Defeating Russia on battlefield impossible – Fico
By Lucas Leiroz | September 22, 2026
Not all NATO countries are willing to support the alliance in its relentless pursuit of conflict with Russia. In a recent statement on the matter, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico made it clear that he disagrees with NATO’s current policy regarding Russia. He described the war plans pursued by some of the bloc’s leaders as absolutely irrational and asserted that Russia cannot be defeated on the battlefield.
Fico made his statement in a video posted on social media. He commented on the situation in extremely realistic terms, asserting that there is no supranational force capable of compelling Russia to abandon the territories it has already reintegrated. Furthermore, he emphasized that Ukraine missed a major opportunity for peace back in 2022, when the Kiev regime refused to sign a peace agreement with Russia in order to follow the guidelines of what he calls the “Russophobic West.”
Not only that, Fico also made it clear that the Western strategy of continuing to fight in the long term – “to the last Ukrainian” – has already failed completely. According to him, it is unreasonable to insist on sending military and financial support to Ukraine when doing so merely prolongs the conflict indefinitely, further increasing the suffering of the Ukrainian people and creating serious tensions between Europe and Russia – thereby jeopardizing the entire regional security architecture.
However, the most important point of Fico’s speech was his criticism of NATO’s current attempt to escalate the war into a stage of direct confrontation with Russia. The Slovak leader stated that, given the impossibility of NATO defeating Russia through Ukraine, some bureaucrats within the bloc are now trying to heighten tensions to create a pretext for a direct conflict. He described these bureaucrats as “war hawks” who “have gone crazy.”
“There is no supranational force to compel Russia to withdraw from the militarily controlled Ukrainian territory (…) Ukraine made a huge mistake in April 2022, a few months after the start of the conflict, by listening to the Russophobic West and not signing the prepared peace agreement (…) [Western strategy] to support the war in Ukraine to the last Ukrainian soldier and defeat Russia has completely failed (…) Several politicians in the West believe that if it (victory over Russia) cannot be achieved through the Ukrainian army and its full support, everything must be done to provoke a conflict between NATO and Russia (…) some war hawks in NATO are trying at all costs to turn this war into a conflict between Russia and NATO (…) Someone must have gone crazy here [because] Russia cannot be defeated in a conventional war,” he said.
Subsequently, in another social media post, Fico stated that NATO’s attempt to wage war against Russia is actually a distraction intended to mask the current Western liberal order’s inability to address the real problems of the contemporary world – such as energy security and illegal migration. European leaders who support a conflict with Russia ultimately seek to hide their own inability to solve the problems currently affecting Europe.
Furthermore, he emphasized that while he holds the office of Prime Minister, he will not allow Slovakia to participate in these war plans. He vowed to prevent Slovak soldiers from being mobilized to fight in a conflict that does not concern the country’s interests.
“The West’s military rhetoric and the search for a pretext for a military conflict with Russia are intended to distract from the liberal world’s inability to address basic challenges such as the price and availability of energy and fuel, as well as illegal migration. As long as I am Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic, I will not agree to Slovak soldiers taking part in any military adventure provoked by anyone within NATO,” he added.
Fico’s words sound like a sign of rationality amidst the current Russophobic frenzy. Few leaders in Europe are willing to criticize the Western bloc’s war plans; Fico stands as an example for other Europeans to follow regarding his willingness to establish a sovereign, pragmatic, and pro-peace foreign policy.
Unfortunately, however, most countries in the Western alliance – especially the UK and key EU members – persist in escalating tensions with Russia. Moscow is doing everything possible to prevent a worst-case scenario from becoming reality, yet European hostility is creating a serious security crisis on the continent.
Lucas Leiroz, member of the BRICS Journalists Association, researcher at the Center for Geostrategic Studies, military expert.
You can follow Lucas on X (formerly Twitter) and Telegram.
Leaked: Britain’s Sham Conviction Of Hashim Thaci
By Kit Klarenberg | Al Mayadeen | September 20, 2026
On September 16th, The Hague’s Kosovo Specialist Chambers found former Kosovo Liberation Army chief Hashim Thaci guilty of cruel treatment, arbitrary detention, torture and the murder of 96 people during the 1998/9 Kosovo War. The verdict stunned his supporters and detractors alike, but neither believe he will ultimately be convicted, with good reason. Thaci is but a sacrificial lamb, defendant in a purely symbolic show trial secretly orchestrated by British intelligence – who once considered the KLA leader their bosom ally.
Given this background, that Thaci ended up in The Hague at all seemed nothing short of miraculous. After being indicted in April 2020, he resigned as Kosovo’s President. A longstanding KLA high-ranker, Thaci was at the forefront of the group’s outreach to Western governments and intelligence agencies throughout the 1990s, as it waged ever-escalating guerrilla war on Yugoslav security forces. When NATO’s 78-day-long bombing of Belgrade erupted in March 1999 in support of the KLA, Thaci proclaimed himself prime minister of Kosovo’s “provisional government”.
