online services, social media — can request verified identity information through it.
Brussels will tell you the privacy protections are robust. And it’s worth taking that position seriously, because it isn’t entirely dishonest.
Article 5a of the regulation is real. It states explicitly that relying parties — the companies and platforms using the wallet — “shall not refuse the use of pseudonyms, where the identification of the user is not required by Union or national law.” The Commission points to this as the safeguard. They have a point. It’s in the law. It’s binding. If you want to use your wallet pseudonymously on a platform that has no legal requirement to know who you are, the regulation says you can. Proponents argue this is a meaningful, enforceable right — and that critics conflating the wallet with mandatory real-name requirements are misreading the text.
The problem is the eleven words the Commission would prefer you not to dwell on: where the identification of the user is not required by Union or national law.
That clause means the pseudonymity right exists only in the space where no law has yet required your identity. It is protection that any member state can legislate away, for any service, with a single national law and a stated reason. Child protection. Anti-terrorism. Financial crime. Age verification. The reasons are not hard to find. The EU has no override mechanism — Brussels cannot prevent a member state from passing a law that, in its domestic application, triggers the exception and requires identification. So the right survives only until a government decides it shouldn’t. One parliament. One vote. The pseudonymity is gone for that service, in that country — legally, permanently, with the full blessing of the regulation’s own text.
And there’s something else the Commission won’t volunteer. The architecture meant to enforce the pseudonymity right — the mechanism that would actually prevent platforms from demanding your identity when they have no legal right to — was quietly gutted in implementation. Privacy advocates at epicenter.works, the only civil society organisation that worked on this file throughout the entire reform process, found that the Commission made relying party registration certificates optional rather than mandatory. Without mandatory certificates, the wallet cannot verify whether a company’s request for your real identity is legitimate or overreaching. Tech giants can demand identification in contexts that don’t legally require it. There is no technical mechanism to stop them. The safeguard exists in the legislation. The infrastructure that would make the safeguard real was made optional in the implementing regulations.
The Commission was told this directly. They proceeded anyway.
Civil society organisations warned EU officials in an open letter that the wallet “may eliminate anonymity, leading to over-identification and a loss of privacy.” Unacknowledged. One hundred and thirteen free speech and privacy experts wrote separately to raise similar concerns about the broader regulatory framework. Ignored. The pattern of constructing the infrastructure first and addressing rights concerns later — or not at all — is not a run of oversight failures. It’s a consistent set of choices made by people who understood exactly what they were choosing.
The Machine Is Already Running
People keep framing this as something that might happen. Future concerns. Hypothetical overreach.
It’s not the future.
The European Democracy Shield is operational — fifty action points, a European Centre for Democratic Resilience, a state-funded network of fact-checkers on Brussels money with a Brussels mandate, described in their own documents as “rapid response capacity” for information “crises.” The Commission decides what a crisis is. There is no external appeal. Just a bureaucrat with a mandate to act within 24 hours and a definition of disinformation so broad that it extends, in the Commission’s own telling, to content “that is not illegal.”
How broad? In May 2025, the Commission hosted a closed-door workshop with platform compliance teams. Training exercises. Internal documents. The US House Judiciary Committee obtained these documents under subpoena — you can disagree with the committee’s politics but you can’t argue with what the documents actually show. One exercise asked participants how to handle a post: an image of a teenage Muslim girl in a hijab alongside the text “we need to take back our country.” The exercise classified the combination as “illegal hate speech” requiring removal. Now, a reasonable person might argue about that specific scenario. Fine. Argue it. But the fact that this is the level at which European regulators are working — training platform compliance teams to remove common political sentiment combined with religious imagery, in closed-door workshops, before any court has ruled, before any democratic debate has happened — tells you something important about where the definitions are pointing.
Think about what that means in practice. Not in theory — in practice. A compliance officer at a platform with 400 million users gets a flag from a Brussels-funded body. The post contains a political opinion combined with an image. The body has designated it harmful. The platform has 24 hours. The alternative is a fine that could be measured in billions. Nobody phones a judge. Nobody consults the person who wrote it. The post disappears. And when it does — when that specific combination of political sentiment and religious imagery gets quietly removed from 400 million people’s feeds at 2am by someone following a process designed in a workshop that was closed to the public — that isn’t a transparency obligation. That’s the state deciding what the public is allowed to see. And doing it with plausible deniability built in at every layer.
That fact-checker network plugs directly into DSA enforcement. Platforms — X, Meta, TikTok, and by mid-2026 almost certainly ChatGPT, which already has three times the user numbers needed to trigger Very Large Online Platform designation — will be legally required to act on those findings. Not consider them. Act. Within 24 hours. Or face fines of 6% of global revenue.
