Iran TV shows details of unofficial preliminary US-Iran MoU framework
Al Mayadeen | May 27, 2026
The Iranian state television has unveiled a preliminary and unofficial draft memorandum of understanding between Iran and the United States, outlining potential arrangements on maritime activity and regional security.
The draft framework, as per the broadcaster, suggests that the United States would commit to lifting a maritime blockade on Iran. In return, Iran would agree to restore commercial shipping through key maritime routes to pre-escalation levels within one month.
The reported arrangement does not apply to military vessels.
The report also said the draft includes provisions placing the management and regulation of maritime transit routes under Iranian oversight, in coordination with the Sultanate of Oman.
Military base troop status remains unresolved
In detail, the unofficial draft stipulated that the United States would agree in principle to withdraw military forces from areas surrounding Iran, including recently deployed regional assets. However, it added that the status of forces already stationed at established military bases would remain subject to further negotiation.
The Iranian state television further revealed that the draft proposes that, if a final agreement is reached within 60 days, it could be submitted for adoption as a binding United Nations Security Council resolution.
The Iranian state broadcaster added that the understanding reportedly reached in Islamabad remains unresolved and non-final, stressing that Iran would not take any steps without verifiable and tangible confirmation of implementation measures.
US-Iran MoU delayed amid disputes over final wording: CNN
CNNreported earlier on Wednesday that a proposed memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the United States and Iran remains uncertain despite earlier signs of broad consensus among negotiators.
According to diplomats familiar with the discussions, officials involved in the talks still do not know when or where the agreement could be formally signed, even after key language in the draft was reportedly finalized over the weekend.
The report said expectations had risen Saturday after US President Donald Trump held calls with Gulf leaders while negotiators considered the text effectively “locked in”. Regional sources cited by CNN said the understanding was viewed as a potential opening toward ending the war, reducing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, and paving the way for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program and other disputes.
However, progress appears to have stalled over unresolved wording disputes.
Fragile negotiations
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio said Tuesday that negotiations still required “a couple of days” to settle “disagreements” over a “word or sentence.”
Speaking during a visit to India, Rubio said talks were continuing in Doha and remained centered on “specific language in the initial document,” while insisting that an agreement could still be reached within days despite renewed military escalation.
“The president’s expressed his desire to make it. He’s either going to make a good deal or no deal,” Rubio said, referring to Trump.
The report noted that delays have increased concerns among regional actors who fear the talks could collapse in a manner similar to previous failed diplomatic efforts between Washington and Tehran.
CNN also cited tensions during earlier contacts involving US Vice President JD Vance in Pakistan last month, when Iranian negotiators reportedly accused Washington of altering agreed terms after discussions had advanced.
Mounting pressure
The ceasefire framework underpinning the negotiations has meanwhile entered its eighth week amid mounting regional strain, including renewed instability in the Strait of Hormuz, Iranian warnings of retaliation following recent US attacks, and escalating Israeli aggression against Lebanon.
The latest tensions come after US Central Command confirmed that American forces carried out strikes in southern Iran on Tuesday, claiming the attacks were conducted “in self-defense” during the ongoing ceasefire period.
At the same time, tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz have continued to intensify after Iran moved to restrict traffic through the strategic waterway in response to US-Israeli aggression.
The report added that international and regional pressure to secure the agreement and prevent further escalation continues to intensify as energy markets and shipping routes remain exposed to the risk of wider conflict.
“A few words or sentence even on a ‘locked in’ MOU is unlikely to give him everything he wants,” CNN wrote, referring to Trump’s efforts to present the agreement as a diplomatic breakthrough.
India-Israel-UAE: An Alliance of Many Anxieties
By Salman Rafi Sheikh – New Eastern Outlook – May 27, 2026
The I2U2 — that much-heralded “West Asian Quad” of India, Israel, the UAE, and the United States — is gathering dust. Launched with fanfare in July 2022 and billed as a transformative framework for regional integration, it has produced little of consequence since its inaugural summit.
Progress stalled through 2024, and its April 2025 revival dialogue in New Delhi was notably described as the first convening of the group in almost two years. Without sustained American engagement, the scaffolding has simply collapsed. What remains, however, is something more durable and more troubling: an informal troika of Israel, the UAE, and India, joined not by shared ambition but by a shared phobia.