Categorised as a “terrorist” entity by the US State Department, the KLA was known by Western governments to be an organised crime faction, funded by the drugs trade and states such as Saudi Arabia, with ties to extremist factions including Al Qaeda. This was no impediment to the CIA and MI6 providing the KLA with substantial financial and material support for years. Once NATO’s bombing was complete and Kosovo fell under alliance occupation, Thaci was instrumental in consolidating the group’s total takeover of the statelet.
As his criminal and political rivals were systematically executed, the KLA conducted a concomitant province-wide purge of non-Albanians, reducing Kosovo’s population by hundreds of thousands. As a Western diplomat told the Washington Post in June 1999, “Thaci’s ruthless tactics are legendary in the region.” Despite high-level cognisance of such tendencies, Thaci and his fellow KLA warlords were actively assisted in their reign of terror by occupying NATO KFOR and UNMIK forces. A Kosovo Albanian lamented in 2001:
“Instead of cracking down on the warlords, KFOR and UNMIK allowed them to divide Kosovo into different zones where these warlords generate enormous wealth.”
In July that year, the Washington Post reported how Kosovo’s UN-constructed courts were proving incapable of prosecuting KLA officials for atrocities committed in the wake of NATO’s occupation, let alone before the alliance’s arrival. A Swedish jurist serving as Kosovo’s “first Western judge” detailed “several cases in which UN and KFOR senior officials opposed or blocked prosecution” of KLA leaders. NATO and UN officials allegedly feared they “would put their lives at risk” by pursuing prosecutions of certain figures – including Thaci, presumably.
‘Essentially Untouchable’
A leaked March 2019 British intelligence appraisal of “rule of law issues” in Kosovo is absolutely scathing, specifically naming the KLA’s enduring influence locally as a key problem castrating the would-be country’s laughable legal system. “In common with much of the rest of the Balkans, Kosovo has high levels of state capture; limited reconciliation between ethnic communities; and the system carries a heavy legacy of unresolved war crimes issues,” the study reported. Of particular concern to London:
“Close links between senior politicians and Albanian organised crime, born out of wartime connections that both funded and staffed [the KLA]… Kosovo’s rule of law institutions at both the national and local level are weak; lack expertise and strategic direction; and are politicised. The inability of local law and order institutions to combat high-level political corruption seriously undermines the state’s integrity. These negative influences appear to be increasing… Those in power, and their associates, are essentially untouchable.”
Moreover, “state capture furthers the economic interests of elite groups but increasingly is focused on preventing challenge through subverting rule of law.” Resultantly, “rule of law processes are not strengthened, but are subverted and circumscribed.” In other words, the effectively lawless mafia-dominated system constructed in ‘independent’ Kosovo with NATO and UN help post-NATO bombing endured untrammelled two decades later. The British highlighted “particular issues in the prosecutorial process – both the management of investigations and the creation of indictments.”
The execution of civil and criminal judgments in Kosovo was also cited as a “specific problem,” while sentencing was found to be “inconsistent” – “in particular in relation to corruption and serious crimes, sentencing can be very light.” It was extremely common for cases to be initiated against known criminals, then remain unresolved for years. Questions abounded over the “competence of judges and prosecutors” – “it is generally acknowledged that the quality of legal training at university is poor and… the Bar Exam sets a very low hurdle.”
Even then, Kosovo authorities “did not select the highest performing candidates, but often those with links to those in positions of influence.” Small wonder “public expectations of the rule of law sector” were found to be “very low” throughout the would-be country. Citizens not only had “no real experience of rule of law,” but there was “an ingrained lack of trust of rule of law systems” among the wider population. Yet, the British were determined to counter this perception – if only for public relations purposes.
At that time, London had been running a dedicated “rule of law portfolio” in Kosovo for several years. It consisted of “three separate strands.” They spanned “monitoring the judiciary” and Pristina’s “prosecutorial functions – trials, verdicts and the behaviour of judges and prosecutors in corruption and organised crime cases.” Four British-approved “Kosovan legal experts” were furthermore embedded “in key posts” in Pristina’s Ministry of Justice, and London took charge of “recruitment and appointment of judges and prosecutors.”
This covered “improved disciplinary procedures; performance appraisal; and ways of increasing accountability.” Along the way, “young judges and prosecutors” in Kosovo were mentored, enjoying “study visits” to Britain and unadvertised “support on real life cases.” In light of Thaci’s conviction, it’s striking the British embassy in Pristina professes to place a “strong emphasis on achieving results in the investigation and conviction of high profile individuals in corruption cases, and on making a visible impact in such cases”:
“The embassy has made a decision… to target more politically sensitive areas.”