The €120 million fine X received in December 2025 wasn’t for hosting child abuse content. It was for opacity — for not giving government-approved researchers access to the recommendation algorithm that determines what information reaches citizens. The Commission called it a transparency obligation. What it actually was: the state asserting the right to see inside the machine that shapes what the public thinks, so it can instruct the machine to shape it differently.
And when the Digital Identity Wallet closes the last gap — when the pseudonymity is quietly legislated away by a member state with a “reason,” when the VPN tunnel gets restricted, when every platform knows exactly who is saying what with a government-verified name attached — the system is complete. Everyone who speaks online, identified. Everything said, attributable. Every flag by a Brussels-appointed body, actionable within a day.
All of it constructed, piece by deliberate piece, in the name of protecting children from harm.
Final thoughts
The Soviet Union had a name for the officials who ran its censorship apparatus. Guardians of the public good. They had fact-checkers — called editors, party reviewers, information officers. Rapid response systems. Legal frameworks for acting on speech that threatened the stability of the state. Most of them genuinely believed they were protecting something real. That’s what makes these systems so durable — the people inside them are sincere.
They didn’t think of themselves as censors either.
What you are watching, from Madrid to London to Brussels, is the construction of a digital order in which the ability to speak freely, anonymously, without state knowledge, is being dismantled — not through jackboots but through frameworks, directives, DSA workshops, government-funded fact-checker networks, and the entirely reasonable-sounding proposition that we must protect our children.
Sánchez is a man whose government has been at war with X since the platform gave his opponents a direct line to Spanish voters that bypassed media institutions his party spent years cultivating. Starmer is a man whose government monitored social media during a domestic political crisis and then moved to expand its legal authority over the very platforms that let citizens talk about what they saw. The European Commission is a body of unelected officials who trained platform compliance teams, in closed-door workshops, to remove political sentiment they’d categorised as harmful — and then ignored 113 experts who wrote to warn them what they were building.
Keir Starmer is a man who appointed an Epstein associate as his personal envoy to Washington, knowing the relationship, knowing the history, and when it collapsed appointed himself the guardian of online child safety
These. Are. The self appointed guardians of the children.
They gave Epstein’s co-conspirators immunity and are still hiding their names two decades later. But they need to know yours before you can post a political opinion. They protected a trafficking network with clients in the highest levels of Western power. But you’re the threat that requires a Digital Identity Wallet. They redacted the men who procured children for a convicted paedophile while publishing the victims’ driver’s licenses. But your VPN is the problem that demands legislative action.
Call that what it is.
They didn’t prosecute the network because they were the network’s best customers. So how dare they invoke children’s safety to strip yours.
€2.5 billion extracted. Fourteen proceedings active. A Digital ID mandate rolling out across 27 countries by year’s end. VPNs under legislative attack in the birthplace of the Magna Carta. Parliamentary scrutiny openly bypassed in London. A Democracy Shield with a rapid response protocol for information crises that no one elected anyone to define.
They’ve been building this for ten years. The fines, the frameworks, the wallets, the fact-checkers, the VPN bans, the bypassed parliaments. Layer by layer. Always with a reason. Always with a child somewhere in the justification.
They’re nearly done.
And when it’s finished — when the wallet is in your pocket, the fact-checkers are wired to the platforms, the pseudonymity has been legislated away in some member state that needed a “reason,” the last encrypted tunnel closed — they will stand in front of all of it and tell you it was always, only, ever about the children.
An internet where you need permission to speak isn’t a safer internet. It’s a controlled one.
Epstein’s co-conspirators walk free while you need state permission to call them what they are.
Believe them if you want. History will know what it was.
Emmanuel Macron stood before the Munich Security Conference last week and offered a blueprint for what European governments should be allowed to delete from the internet. The French president wants mandatory identity verification for social media users, one account per person, algorithm transparency on the government’s terms, and the legal authority to block platforms that refuse to comply.
“We have to be sure there is one single person with one account,” Macron said. “If this is an AI system, if this is bot or organized by big organization, it should be just forbidden.”
The statement describes a system where every social media user would have their identity verified by platforms and tied to a single permitted account. Anonymous speech, pseudonymous commentary, and the ability to maintain separate personal and professional presences online would effectively end for anyone using platforms that serve the European market.
Macron suggested this as a way to protect democracy. The mechanism would give governments a powerful tool to identify, track, and silence any user whose speech they find objectionable.
France is moving to ban social media access for anyone under 15, a policy that requires verifying every user. Macron defended this by characterizing free expression online as a form of brainwashing.