Three States, One Obsession
Strip away the diplomatic pleasantries, and the organic glue binding Jerusalem, Abu Dhabi, and New Delhi is strikingly similar: each government perceives political Islam — in its domestic and regional expressions — as a foundational threat to its survival. For the UAE, the enemy has a name: the Muslim Brotherhood. Abu Dhabi under Mohammed bin Zayed has treated Brotherhood-affiliated movements as an existential menace to dynastic stability. The Emirati government’s sweeping crackdown on al-Islah, the Brotherhood’s local affiliate, was driven by the calculation that political Islam of any kind is fundamentally threatening to government security. The UAE formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation in 2014, backed the military coup in Egypt, led the 2017 blockade of Qatar, and as recently as January 2025, blacklisted eleven individuals and eight UK-based organisations linked to Brotherhood networks. This is not counterterrorism policy in any conventional sense; it is a preemptive war on political pluralism dressed in security language.
India’s version of the same anxiety plays out along the Hindu-Muslim fault line. Anti-Muslim sentiment has intensified systematically since 2014. India’s 200 million Muslims — the world’s third-largest Muslim population — have faced demolitions of homes, discriminatory citizenship legislation, and a political atmosphere. The BJP government has systematically reframed domestic Muslim political life as a security threat, deploying counterterrorism law against peaceful dissent. If the UAE fears a Brotherhood-style capture of the state, India fears the democratic agency of its own largest minority.
Israel’s specter is Palestine. More precisely, it is the impossibility of indefinitely suppressing Palestinian political self-determination without a cost to legitimacy. For all three governments, the language of “counterterrorism” functions as a tranquilizer: it sedates domestic dissent, silences international criticism, and transforms political opponents into security threats. This shared grammar of repression is the true foundation of the troika.
While tackling these internal and regional threats remains a key imperative, the most recent push to revive the alliance, even without Washington being a formal member, is Iran and the still ongoing Iran war.
From Phobia to Alliance: Iran as the Accelerant
If political Islam is the ideological glue, Iran is what has now hardened this informal troika into something resembling a war coalition. Following the US-Israeli strikes on Iran that began on February 28, 2026, the theoretical alignments of the Abraham Accords era became operational reality. Iran retaliated by targeting Gulf infrastructure, firing some 550 ballistic and cruise missiles and more than 2,200 drones at the UAE, making it the most targeted country in the region, including Israel. In response, Israel did something unprecedented: it deployed an Iron Dome battery, Israeli troops to operate it, and reportedly also its cutting-edge Iron Beam laser defence system and Spectro surveillance technology to Emirati soil. The Financial Times reported that Israeli military personnel on the ground in Gulf states were “a not insignificant number”. Emirati officials, reflecting on who came to their defence, reportedly said: “It was a real eye-opening moment. To see who our real friends are.”
The Abraham Accords, signed in 2020, were partly motivated by a shared perception of the Iranian threat. What the 2026 conflict has done is strip away all residual ambiguity about what that means in practice. The UAE allowed its territory and airspace to be used by Israeli and American forces for strikes on Iran, according to Iranian officials. The Israeli Air Force carried out strikes in southern Iran during the war to neutralize short-range missiles threatening Gulf states. Abu Dhabi and Jerusalem are no longer strategic partners in aspiration; they are military partners in fact. The dream project of dismantling Iran as a regional power, long whispered in the corridors of both capitals, is now an open agenda.
It is in this context that Prime Minister Modi’s May 15, 2026 visit to Abu Dhabi — his eighth trip to the UAE in twelve years — must be read. The visit produced a raft of agreements: $5 billion in Emirati investment pledges, a long-term LPG supply deal, ADNOC access to India’s strategic petroleum reserves, and — most significantly — a formal Framework for the Strategic Defence Partnership covering defence industrial collaboration, cybersecurity, intelligence sharing, maritime security, and joint military exercises. Modi also chose to publicly condemn the Iranian attacks on the UAE and pledged India’s support in maintaining regional peace — a significant departure from the studied neutrality New Delhi had maintained for years. The visit came one day after India had hosted Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who had openly accused the UAE of being “directly involved” in the US-Israeli war on Iran. The juxtaposition was not accidental; it was a signal about the direction of India’s foreign policy.
Silence Is No Longer a Strategy
For years, India’s position in this triangular relationship was one of studied ambiguity. New Delhi deepened ties with Israel and the UAE while maintaining functional relations with Iran and nominally adhering to the principle of strategic autonomy. That posture is now collapsing under the weight of events.