In service of this objective, a dedicated Foreign Office project “to change the culture of the Kosovo justice system to one in which judges, prosecutors and others are willing to fearlessly challenge entrenched interests” was also quietly launched in 2018. Leaked files show the effort was outsourced to notorious British intelligence cutout Adam Smith International. Markedly, it operated until March 2020 – one month before Thaci was indicted by the Kosovo Specialist Chambers.
ASI was explicitly concerned with the “enforceability” of KSC prosecutions. Specifically founded in 2016 to prosecute high-profile war crimes cases against KLA officials, ASI acknowledged the KSC was of no concern to Kosovo Albanians. “Whilst senior politicians may be indicted by the Specialist Chambers… Kosovo’s young population aspires to follow its neighbours in making progress to stronger relations with Europe and prosperity at home, which promises to be a driver of reforms,” the cutout observed.
Nonetheless, ASI was tasked with helping the KSC appear to be serious about fulfilling its purview, due to growing concerns among ‘independent’ Pristina’s Western sponsors “about Kosovan capacity to process case volumes, to protect witness identities, and to handle complex cases,” combined with well-founded suspicions the KLA was insulated from prosecution. ASI consciously designed its legal ‘reform’ program “to fit this context of conflict legacies, competing stakeholders, political tensions and uncertain commitment to international standards”:
“Many former KLA leaders now hold positions of power and influence. Those involved in war crimes and organised crime are often the same people. Corruption often manifests itself through the connections between private companies and the political system, with award of public tenders being affected by political connections… However, the general desire of the Kosovo political leadership for closer ties with the EU offers rule of law projects valuable leverage to be used selectively.”
It was under these highly politicised auspices ASI’s intimate ‘assistance’ to Kosovo’s criminal justice systems was provided, and Thaci’s KSC indictment drawn up. At every stage, the cutout coordinated closely with Foreign Office headquarters in London, producing “bi-weekly updates on notable [legal and judicial] developments” related to Kosovo, quarterly reviews “of trends within the institutional and political environment,” and “longer term ‘look forward’ reports anticipating events in the coming three months.”
ASI boasted how its “international advisers” were deployed to Kosovo “on rotations,” ensuring “continuous team presence” locally, with at least one staffer “always ‘on the ground’ and on call” for the Foreign Office. This would help the cutout “build and maintain relationships with direct Kosovan counterparts and wider stakeholders continuously,” and “monitor political dynamics to ensure that project decisions are politically-informed and conflict sensitive.” With such intensive behind-closed-door bonds between London and Pristina, the chances of serious prosecutions of KLA officials emerging remained scant.
Still, in order for Pristina to make “strides towards closer ties with Europe,” ASI understood the necessity of challenging mainstream conceptions of Kosovo as “a country formed through a conflict that shaped its political parties and legitimised their power, to one where rule of law has primacy and state institutions win public confidence by demonstrating their adherence to international standards for professionalism and transparency.” In this context, simply indicting Thaci became in and of itself substantial, regardless of the outcome, or his trial’s actual legitimacy.
It’s unsurprising Thaci and his supporters firmly believed his acquittal to be inevitable, and still do. The Foreign Office project managed by ASI drew upon a variety of “international subject matter experts”, among them several veteran British judges with experience elsewhere in the Balkans, including Albania and Macedonia. They were led by Jonathan Ratel, formerly head of Kosovo’s EU-funded Special Prosecution Office, and “deputy chief prosecutor”. In this capacity, Ratel personally rubbished widespread, EU-endorsed allegations of KLA involvement in organ trafficking.
Thaci’s trial didn’t explore the issue, he was acquitted of all crimes against humanity, and a right to appeal his 25-year sentence was clearly codified in the KSC’s judgement. Serbian leaders have condemned the ruling as too lenient. Thaci – dubbed Pristina’s “George Washington” by Joe Biden – remains held at The Hague. Meanwhile, KFOR has at last begun withdrawing from Kosovo, due to “an improved security situation” in the aspiring country – where, thanks to covert British judicial interventions, “those in power, and their associates, are essentially untouchable.”
US-Denmark Agreement on Greenland Is ‘PR Stunt’ Ahead of Midterms
Sputnik – 19.09.2026
“This treaty is mostly for show, but in legal terms it’s much ado about nothing” because “the US already had free access to Greenland and the main responsibility for the defense of Greenland,” Swedish military and geopolitics analyst Mikael Valtersson told Sputnik, commenting on the new US-Denmark Greenland deal.