“Free speech would mean I will give the mind, brand the heart of my teenagers to algorithm of big guys,” he said. “I’m not totally sure I share the values, or Chinese algorithm without any control. We are crazy.”
The argument runs as follows: letting young people encounter ideas online without government permission is insanity. The solution requires every user to prove their age to access platforms where public discussion happens.
Macron suggested that speech illegal in newspapers should remain illegal when moved online. “How is that the craziest and most harmful narratives can go unchecked in our digital space, where they will fall under the law if published in print?”
The question assumes “harmful narratives” is a category the government should define. It also assumes the government should have the power to prevent people from encountering ideas it has labeled crazy.
Macron invoked the Digital Services Act as the foundation for expanded censorship across Europe. “This is a very important regulation because for the first time we created the framework to regulate this platform.”
The DSA gives EU regulators the authority to demand content removal from platforms. Macron called for going further: using the law to “excuse those who clearly decide not to respect our rules and our regulation” and to “block all those [who allow] interferences in our systems.”
He offered a familiar list of speech categories he wants suppressed: “racist speech, hateful speech, anti-Semitic speech.” These terms have no fixed legal definition that applies uniformly across EU member states. Who is racist, what constitutes hatred, which criticism of which policies counts as anti-Semitism: these determinations would be made by regulators and platforms operating under government pressure.
Macron described limits on speech as somehow inherent to democracy itself: “When you have free speech, you have respect, you have rules, and the limit of my freedom is the beginning of your freedom.”
This formulation treats speech as equivalent to physical coercion. Your words are framed as a boundary violation against others simply by existing. The speech that most requires protection is speech that offends, that challenges consensus, that the powerful would prefer to suppress. Macron’s framework offers no protection for any of it.
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who opened the conference, echoed the European position that speech protections should end where government-defined values begin.
“A divide has opened up between Europe and the United States,” Merz said. “And Vice President JD Vance said this very openly here at the Munich Security Conference a year ago, and he was right. The battle of cultures of MAGA in the US is not ours. Freedom of speech here ends where the words spoken are directed against human dignity and our basic law.”
“Human dignity” is the phrase German law uses to justify prosecuting speech. The Constitutional Court has interpreted it to cover insults, Holocaust denial, and an expanding category of expression that authorities determine undermines respect for persons or groups. It is the legal mechanism under which German police have raided homes over social media posts and prosecuted people for memes.
European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen joined the censorship chorus with a declaration of territorial authority over online expression.
“I want to be very clear: our digital sovereignty is our digital sovereignty,” she said, adding the EU “will not flinch where this is concerned.”
Von der Leyen described European speech regulation as under attack from the United States, “which has wielded the threats of tariffs on partners to secure preferential access and has decried the EU’s digital rules as an assault on free speech.”
The EU’s digital rules are an assault on free speech. The DSA empowers bureaucrats to demand platforms remove content, under threat of massive fines.
The EU has opened formal proceedings against X for its policies. European regulators have forced platforms to suppress content that would be legally protected in the United States.
Von der Leyen framed resistance to this regime as a threat to Europe’s “democratic foundation.” She claimed Europe has “a long tradition in freedom of speech” while defending a legal structure designed to ensure certain speech never reaches European audiences.
“The European way of life – our democratic foundation and the trust of our citizens – is being challenged in new ways,” she said. “On everything from territories to tariffs or tech regulations.”
The phrasing groups speech regulation with tariffs and territorial disputes. All three are matters where Europe will defend its sovereignty. What Europeans are permitted to say, read, and share online is treated as equivalent to where national borders fall.
The leaders who gathered in Munich spoke of protecting democracy while proposing tools that would let governments identify and punish dissent. They invoked free speech while demanding the power to decide which speech is free. They claimed to defend Europe while stripping Europeans of the ability to speak freely online.
Ian Proud discusses why an economic reset with Russia is required for a stable peace and to prevent Europe from becoming a weakened relic of a unipolar past. As a former British diplomat, Proud performed a number of roles, including the Economic Counsellor at the UK’s embassy in Moscow between 2014 and 2019.
Russia is ready to discuss establishing “temporary external governance” in Ukraine under UN auspices to facilitate long-overdue democratic elections, Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin has said.
In an interview with TASS released on Sunday, Galuzin noted that the idea was first floated by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2025, describing it as one possible way to further the peace process.
This step, he said, “would make it possible to hold democratic elections in Ukraine, bring to power a capable government with which a full-fledged peace treaty could be signed, along with legitimate documents on future interstate cooperation.”