The contradiction at its heart is Chabahar. In May 2024, India signed a ten-year agreement to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal, committing $120 million with a further $250 million credit line. This was to be New Delhi’s only viable overland and maritime gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that bypasses Pakistan. Iranian Foreign Minister Araghchi has called it a “golden gate” for India’s connectivity ambitions. Yet the US ended its special sanctions waiver for Chabahar in September 2025, and India has been reduced to exploring a temporary transfer of its stake back to Iran to avoid American penalties. Strategic autonomy, it turns out, survives only on American sufferance. Meanwhile, any Indian military technology that reaches the UAE now enters a security ecosystem that includes Israel — meaning India’s new defence partnership with Abu Dhabi is, in practice, an indirect alignment with Tel Aviv.
India now faces a reckoning that its political class has been deferring for years. As the region moves from cold confrontation to hot war, the space for equidistance evaporates. Every arms deal, every investment pact, every public statement condemning Iranian strikes while maintaining silence on Gaza and the West Bank narrows the gap between partnership and complicity. The troika that fear built has a peculiar logic: states drawn together by what they dread at home — Muslim political power in its various forms — will inevitably be pulled toward a shared agenda abroad. For India, the path ahead is less a clear choice than a delicate negotiation — with its own pluralistic traditions, with its new partners in the Gulf and Israel, and with a neighbourhood that offers no easy answers. What happens next will depend not on grand declarations, but on the quiet, unglamorous work of balancing interests without losing sight of the human cost at home.
Salman Rafi Sheikh is a research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs.
Al Jazeera Claims The US-Iran Deal is Done… Not So Fast
By Larry C. Johnson | SONAR21 | May 27, 2026
Notwithstanding the Al Jazeera report, there are still significant areas of disagreement that make a deal between Iran and the US unlikely. The Pakistan-Qatar mediation channel toward a possible memorandum of understanding remains active. But “active” does not mean “settled.” The unresolved center of gravity remains sequencing. The following is based on information I received from a knowledgeable source with access to the negotiations. It mirrors my analysis.
Washington and Israel want Iranian concessions first, while Tehran wants tangible, front-loaded economic and security relief before it gives ground on anything that matters. That is the heart of the present deadlock.
Iran’s position is not theatrical. It is rooted in a clear strategic doctrine: after decades of sanctions, pressure, assassinations, sabotage, and military threats, Tehran will not trade hard leverage for verbal assurances or a memorandum of understanding.
Promises are not enough. Mechanisms matter. Sequencing matters. Asset movement matters. Enforcement matters. The central judgment is this: Iran is not blinking.
Tehran is not operating from weakness, confusion, or desperation. It is executing a highly disciplined strategic posture: firmness on the fundamentals, flexibility on the margins, and careful use of its available leverage across the nuclear file, the Strait of Hormuz, regional alliances, frozen assets, and the Pakistan-Qatar mediation channel.
This is not the behavior of a state preparing for unconditional surrender. Nor is it the behavior of a state recklessly lurching toward total war. It is the behavior of a state converting pressure into leverage — and leverage into economic and security guarantees.
The Nuclear File: Sovereignty Is the Red Line
According to a knowledgeable source, enrichment is not a negotiable bargaining chip. Tehran views enrichment as three things simultaneously:
- A sovereign right;
- A deterrence instrument;
- A domestic legitimacy anchor.
No meaningful quantity of enriched uranium will leave Iranian territory under the present framework. That line is firm.
On weaponization, the assessment is more nuanced. Iran is not presently building a bomb. But it is deliberately preserving the capability to move toward one if it concludes that its survival is at stake.
The phrase “all bets are off” should not be read as an announcement of imminent weaponization. It should be read as doctrine: if Iran faces an existential assault, it will not leave any strategic option permanently closed. That is virtual deterrence — and, at least for now, it is working.
Strait of Hormuz: Tehran’s Non-Nuclear Strategic Lever
The Strait of Hormuz is Iran’s most powerful non-nuclear instrument. The logic from Tehran is blunt: the United States cannot freeze Iranian assets, sanction Iranian exports, suffocate Iranian banking channels, and then expect unconditional maritime passage as though nothing has happened.
Iran’s emerging posture appears tiered and deliberate. Friendly states receive passage. Neutral states are handled selectively. Hostile or adversary-linked shipping will face interdiction, delay, or denial. This is not simply military posturing. Tehran is attempting to convert maritime geography into a regional security architecture based on reciprocity: if Iran’s economy is strangled, the economic arteries of others will not remain entirely immune.