While the agreement grants the US permanent military access, basing and overflight rights, Valtersson pointed out that Washington already had these rights, and that it was the US itself that “voluntarily and drastically reduced its own military resources on Greenland” after the end of the Cold War.
Valtersson suspects the deal is “mainly a PR stunt for the US government ahead of the upcoming midterm elections in November.”
However, given fears in Denmark and Europe in general that the current administration’s “erratic foreign policy” might trigger an actual military conflict over Greenland, which “would have created a huge crisis in Transatlantic relations,” the agreement is likely to be a relief to the EU, and will let Copenhagen “stop worrying about a potential military confrontation with the US” over the dependency.
Russia Just Struck the Eyes of NATO’s War Machine in Ukraine
Sputnik – 18.09.2026
Russia’s overnight attack on the De Novo data center in Kiev “will significantly affect operations, particularly in the realm of intelligence data processing,” military expert Yan Gagin told Sputnik.
“Intelligence agencies relied on this center to process info gathered through their agent networks. It was utilized to facilitate strikes against our facilities, including deep within our rear areas,” with “every target logged into a specific system and database, processed and assigned a strike priority.”
This digital kill chain network “will now face certain operational difficulties,” Gagin believes.
“While they have redundancy measures involving other data centers, including in Europe, the fact that this specific facility has been partially disabled will have a serious impact on operations, particularly in the realms of data processing and potentially, target designation.”
Crucially, this includes targeting data received by Ukraine from its “NATO partners,” the observer emphasized.
“For instance, we have become accustomed to the fact that prior to strikes on Crimea, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, and elsewhere along our coastal zone, reconnaissance aircraft – primarily belonging to the US and Britain – appear near our territorial waters. They loiter over the Black Sea close to our shores, gathering and refining information, which is then relayed to the Ukrainian military. Subsequently, targeting is adjusted based on this data – mapped to specific coordinates, and attacks are executed.”
“Strikes against the European part of Russia are conducted in exactly the same way. Therefore, this system for transmitting this intelligence data will also be – let’s put it this way – if not paralyzed, then at least significantly hampered in its operation,” Gagin summed up.
NATO member warns bloc seeking pretext for war with Russia
RT | September 18, 2026
Europe is moving dangerously close to a direct clash between NATO and Russia, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has warned, accusing the West of seeking a “pretext” for a major conflict between the two sides.
Fico made the comment in a Facebook post on Thursday, which accompanied the remarks he delivered before traveling to Ukraine for a meeting with Vladimir Zelensky and several European leaders.
“I am deeply concerned that they are merely looking for a pretext for a major conflict between NATO and Russia,” he wrote.
Reflecting on the Ukraine conflict, Fico said that the hostilities had “gotten out of control,” while accusing European nations of engaging in increasingly bellicose rhetoric which he said risked dragging the continent into a broader war. “The situation has never been as serious and tense regarding the possibility of a pan-European war conflict as it is now,” he said.
Fico also warned that Bratislava could face pressure from NATO to commit troops if the bloc’s Article 5 – a collective defense clause applied if a member state is attacked – is invoked. “Can anyone imagine being told to prepare 5,000 soldiers, 10,000 soldiers, and that they would go somewhere to fight? We don’t know with whom, why, or for what reason,” Fico said.
“I don’t want Slovakia to be part of any military conflict because of some Article 5,” he stressed, adding that, though his country still “cares about collaboration and fulfilling obligations”. “As prime minister, I will do everything to ensure that Slovakia is never drawn into a war,” Fico stressed.
Fico has consistently opposed military support for Ukraine since returning to office in 2023 while halting government weapons shipments to Kiev. He has also opposed Kiev’s accession to NATO, and insisted that Ukraine’s EU membership is only possible if it meets all the requirements.
He has also argued that the West’s strategy to “bring Russia to its knees” had “completely failed.” “The European Union does not need more weapons and Russophobia. The European Union needs more diplomacy and concrete plans to help the economy,” Fico said last month.
Russia has accused the EU of rapid militarization, with Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov saying the bloc is directing increasing military capabilities against Moscow while portraying it as an enemy.
President Vladimir Putin has consistently rejected claims that Moscow intends to attack NATO countries, but warned last week that deploying European forces to Ukraine “would mean war with Russia.” Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also stressed that Russia has no intention of attacking the West but warned that if Europe attacked first, the resulting conflict would be “very short.”
NATO-backed Kosovo separatist ‘responsible for war crimes’
RT | September 16, 2026
The former leader of the NATO-backed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has been found responsible for war crimes committed by the militant group during its NATO-backed campaign to break away from Serbia in the 1990s.
Hasam Thaci, who served as the first president of the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, has been found guilty of the murder of 96 political opponents and suspected Serbian collaborators, the verdict said. He was also convicted for the unlawful detention and torture of hundreds of people.