“In general, Russia is prepared to discuss with the US, European nations, and other countries the possibility of introducing temporary external governance in Kiev,” he added.
Galuzin acknowledged that while the UN “does not formally have a standardized mechanism” for these types of cases, there are historical precedents.
Moscow proposed the idea of external governance after the expiration of Vladimir Zelensky’s presidential term in 2024. At the time, the Ukrainian leader refused to hold new elections, citing martial law, which prompted Russia to declare him “illegitimate.” Moscow has since said Zelensky’s legal status is a major obstacle to concluding a binding peace deal.
Following US pressure, Zelensky signaled that he is open to having an election, but demanded security guarantees from the West and Russia.
In March 2025, the US dismissed the external management proposal, saying governance in Ukraine is “determined by its Constitution and the people of the country.” Prior to this, however, US President Donald Trump branded Zelensky “a dictator without elections.”
Patrik Baab is a German journalist and best-selling author who reported on both sides of the frontline in Ukraine. Baab outlines how the freedom of speech is destroyed by a failing political elite.
The Bureau of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), part of the Council of Europe (not the European Union), established in October 2025 a platform for Russians in exile called the Russian Democratic Forces, which is intended to represent a new Russian government-in-exile in Europe.
With little media attention, Europe is attempting to elevate the status of the Russian opposition, while openly admitting that the new, so-called opposition lacks the structure and power to make a significant difference. Above all, they admit that the selection of members for this so-called government-in-exile was fundamentally undemocratic.
Following the formation of a so-called representative delegation of Belarusian democratic forces, the Assembly recently decided to appoint a Russian delegation as well – again, without democratic consultation.
Regarding the Russian Democratic Forces, some individuals were invited to participate in hearings organized by Assembly committees. During these hearings, the discussions focused solely on how these figures could help end what they call “Russia’s war of aggression” and on ways to strengthen sanctions against Russia.
The most absurd claim is their desire to guarantee Russians access to free and independent media in order to counter Russian disinformation. This is reminiscent of the sanctions Europe has imposed on Russian media outlets such as RT, Sputnik, Channel One Russia, etc., and, of course, this geopolitical website, the Strategic Culture Foundation, where this article is published. The new media outlets they propose to establish are, naturally, funded by Europe itself – a platform for the so-called Russian government-in-exile.
They will rely exclusively on European disinformation articles opposing the current Russian government. The Russians in exile, out of fear, will write articles filled with anti-Russian propaganda and criticism, afraid of losing their European residence permits or visas should they write anything positive about Russia.
The absurdity of it all, of course, is that Europe itself has been censoring its own media and journalists since new legislation, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA), was approved. Since February 2025, the EU has officially implemented the 2022 law to combat disinformation, particularly what they call “fake news” originating from Russia.
Or take the European Media Freedom Act (EMFA): This law came into effect in May 2024 and supposedly protects media pluralism and ensures that journalists can work without state interference or abuse of legal process. An example of this absurdity – and the exact opposite of what the EMFA advocates – is the case of German journalist Hüseyin Dogru, who has been completely cut off from funding due to European Union sanctions and can no longer provide for his family’s basic needs while living in Germany. He is accused of spreading disinformation about Russia and Israel.
Another initiative is the so-called European Democracy Shield, presented in November 2025. This initiative aims to protect the EU’s democratic information space from foreign interference and information manipulation. Yet this initiative is now being violated by Europe itself. As they state: “The European Democracy Shield initiative aims to strengthen information integrity in Europe by addressing issues such as disinformation and election interference.” But this is exactly the opposite of what the EU is doing by establishing – by Europeans – a so-called Russian government-in-exile, which, by their own admission, may not have been entirely democratic in its establishment or candidate selection.
After all, it is the European Union itself, through the European Commission, that has established an undemocratic Russian government-in-exile, as they themselves admit. The president of the so-called committee that approves the candidates and the structure of the platform is German, and other committee members come from Spain and Cyprus. Not a single Russian sits on the Assembly’s board.
They even prepared a list of so-called “democratic” candidates promoting the new Russian government-in-exile – a list of “Participants of the Russian Democratic Forces” for the platform. This list is approved exclusively by the Bureau of the Assembly – the European Union, or in this case, the European Commission – based on a proposal from the President of the Assembly, who, as mentioned, is a European citizen of German nationality. The list of potential candidates is submitted to the President of the Assembly in consultation with organizations of the Russian Democratic Forces whose members meet the criteria, and is approved by them.