The reported MOU framework involving the Strait appears real: Iranian de-escalation in exchange for sanctions relief, asset movement, and restoration of commercial access. But the sequencing dispute remains unresolved. Iran wants assets released before surrendering maritime leverage. Washington wants compliance in the Strait before releasing assets. As I write this (Tuesday evening eastern time) this issues remains unresolved.
The Drone and Air-Defense War: Contested Skies, Real Costs
The airspace over Iran, the Persian Gulf, and adjacent maritime corridors has become a live drone and air-defense battlespace. Iran’s message is clear: it may not dominate the air domain, but it can make aerial operations expensive, politically visible, and operationally imperfect. Every drone interdicted, every platform forced down, every failed or disrupted operation adds friction. That friction shapes how Washington and Tel Aviv assess the real cost of escalation.
This is deterrence by attrition. Not absolute deterrence. Not total denial. But enough to complicate operational planning and raise the political price of continued pressure.
Frozen Assets: The Economic Core of the Negotiation
The frozen-assets file is not peripheral. It is central. According to a knowledgeable source with access, Iran is demanding immediate movement on approximately $12 billion held through Qatar-linked channels, within a much larger claim that Tehran places at more than $100 billion in frozen overseas assets.
This is the economic heart of the negotiation. Tehran wants asset release as a precondition for meaningful concessions. Washington wants asset relief conditioned on Iranian performance first. Until this is resolved in a concrete, enforceable way — not with vague language or aspirational language — no MOU is likely to hold. Iran is leery of any verbal assurances from the West and does not trust a MOU having been burned previously on this issue after signing the JCPOA.
For Tehran, this is not merely about money. It is about proof of seriousness. If Washington cannot or will not move assets, Tehran will conclude that the negotiation is designed to extract concessions without delivering relief.
Lebanon and Hezbollah: The Detonator Built Into the System
Lebanon remains the most dangerous variable in the entire equation. The diplomatic architecture now being constructed contains a structural flaw, and that flaw runs directly through Beirut. Lebanon is not a side theater. It is the tripwire.
Israel wants continued freedom of operation in southern Lebanon. Iran views Hezbollah as a central pillar of its regional deterrence architecture. From Tehran’s perspective, Hezbollah is not a disposable card. It is non-negotiable. Hezbollah has not agreed to disarm. Israel has not abandoned its operational doctrine. Iran has not agreed to separate the Lebanese file from its broader regional deterrence posture.
The American formula — that if Hezbollah behaves, Israel will behave — is not a guarantee. It is an aspiration dressed up as a diplomatic condition. This means that even a signed MOU between Washington and Tehran could be blown apart by one Israeli operation in Lebanon, or one Hezbollah response, that crosses a threshold neither side can fully control. In fact, Israel has renewed its offensive in Lebanon on Tuesday, but apparently acceded to Donald Trump’s demand to halt bombings of Beirut.
The ground war in southern Lebanon, however, is back on in its full fury, with Israel trying to push beyond the Yellow Line while Hezbollah is scoring major hits on Israeli forces, tanks and vehicles. Netanyahu is facing major pressure from Ben Gvir and Smotrich to expand military operations
Abraham Accords and the Pakistan Variable
Iran’s rejection of the Abraham Accords is categorical. Tehran views the Accords as a U.S.-backed normalization architecture designed to entrench Israeli regional legitimacy while hollowing out the Palestinian cause. Any attempt to fold that architecture into an Iran settlement cuts directly against Tehran’s strategic and ideological position.
The Pakistan dimension is especially sensitive. Islamabad is functioning as a key mediation channel between Washington and Tehran. But pressuring Pakistan to join or support the Abraham Accords while simultaneously relying on Pakistan to carry messages to Tehran creates a structural contradiction. Pakistan understands this. Its public rejection of forced linkage is not diplomatic boilerplate. It is the condition under which Islamabad preserves credibility with Tehran and keeps the mediation channel alive.
Saudi Arabia remains in its established position: no normalization without a credible path to Palestinian statehood. In the current environment, that condition cannot be met.
Three Triggers That Could Blow This Up
The negotiations remain alive because both sides understand the danger of uncontrolled escalation. But there is no strategic trust. The situation remains combustible and highly sequenced. One operational incident could change the trajectory very quickly.