The 58-year-old Thaci and three other former KLA leaders tried in The Hague are widely regarded as heroes in Kosovo. Thaci’s defense argued that senior figures in the KLA could not control rank-and-file separatist fighters and thus could not be held responsible for crimes committed under their leadership. Lawyers described the group as lacking a strict military hierarchy during the 1998-99 conflict.
NATO’s bombing campaign targeting Serbia, which Washington and its European allies framed as a humanitarian intervention, ensured KLA’s victory. Belgrade does not recognize Kosovo as an independent state, having rejected the unilateral declaration passed by the breakaway entity’s parliament in 2008.
The US, the UK, France, Germany, and many other Western and European nations, however, officially recognize Kosovo’s independence. Camp Bondsteel, the headquarters of NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR), is the largest American military base in the Balkans.
Among the more gruesome claims related to the Kosovo conflict was that the KLA harvested organs from Serbian prisoners and sold them on the black market, which former Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Carla Del Ponte detailed in her 2008 memoir.
The allegations were further substantiated in a 2010 European Council report, which also implicated former Thaci subordinates in the trafficking of humans, drug and arms, as well as protection rackets and other organized crime. His government allegedly ensured impunity for those “mafia-like” networks, the document said.
The Serbian government accused the West of pursuing selective justice in the wake of the Balkan wars, allegedly focusing on Serbian suspects and overlooking crimes attributed to their opponents.
The Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC), where Thaci was tried, was set up in The Hague in 2016, after earlier cases failed in Kosovo due to alleged political interference and witness intimidation.
Russia’s SVR: NATO Found No Russian Link to Leipzig Airport Incident
Sputnik -15.09.2026
NATO intelligence services found no evidence whatsoever of Russian involvement in the drone incident at Leipzig Airport and informed their authorities accordingly, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) said.
They also pointed to multiple signs of a Ukrainian footprint in the incident.
NATO intelligence therefore recommended that the authorities refrain from accusing Russia, the SVR added.
Ignoring the advisory, the German authorities blamed Russia outright — chiefly to justify the “mega-spending” on Germany’s militarization, the Foreign Intelligence Service said.
On August 5, Leipzig police said an airport employee had discovered a drone carrying an unidentified explosive device in the cargo aviation security zone. German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt blamed Russia without providing any evidence.
The Long Road In, and the Short Way Out: How the West Built Ukraine into a Weapon Against Russia
By Larry C. Johnson | Sonar21 | September 10, 2026
Across three pieces I’ve written for Sonar21, I have been making one continuous argument: The war in Ukraine was not a crisis that erupted in 2022. It was the payoff of a deliberate, decades-long Western project to turn Ukraine into an instrument for weakening Russia — carried out under the cover of “partnership” and “peacekeeping.” And having spent thirty years building that instrument, Washington and NATO will do with Ukraine exactly what they have done with every client before it: discard it the moment it stops paying.
The camel’s nose: 1992–1999
The West slipped its nose under the Ukrainian tent almost the instant the Soviet Union collapsed. The formal machinery started in 1992, when Ukraine joined NATO’s North Atlantic Cooperation Council. The practical military ties came fast behind it: the U.S.–Ukraine State Partnership Program with the California National Guard in 1993, Ukraine’s entry into the Partnership for Peace and its first joint exercise in 1994, and the standing-up of the Yavoriv training area near Lviv.
The “peacekeeping” label was camouflage, and the drills themselves give it away. Once the Sea Breeze exercises in the Black Sea began incorporating anti-submarine warfare in the late 1990s, the humanitarian pretense was finished. You do not rehearse hunting submarines to deliver disaster relief. You do it to prepare to fight the Russian navy. I spent 23 years scripting military exercises for U.S. Special Operations Forces, and I know the difference between a training game and a rehearsal for war. These were rehearsals — a structured program to train and equip Ukraine to fight Russia, if need be with NATO at its side.
Set that against 1999, when NATO took in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. That expansion broke James Baker’s assurance that the alliance would not move “one inch” to the east — a promise Bill Clinton simply threw away. And it is no accident that when the war came, Russia struck the Yavoriv facility in the opening weeks of March 2022. They knew exactly what had been built there, and why.
From partner to de facto member: 2000–2010
The next decade finished the job, turning Ukraine into a NATO member in everything but name. Consider one figure: between 2000 and 2010, Ukraine ranked among the top six hosts of NATO and U.S. European Command exercises, with Georgia right behind it. Two non-members hosted more allied exercises than the overwhelming majority of the actual member states. That is not partnership. That is prima facie evidence that the West meant to bring both countries in, whatever Moscow said.