This is, of course, utterly absurd. Imagine the reverse situation: Russia establishes a committee for, say, Dutch or German citizens in exile, appoints them as the opposition government for the Netherlands and/or Germany, and recognizes them as a government-in-exile in Russia. Perhaps Russia should do this as counter-propaganda – to show Europe and make it clear that their behavior is absurd, undemocratic, and, above all, insane. I can just imagine the headlines in European media and the outrage from European politicians and journalists – full of words like “undemocratic and criminal” – if Russia were to do this!
Among the members of the so-called Russian government-in-exile are names such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oligarch once convicted in Russia for fraud and theft, who has already served time in a Russian prison, and chess grandmaster Garry Kasparov, who has a far stronger connection to modern-day Azerbaijan or Armenia, having been born and spent his entire childhood in Baku, present-day Azerbaijan.
Another well-known opponent is Vladimir Kara-Murza, who claims to have been poisoned by Putin – similar to the Skripal and Litvinenko cases, or more recently, the allegation that Navalny was poisoned in a Russian prison. He is described as a Russian-British political activist, journalist, author, filmmaker, and a former political prisoner. He is the vice-chairman of Open Russia, an NGO founded by the convicted former oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, which promotes civil society and democracy in Russia. In essence, they promote the interests of the US and Europe and advocate for Russia’s subordination to them, running as puppet presidents and governments for the West.
Also part of the new Russian government-in-exile are the deranged members of the provocative punk rock group Pussy Riot, such as Nadya Tolokonnikova. These individuals, eager to attract attention with provocative actions against the Russian Orthodox Church – actions bordering on Satanism (in Europe they are called feminists) – have been condemned in Russia for their behavior. Wikipedia (a Western propaganda tool) even acknowledges that public opinion in Russia is not sympathetic to the band members. They have been labeled an extremist organization in Russia. These are just a few candidates; the rest of those chosen are even less significant or unknown to the Russian people.
Europe is also using ethnic minorities in Russia – such as the Bashkirs, Chuvash, Tatars, Chechens, and many others – to sow division and thus break up Russia, following the example of the Balkanization of the former Yugoslavia. A good example of the propaganda machine targeting ethnic minorities in Russia is the German Center for East European and International Studies, called ZOiS, located in Berlin, Germany.
For instance, a certain PD Dr. Sabine von Löwis has written an article there on “Conflict Dynamics and Border Regions,” which discusses: “The disintegration of the Soviet Union led to the creation of not only the fifteen successor states but also a series of de facto states and peoples.” The goal is likely to drive a wedge between the various groups living in the Russian Federation.
The Russian government-in-exile, as the EU calls it, was established following the example of the Americans, who have appointed puppet presidents and governments worldwide to destabilize the countries they effectively occupy and thus plunder their resources. Russia itself is rich in resources such as gas, oil, and minerals. Some members of Russia’s indigenous peoples, as mentioned above, are also on the list of the so-called Russian government-in-exile. This is a blatant provocation by the EU to drive a wedge between Russians – or at least that is the intent. In recent years, entire sessions have appeared on YouTube proposing to divide Russia along ethnic lines, just as was done with the former Yugoslavia, which is now under the control of Europe and the US.
Recent examples of US regime change, with European assistance, include Syria, Venezuela, the blockade against Cuba, the ongoing destabilization of Greenland, and, of course, the conflict in Ukraine. Russia’s neighbors, such as Georgia, Moldova, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, have also fallen victim to provocations involving regime change and destabilization. This task is now largely reserved for the Europeans – particularly in Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia – with US assistance behind the scenes.
But do not think for a moment that Ukraine will be completely abandoned to Europe. The Americans, together with the Europeans, are eyeing the riches, natural resources, and rare earth metals found primarily in the Donbas, which are now largely in Russian hands. Leaving Ukraine to the Europeans is merely a pretext for so-called peace talks.
Times are growing dangerous these days, with an American administration that talks about peace while simultaneously attacking countries, kidnapping presidents, and throwing them in jail. It supports terrorist leaders in Syria and transfers thousands of ISIS terrorists from the Kurdish-controlled al-Hawl camp to Iraq. What will they do with them? Release them for a potential coming war against Iran – an ally of Russia? Hopefully not, but these days, we cannot be sure. The West is in free fall, without rules or morals.
European officials who continue to oppose dialogue with Russia are suffering from “political myopia,” Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov has said. The comments come after Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda criticized some EU members for “knocking on the Kremlin’s door.”
Speaking to national broadcaster LRT this week, Nauseda lamented growing EU discussion of renewed diplomatic engagement with Russia, arguing it undermines bloc unity. “We have to act together and not send this or that representative to knock on or scratch the Kremlin’s door,” he said.