The three most dangerous triggers are:
1. Failure of the frozen-asset transfer mechanism
If Tehran concludes that Washington is blocking relief while extracting concessions, the entire diplomatic framework could collapse.
2. An Israeli operation in Lebanon that crosses Iran’s response threshold
This could force Hezbollah into a major confrontation and pull Iran back into a harder regional posture.
3. Renewed US strikes during the ceasefire or negotiation window
If Iran reads such strikes as negotiation under fire, it is likely to conclude that diplomacy is merely cover for coercion.
Col Doug Macgregor NO DUST NO DEAL, Seems Like We’re Closer to Hot War w/Iran
Daniel Davis / Deep Dive – May 26, 2026
Meet the Convicted Jewish Felon Who Scammed Floyd Mayweather

José Niño Unfiltered | May 26, 2026
Floyd Mayweather Jr., the undefeated boxing champion who retired with a perfect 50-0 professional record and earned over $1 billion in career purses, filed a bombshell lawsuit in May 2026 against his former investment manager Jona Rechnitz, alleging a multi-year scheme to divert approximately $175 million from his accounts. The case has placed renewed scrutiny on Rechnitz, a convicted felon and former federal cooperating witness with documented connections to Orthodox Jewish political and charitable networks.
Mayweather’s complaint, filed in New York state court by attorney Leo Jacobs, names Rechnitz, associate Ayal Frist, Frist Apex Ventures—a Florida-based real estate and investment firm—and Manhattan attorney Alexander Seligson as defendants. The core allegation is that Rechnitz, who began cultivating Mayweather’s trust around 2017 and by 2024 had embedded himself as his investment manager, real estate adviser, and banking liaison, systematically redirected funds to accounts tied to himself and Frist. Mayweather alleges he did not know at the time that Rechnitz had previously pleaded guilty in federal court to honest-services wire-fraud conspiracy, or that a civil judgment in excess of $17.7 million had been entered against Rechnitz in a separate case.
Mayweather alleges that a $7.5 million wire on July 1, 2024 for a 12-month investment to Frist Apex Ventures produced no investment and the money was never returned. The complaint further alleges that $15 million in real estate settlement proceeds were diverted to Frist Apex at Rechnitz’s direction without Mayweather’s authorization— with Seligson allegedly verbally admitting to causing that transfer— that over $8.8 million of a $16.4 million loan on four of Mayweather’s properties was sent to Frist Apex with only $2.5 million reaching Mayweather Promotions, and that $2.1 million of an $8.2 million refinance of a Las Vegas property was directed to Frist Apex without authorization.
The lawsuit also details smaller but equally brazen diversions. Rechnitz allegedly diverted a $1 million deposit Mayweather agreed to pay on a New York property, sending it to a New York jeweler instead, causing the property deal to collapse. Nearly $100 million in Mayweather’s jewelry was allegedly pledged to 2 Miami jewelers for only $13 million, with a substantial portion of the jewelry still in the jewelers’ possession. Mayweather also claims he signed a bill of sale for his Gulfstream jet at Rechnitz’s suggestion with the buyer’s name left blank, and he does not know who purchased the aircraft or where the proceeds went.
Rechnitz’s attorney Morris Missry pushed back forcefully, calling the claims “utterly baseless and refuted by substantial documentary evidence including Mr. Mayweather’s own correspondence.” The defense also threatened to expose Mayweather’s own financial issues, stating that “Mr. Mayweather’s gambling issues, prolific spending habits, monies owed to third party creditors and IRS tax liens and levys, as well as other unseemly behavior will be exposed.”
The relationship between the two men dates back several years. Rechnitz first approached Mayweather at a basketball game, presenting himself as a celebrity jeweler and courtside regular. By 2021, Rechnitz was considered part of the “Money Team”, Mayweather’s entourage, wearing black T-shirts and TMT baseball caps. The relationship deepened through the Mayweather vs. Logan Paul exhibition fight in June 2021, in which Rechnitz organized ticket sales and introduced the EthereumMax cryptocurrency promotion. As recently as May 2025, Mayweather had publicly defended Rechnitz, stating he trusted him.
Long before he entered Mayweather’s orbit, Rechnitz had grown up in a world far removed from boxing. Jona Rechnitz was born into a wealthy, politically connected Orthodox Jewish family based in Los Angeles, California. He attended Yavneh Hebrew Academy, a prestigious private Jewish school, and graduated from Yeshiva University Los Angeles High School in the same class as conservative pundit Ben Shapiro. He later attended Yeshiva University in New York.