By 2010, only two things still separated Ukraine from a full member: it paid no dues, and it had no Article 5 guarantee. In every operational sense — Sea Breeze, Rapid Trident, the Yavoriv pipeline, the annual target plans — it was already inside the alliance. And this was never only a military effort. U.S. and British intelligence, the CIA included, were coordinating with NATO and EUCOM to pry Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and lock it into the West’s. When the 2008 Bucharest Summit declared that Ukraine “will become a member” — even as France and Germany blocked the formal Membership Action Plan — the trajectory to 2014 and everything after was set.
The exit: under the bus
That is how the instrument was built. Here is how it gets discarded. Any foreign government that trusts an American security promise should first study what happened to the South Vietnamese, the Afghans, the Iraqis, the Libyans, the Cambodians. When a war stops serving Washington’s purposes, the U.S. says adios.
The recriminations over the failed counteroffensive are the opening of exactly that. The West is lining up to blame Kyiv while its pledges of weapons turn out to be lip service. The maritime-drone strikes on Russian ships are pinpricks — militarily trivial, and dangerous mainly because the Western surveillance that guides them invites Russian retaliation against NATO reconnaissance over the Black Sea and stiffens Moscow’s resolve to strangle Ukraine’s ports. If you want an honest barometer of where this war is heading, forget the briefings from British intelligence and the Institute for the Study of War. Watch for the day the London bookmakers start taking bets on when Zelensky falls.
The through-line
Lay the three pieces end to end and the shape is plain. The first two document the patient construction — three decades of exercises, training centers, intelligence coordination, and summit declarations, all aimed at Russia. The third describes the disposal: the moment the project stumbles on the battlefield, the same patrons who spent thirty years cultivating it start hunting for the door. The line running from the 1992 partnership councils to the blame game of 2023 is not accident, and it is not drift. It is design. The men who built the road into this war have no intention of walking back out of it alongside the country they sent down it.
US Placing Missiles in Europe to Cancel Strategic Stability Talks Prerequisites – Russian MFA
Sputnik – 07.09.2026
MOSCOW – The deployment of US ground‑based US intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in Europe, in particular in Norway, will nullify the prerequisites for a constructive dialogue with the United States on strategic stability, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said on Monday.
“Steps such as the deployment of US ground‑based US intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems in Europe, which threaten Russia, will, to put it mildly, nullify the prerequisites for a constructive conversation with the United States on strategic issues,” Zakharova said in a statement.
Russia views the deployment of systems in Norway capable of launching medium- and short-range missiles as yet another step in a series of highly destabilizing actions by NATO, the statement read.
“As part of Russia’s response measures, the locations where US systems are deployed and controlled, as well as the infrastructure supporting them, are becoming the focus of special attention from Russia’s strategic deterrence forces, which includes planning the combat use of the relevant strike assets in the event of an armed conflict,” Zakharova said.
The ministry added that favorable conditions for a substantive and productive dialogue with the United States on strategic stability had not been established now.
How Britain built a war network around Russia
The UK is spinning a web of influence designed to survive any Ukraine peace deal
By Oleg Yanovsky | RT | September 5, 2026
Last week, UK Prime Minister Andy Burnham announced in Kiev that defense manufacturer MBDA had been authorized to disclose information concerning the British components of the SCALP missile, the French version of the long-range Storm Shadow, to Ukraine.
Officially, the decision concerns documentation required to organize local assembly, but in practice, it could facilitate the transfer of blueprints, components, assembly kits or finished missiles.
Moscow regards this technology transfer as the UK crossing a red line, as London hasn’t even attempted to shift responsibility onto intermediaries and the decision was publicly authorized by the prime minister. Britain has therefore assumed direct responsibility for the resulting escalation and deepened its involvement in military operations against Russia.
SCALP was developed through a joint British-French program and its assembly requires classified information about British components and French sub-assemblies, as well as access to a secure facility. Ukraine doesn’t possess a complete production cycle, but even a partial transfer of classified data would integrate Ukrainian assembly into the British-French manufacturing chain and bind all three parties together for years.
Before this decision, Britain had been far more careful about covering its tracks. For example, the Flamingo missile, marketed as a product of the Ukrainian company Fire Point, is identical to a design unveiled in 2025 by the British-Emirati Milanion Group. That arrangement allowed London to keep its distance, with formal responsibility for the missile’s development and deployment resting with Kiev.
Britain is also attempting to free future missile projects from the American vetting process, so under Project Brakestop, the Ministry of Defense has commissioned MBDA UK, MGI Engineering and Rotron Aerospace to produce three prototypes of long-range missiles for Ukraine. The purpose is to reduce dependence on US authorization and, consequently, on the position of the administration in Washington. London wants to determine for itself when and under what conditions such weapons are transferred.