Any European leader can have a direct line to Russian President Vladimir Putin if requested, Peskov countered. The Russian leader prefers contact “even where very serious contradictions exist” because dialogue helps resolve tensions, he added.
Politicians who insist on isolating Russia are stuck in an “absolutely shortsighted, irrational, and senseless approach” that demonstrates “political illiteracy, political myopia, and nothing more,” Peskov stated.
French President Emmanuel Macron and Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni are among the leaders advocating renewed diplomacy with Moscow. France and Russia have restored technical-level contacts, although no top-level calls are planned, Peskov previously reported.
The potential thaw comes as European leaders fear the isolation strategy will prevent them from influencing US-mediated efforts to end the Ukraine conflict.
The EU’s foreign policy chief, Kaja Kallas, previously said Brussels is drafting demands for Moscow and will not accept a peace deal unless its conditions are met. Russia has repeatedly said it will not be pressured into an agreement that undermines its national security or serves as a pause for Ukraine to rebuild its military and renew hostilities.
Col Douglas Macgregor argues that Trump ran on ending “endless wars” and prioritizing America First, yet instead presides over a massive, unaccountable $1.5 trillion defense budget and a widening set of military confrontations. Rather than reducing foreign interventions, U.S. policy is escalating tensions—especially with Iran and Russia—while failing to end the war in Ukraine.
They criticize U.S. seizures of Russian, Iranian, and Venezuelan oil tankers as symbolic, economically trivial, and strategically pointless actions that risk provoking Russia without meaningfully weakening its war effort. These moves are framed more as political theater and economic self-interest (boosting U.S. oil exports) than serious strategy.
The discussion rejects claims—circulating in European media and think tanks—that Russia would quickly attack NATO or the Baltics after a Ukraine ceasefire, calling such scenarios absurd fear-mongering designed to justify perpetual conflict and sustain Cold War–era institutions. The argument is that Russia lacks both the interest and incentive to expand westward and would prefer normalized economic relations.
Overall, the segment contends that Washington, European leaders, and influential think tanks are more invested in maintaining hostility and ongoing wars than in pursuing negotiated settlements. Trump’s instincts may lean toward ending conflicts, the speaker concludes, but he has failed to act decisively, allowing wars and tensions to continue despite campaign promises to the contrary.
Since the war started, voices in the alternative media have said that Ukraine cannot win a war against Russia. Indeed, John Mearsheimer has been saying this since 2014.
Four years into this devastating war, those voices feel at one and the same time both vindicated and unheard. Ukraine is losing yet western leaders in Europe appear bent on continuing the fight.
Nothing is illustrative of this more than Kaja Kallas’ ridiculous comment of 10 February that Russia should agree to pre-conditions to end the war, which included future restrictions on the size of Russia’s army.
Comments such as this suggest western figures like Kallas still believe in the prospect of a strategic victory against Russia, such that Russia would have to settle for peace as the defeated party. Or they are in denial, and/or they are lying to their citizens. I’d argue that it is a mixture of the second and third.
When I say losing, I don’t mean losing in the narrow military sense. Russia’s territorial gains over the winter period have been slow and marginal. Indeed, western commentators often point to this as a sign that, given its size advantage, Russia is in fact losing the war, because if it really was powerful, it would have defeated Ukraine long ago.
And on the surface, it might be easy to understand why some European citizens accept this line, not least as they are bombarded with it by western mainstream media on a constant basis.
However, most people also, at the same time, agree that drone warfare has made rapid territorial gains costly in terms of lost men and materiel. There is a lot of evidence to suggest that since the second part of 2023, after Ukraine’s failed summer counter-offensive, Russia has attacked in small unit formations to infiltrate and encircle positions.
Having taken heavy losses at the start of the war using tactics that might have been conventional twenty years ago, Russia’s armed forces had to adapt and did so quickly. Likewise, Russia’s military industrial complex has also been quicker to shift production into newer types of low cost, easy build military technology, like drones and glide bombs, together with standard munitions that western providers have been unable to match in terms of scale.
And despite the regular propaganda about Russian military losses in the tens of thousands each month, the data from the periodic body swaps between both sides suggest that Ukraine has been losing far more men in the fight than Russia. And I mean, at a ratio far greater than ten to one.
Some western pundits claim that, well, Russia is advancing so it is collecting its dead as it moves forward. But those same pundits are the ones who also claim that Russia is barely moving forward at all. In a different breath, you might also hear them claim that Russia is about to invade Estonia at any moment.
Of course, the propaganda war works in both directions, from the western media and, of course, from Russian. I take the view that discussion of the microscopic daily shifts in control along the line of contact is a huge distraction.
The reality of who is winning, or not winning, this war is in any case not about a slowly changing front line. Wars are won by economies not armies.
Those western pundits who also tell you that Russia will run out of money tomorrow – it really won’t – never talk about the fact that Ukraine is functionally bankrupt and totally dependent on financial gifts which the EU itself has to borrow, in order to provide. War fighting for Ukraine has become a lucrative pyramid scheme, with Zelensky promising people like Von der Leyen that it is a solid investment that will eventually deliver a return, until the day the war ends, when EU citizens will ask where all their tax money disappeared to.
Russia’s debt stands at 16% of its GDP, its reserves over $730 billion, its yearly trade surplus still healthy, even if it has narrowed over the past year.
Russia can afford to carry on the fight for a lot longer.
Ukraine cannot.
And Europe cannot.
And that is the point.
The Europeans know they can’t afford the war. Ukraine absolutely cannot afford the war, even if Zelensky is happy to see the money keep flowing in. Putin knows the Europeans and Ukraine can’t afford the war. In these circumstances, Russia can insist that Ukraine withdraws from the remainder of Donetsk unilaterally without having to fight for it, on the basis that the alternative is simply to continue fighting.
He can afford to maintain a low attritional fight along the length of the frontline, which minimises Russian casualties and maximises Ukraine’s expenditure of armaments that Europe has to pay for.
That constant financial drain of war fighting is sowing increasing political discord across Europe, from Germany, to France, Britain and, of course, Central Europe.
Putin gets two benefits for the price of one. Europe causing itself economic self-harm while at the same time going into political meltdown.
That is why western leaders cannot admit that they have lost the war because they have been telling their voters from the very beginning that Ukraine would definitely win.
Europe’s leaders are hiding from the political reckoning that they will face, as their voters wake up to the fact that they were lied to.
Who will want to vote for Merz, Macron, Tusk, Starmer and all these other tinpot statesmen when it becomes clear that they have royally screwed the people of Europe for a stupid proxy war in Ukraine that was unwinnable?
What will Kaja Kallas do for a job when everyone in Europe can see that she’s a dangerous warmonger who did absolutely nothing for the right reason, and who failed at everything?
Zelensky is wondering where he can flee to when his number’s up, my bet would be Miami.
So if you are watching the front line every day you need to step back from the canvas.
When the war ends, Putin will reengage with Europe but from a position of power not weakness.
Tensions between Hungary and Ukraine have reached a new level of severity, dangerously approaching the possibility of open confrontation. What was once limited to diplomatic disagreements and rhetorical disputes now takes on broader strategic dimensions, with potential for regional destabilization. The recent statement by Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, labeling Ukraine as an “enemy,” should not be seen as mere rhetoric but as an indication of a structural rupture in bilateral relations — and possibly a prelude to more serious developments.
The immediate trigger of the crisis lies in Kiev’s insistence, with support from sectors in Brussels, that Budapest end its energy cooperation with Russia. For Hungary, a country highly dependent on external energy supplies, agreements with Moscow are not an ideological choice but a strategic necessity. Any attempt to interfere in this area is perceived by the Hungarian government as a direct violation of its sovereignty and national security.
However, the energy issue is only the surface of a deeper problem. For years, Budapest has denounced discriminatory Ukrainian policies against the Hungarian minority in the Transcarpathian region. Occurrences of forced recruitment, linguistic pressure, and cultural marginalization have fueled growing resentment within Hungary. All of this has contributed to the intensification of bilateral tensions.
It is precisely at this point that the risk of armed conflict begins to gain relevance. Although a direct war between two European countries seems unlikely in the short term, history shows that conflicts often emerge from poorly managed crises involving ethnic minorities and border disputes. Hungary, a member of NATO and the European Union, could not act militarily without triggering serious continental repercussions. Nevertheless, even a mere hardening of its posture — such as reinforcing military presence at the border, conducting strategic exercises, or creating mechanisms to protect the Hungarian diaspora — would already significantly raise regional tensions.
For the Kiev regime, which faces a prolonged conflict with Russia, opening an additional front with a NATO neighbor would be strategically disastrous. However, the logic of total war and permanent mobilization tends to reduce the margin for political concessions. If the Ukrainian government interprets Hungarian criticism as internal sabotage of its war effort, it may respond with even harsher measures — deepening the cycle of hostility.
The European Union thus faces a delicate dilemma. If it chooses to pressure Budapest to align unconditionally with the pro-Ukraine agenda, it risks deepening internal divisions and fueling sovereigntist movements within the bloc. On the other hand, if it recognizes the legitimacy of Hungary’s concerns, it may be accused of weakening political support for Kiev. In either case, European cohesion suffers.