British drones are already being used by Ukraine to strike targets deep inside Russia. They include the Nyan jet-powered drone, manufactured by Callen-Lenz, a subsidiary of BAE Systems. For its developers, the battlefield offers something particularly valuable: operational data with which to refine the weapon.
Russia has also repeatedly pointed to the direct involvement of British specialists in the deployment of Storm Shadow missiles.
On the same day as the SCALP announcement, London secured access to Avengers AI Labs, an extensive body of data gathered by Ukrainian frontline sensors, so now British companies will be able to use this information to train target-recognition and autonomous-control systems, greatly shortening the journey from development to battlefield deployment.
Five British governments have come and gone during the active phase of the Ukraine conflict, but the country’s anti-Russian course has remained remarkably consistent.
Boris Johnson began a program to develop the Ukrainian navy, Rishi Sunak signed a ten-year security agreement, Keir Starmer followed with the Centenary Partnership Agreement and Burnham has now authorized access to classified missile technology. Each government has built upon the commitments made by its predecessor.
The same continuity is visible in Britain’s strategic doctrine, where Sunak’s Conservative government described Russia in its 2023 Integrated Review Refresh as the “most acute threat” to British security and Starmer’s Labour government retained that position. The 2025 National Security Strategy called Russia “the most obvious and pressing example” of confrontation, while the Strategic Defence Review described it as an “immediate and pressing threat.”
That review established the principle of “NATO first, but not only NATO” and committed Britain to preparing for war.
These doctrines are supported by long-term financial obligations, given London has promised Ukraine £3 billion, approximately $4 billion, annually until at least the 2030-31 financial year. The century-long partnership agreement provides for joint production, technology transfers and cooperation in the Baltic, Black and Azov seas where Britain’s presence is intended to endure for decades, regardless of when the current military campaign ends.
The declaration signed by Britain, France and Ukraine on January 6, 2026, already outlines arrangements for the postwar period. These include multinational forces, military logistics hubs, secure facilities and a special legal regime for foreign personnel. In London’s calculations, a ceasefire wouldn’t end its involvement, but it would consolidate a new phase of Britain’s military and industrial presence.
To coordinate these efforts, Britain is assembling several overlapping structures, such as the Joint Expeditionary Force, the Maritime Coalition, the “coalition of the willing,” the International Fund for Ukraine and Lancaster House 2.0. Meanwhile, a classified British-German program known as Deep Precision Strike also envisages developing weapons with a range exceeding 2,000 km during the 2030s.
The International Fund for Ukraine is financed by Britain and 15 other countries, while the British Ministry of Defense administers procurement. Participating states receive technology, contracts, guarantees and a place at the planning table while London turns the resources of its partners into instruments of British influence.
Ukraine is not the only front in this strategy, and across northern and eastern Europe, Britain’s coalition network already rests upon established military infrastructure.
The Joint Expeditionary Force coordinates national and NATO operations during the transition from crisis to conflict, at the same time Britain is doubling its contingent in Norway, expanding its presence in Estonia and deploying equipment stocks, command systems and targeting capabilities. A network of supply, communications and fire-control facilities is being constructed close to Russia’s borders to enable rapid combat deployment.
Britain also seeks a leading role in coordinating NATO defense initiatives. This allows London to shape allied plans, establish standards and monitor their implementation, while also influencing how other countries build their armed forces and prepare for a possible war against a specifically identified opponent. Yes, Russia, of course.
Britain’s elected governments merely provide public legitimacy for this strategic course, as beyond the electoral cycle, the same network of intelligence agencies, professional bureaucrats, City financial interests, defense corporations, foundations and think tanks continues to operate.
This network establishes the institutional framework, distributes contracts, attracts investment and moves personnel between government departments and corporate boards. Ukraine has become one of its principal hubs, bringing together British standards, European manufacturing, Western capital, defense conglomerates and Silicon Valley start-ups.
This is the essence of the British approach, where London compensates for its shortage of resources by coordinating the capabilities of others and turning that coordination into political power.
The British establishment understands two arguments, a threat to its status and the prospect of unacceptable costs, and this status gives the UK the ability to form coalitions, exclude opponents and write the rules, and fear arises only when the consequences of escalation reach Britain itself.
London will therefore support only a settlement that preserves its military and institutional position in Ukraine and it won’t accept any peace agreement that restricts British influence over the postwar order.
Russian attacks on port and logistics infrastructure in Yuzhny and Izmail affect more than supplies to the Ukrainian armed forces. For Britain, which leads the Maritime Coalition and has extended its century-long partnership to the Black and Azov seas, these ports possess particular strategic value, given that military logistics, export routes, insurance markets and future maritime programs all converge there.
Russian policy must recognize the networked character of Britain’s strategy and focus upon the coordination centers through which London harnesses foreign resources while diluting its own accountability. So long as Britain can raise the stakes while transferring the costs to its partners, its policy will not change.