The potential developments go beyond the immediate military dimension. A diplomatic escalation will result in Hungary more and more systematically vetoing European initiatives favorable to Ukraine, blocking financial packages, and paralyzing strategic decisions at the EU level. In a more extreme scenario, internal sanctions against Budapest or even mechanisms to suspend rights within the EU could arise — measures that would further aggravate the political environment.
On the military front, even if direct confrontation remains unlikely, border incidents, refugee crises, or disputes involving consular protection of dual citizens cannot be ruled out. In prolonged conflict contexts, small incidents can quickly escalate out of control.
The central fact is that formal rhetoric of enmity changes the nature of bilateral relations. When one state frames another as a direct threat, institutions begin preparing for scenarios of containment and potential confrontation. Europe, already marked by a large-scale conflict in the East, may be approaching a new focal point of instability.
Hungary has every right to use all necessary means to protect itself from Ukrainian provocations — including military means if diplomatic efforts fail. The only remaining question is whether, in such a scenario, NATO and the EU would side with one of their member states or continue to ignore Ukrainian crimes, as they have done in the current conflict with Russia.
Trump claims Iran’s military is routed just as IRGC launched missiles strike American bases
RT | June 10, 2026
The Iranian military has been “completely defeated,” US President Donald Trump has claimed, warning Tehran it will “pay the price” for delaying a deal with Washington.
The warnings came after Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) announced missile and drone strikes on American military facilities in several Arab countries in retaliation for recent US attacks. US Central Command said the operations inside Iran were carried out after an AH-64 Apache helicopter was lost near the Strait of Hormuz, an incident it blamed on Tehran.
Trump posted on Truth Social on Wednesday that Iran “is all talk and no action,” adding that “The Bully of the Middle East is DEAD!!!” … Full article
HEAT exposure could drive a dramatic rise in cardiovascular disease (CVD) burden across the USA over the next 25 years, with researchers warning that climate change and population ageing may combine to reverse decades of progress in heart health.
Heat Exposure Threatens Future Heart Health A new modelling study estimated that heat-attributable CVD burden could more than triple by 2050 under a high greenhouse gas emissions scenario, disproportionately affecting older adults and economically disadvantaged communities. … Full article
… Climate change and land use conversion have the potential to increase the frequency of encounters between snakes and humans. This situation arises due to changes in temperature and rainfall, the loss of natural habitats, and shifts in food sources, which drive snakes to move into areas closer to human activity.
Prof Mirza Dikari Kusrini, a lecturer in the Department of Forest Resource Conservation and Ecotourism, Faculty of Forestry and Environment (Fahutan) at IPB University, explained that climate change affects snakes’ behavior, distribution, and movement patterns. … Full article
This site is provided as a research and reference tool. Although we make every reasonable effort to ensure that the information and data provided at this site are useful, accurate, and current, we cannot guarantee that the information and data provided here will be error-free. By using this site, you assume all responsibility for and risk arising from your use of and reliance upon the contents of this site.
This site and the information available through it do not, and are not intended to constitute legal advice. Should you require legal advice, you should consult your own attorney.
Nothing within this site or linked to by this site constitutes investment advice or medical advice.
Materials accessible from or added to this site by third parties, such as comments posted, are strictly the responsibility of the third party who added such materials or made them accessible and we neither endorse nor undertake to control, monitor, edit or assume responsibility for any such third-party material.
The posting of stories, commentaries, reports, documents and links (embedded or otherwise) on this site does not in any way, shape or form, implied or otherwise, necessarily express or suggest endorsement or support of any of such posted material or parts therein.
The word “alleged” is deemed to occur before the word “fraud.” Since the rule of law still applies. To peasants, at least.
Fair Use
This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. We are making such material available in our efforts to advance understanding of environmental, political, human rights, economic, democracy, scientific, and social justice issues, etc. We believe this constitutes a ‘fair use’ of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law. In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. For more info go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml. If you wish to use copyrighted material from this site for purposes of your own that go beyond ‘fair use’, you must obtain permission from the copyright owner.
DMCA Contact
This is information for anyone that wishes to challenge our “fair use” of copyrighted material.
If you are a legal copyright holder or a designated agent for such and you believe that content residing on or accessible through our website infringes a copyright and falls outside the boundaries of “Fair Use”, please send a notice of infringement by contacting atheonews@gmail.com.
We will respond and take necessary action immediately.
If notice is given of an alleged copyright violation we will act expeditiously to remove or disable access to the material(s) in question.
All 3rd party material posted on this website is copyright the respective owners / authors. Aletho News makes no claim of copyright on such material.
Aletho News 