Deterrence begins when the cost of a strategy is borne not only by those who execute it, but also by those who organize it.
This article was first published by Kommersant and was translated and edited by the RT team.
The dangerous European illusion about a war with Russia
By Lucas Leiroz | Strategic Culture Foundation | September 4, 2026
The Leipzig incident exposed something more troubling than the incident itself: the confidence with which German and European authorities seem to approach the possibility of a direct confrontation with Russia.
While German and European authorities go public, in what looks like a ridiculously rehearsed performance, accusing Russia of “hybrid attacks,” it seems clear to any attentive observer that Europeans are completely disconnected from reality.
The central question lies elsewhere: what would happen if Russia actually decided to attack Germany?
The answer would probably be very different from what Europeans seem to imagine.
First of all, the obvious needs to be repeated: Europe is not Ukraine.
The Special Military Operation in Ukraine is taking place in a specific territory, with its own military dynamics and within certain strategic limits. From the earliest stages of the conflict, Moscow established a clear list of strategic objectives to be achieved through conventional means of warfare, while respecting the civilian population and avoiding unnecessary escalation.
There are clear reasons for this approach in Ukraine. Despite the delusional Banderist attempts to rewrite history, the truth is that Russians and Ukrainians have always been one people, sharing common ethnic, cultural, and religious roots. Millions of Russians have Ukrainian relatives and vice versa. An unrestricted war against Ukraine would consequently affect millions of Russians. Therefore, there is nothing surprising about Russia’s strategy of military restraint.
None of this would happen in Europe.
A direct confrontation between Russia and a NATO member would produce completely different calculations. Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and other European countries would not be regarded as fraternal nations occupied by coup juntas. On the contrary, they would be regarded as total enemies, against whom the use of force would face far fewer constraints, if any.
The idea that a potential Russian offensive against Europe would simply consist of more drones, sabotage, and limited attacks against infrastructure seems extremely comforting. And precisely for that reason, it is dangerous. Europeans are provoking Russia while taking the experience of Ukraine as an example of what could happen to them in a potential direct war.
But this calculation is wrong. Russian actions against Europe would be completely different. In Ukraine, Russia’s foremost concern is to spare civilians. Attacks against infrastructure are avoided, offensives are restrained, and even retaliation for Ukrainian provocations on Russian territory is often ignored simply because Russia does not want the violence of a potential escalation to result in the deaths of more Ukrainian civilians.
In Europe, the immediate and total destruction of every enemy target would be the highest priority, regardless of the humanitarian costs. Europeans are not Ukrainians, and the ties between Russia and Western Europe are not the same as the ties Russia has with Ukraine. There would be no comparable pressure within Russian public opinion for restraint in the use of force.
Furthermore, it must be remembered that restraint in the use of force in a war with Europe could actually be dangerous for Russia, since it would be dealing with countries belonging to a collective-defense bloc with nuclear capabilities. Russia would therefore be forced to launch attacks powerful enough to dismantle the offensive capabilities of its adversaries, regardless of the costs. It would be a matter of security.
This does not mean that Russia wants to start a war against Germany. Nor does it mean that every incident on German territory is automatically part of a Russian military campaign. It means that European governments should take much more seriously the consequences of turning every incident on European territory into another step toward escalation. And, of course, it means that Russia has nothing to do with the recent suspicious incidents in Europe – which could be either sabotage carried out by local militants or carefully prepared false-flag operations.
Berlin has already announced diplomatic measures against Moscow, including the closure of the Russian consulate in Bonn and measures against Russian institutions on German territory. The European Union is discussing new sanctions. The more Europe turns incidents of this kind into direct political confrontation, the greater the need to understand where the limits of escalation lie. Russia certainly does not care about diplomatic actions, but Moscow is definitely growing tired of Europe’s participation in Ukrainian terrorism.
Europeans should ask themselves whether they are really prepared to discover, through their own experience, what the Russian response would be in the event of an open war.
They definitely should not try to see these consequences.
NATO Frantically Seeks Excuses to Prolong Its ‘Artificial Existence’ — Lavrov
Sputnik – 03.09.2026
NATO is pushing deeper into Asia and looking for new justifications to preserve itself, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok.
The alliance should have dissolved itself alongside the Warsaw Pact after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but instead kept searching for new missions.
After NATO’s campaign in Afghanistan “ended badly” and its forces fled, the alliance replaced the Soviet threat with an invented “Russian threat,” Lavrov said.
NATO is now seeking to establish its infrastructure in Asia, while the US Congress has considered the concept of an Indo-Pacific treaty organization.
Lavrov warned that such plans would reproduce “NATO ideology” and “NATO mentality” in the Asia-Pacific region.