His family represents a broader web of Orthodox Jewish political power. His father Robert Rechnitz served as former chair of the West Coast region of American Friends of Likud, the U.S. nonprofit that promotes Benjamin Netanyahu’s political party. Robert also chaired the Iron Dome Congressional Tribute held at the U.S. Senate on February 27, 2013, and served as national finance co-chair for Senator Lindsey Graham’s 2016 presidential campaign. His cousin Shlomo Yehuda Rechnitz is an ultra-Orthodox philanthropist who operates a large nursing home network in California and was identified by the Forward as one of the largest donors to Netanyahu’s reelection campaign in December 2014.
Rechnitz began his career at the U.S. branch of Africa Israel Investments, the international real estate empire owned by Israeli billionaire Lev Leviev—the so-called “King of Diamonds”—where Rechnitz rose to Director of Acquisitions. He then founded his own real estate firm, JSR Capital, and settled on Manhattan’s Upper West Side.
His entire business and social infrastructure was built on Orthodox Jewish community networks. In New York, he partnered with Jeremiah Reichberg, a liaison between the NYPD and the Orthodox Jewish community in Borough Park, Brooklyn. His diamond dealer relationships in Los Angeles were largely within the tight-knit Orthodox diamond industry.
The defining scandal of Rechnitz’s career is the NYPD corruption case. From approximately 2008 to 2016, Rechnitz and Reichberg ran a systematic bribery operation targeting senior NYPD officials. The scheme involved chartering private jets to fly police officials to Las Vegas for a Super Bowl watch party in February 2013—the $60,000 jet included a prostitute as entertainment—paying hotel costs for police officers’ family vacations to Rome, buying expensive watches, and funding home renovations. They arranged for an NYPD counterterrorism squad to provide security for a midtown synagogue following the 2015 Paris attacks outside proper authorization channels. They also arranged for police to shut down part of the Lincoln Tunnel for Israeli billionaire Lev Leviev. In exchange, the officials provided gun license processing favors, parking perks, security details, and general influence within the department.
In 2016, Rechnitz pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud. He became a cooperating government witness whose testimony prosecutors described as “without exaggeration, one of the single most important and prolific white collar cooperating witnesses in the recent history of the Southern District of New York.”
His testimony led to multiple convictions. Norman Seabrook, president of the Correction Officers’ Benevolent Association, was convicted on bribery charges after Rechnitz delivered $60,000 in cash inside a Ferragamo handbag in exchange for Seabrook directing $20 million in union pension money into hedge fund Platinum Partners. Murray Huberfeld, founder of Platinum Partners, was sentenced to 30 months. Jeremy Reichberg was convicted on bribery and related charges and sentenced to 4 years.
Simultaneously, Rechnitz was a major fundraiser for NYC Mayor Bill de Blasio’s 2013 campaign. He testified that he and Reichberg raised over $100,000 for de Blasio’s favorite causes expecting political favors in return. Rechnitz also admitted to doctoring emails from Mayor de Blasio and forwarding them to friends to exaggerate his own importance and influence.
At his December 2019 sentencing, Judge Alvin Hellerstein sentenced Rechnitz to 5 months in prison and 5 months of house arrest, far less than the 20 years he faced, and ordered him to repay up to $10 million to the COBA union. He did not serve a single day in prison for nearly a decade after his 2016 guilty plea. By March 2026, he was re-sentenced to the same 5-month term with a surrender date of May 8, 2026, but has been fighting even that sentence.
After relocating to Los Angeles, Rechnitz’s luxury jewelry business Jadelle faced at least 13 lawsuits from jewelers and creditors. Jewelers Peter Voutsas and Ira Rovinsky filed a joint suit claiming Rechnitz had stolen jewelry worth $7 million that had been consigned to them, pawning it for a fraction of its value. Real estate investor Victor Noval alleged Rechnitz borrowed $2.9 million using diamonds as collateral—diamonds that were allegedly not his to pledge—and then issued checks that bounced. Jeweler Oved Anter, who had consigned $2.8 million in jewelry to Jadelle, alleged fraud in a separate suit, describing Rechnitz’s operations as “one of Jona Rechnitz’s blazing trail of Ponzi scheme frauds.” The FBI investigated the alleged theft or taking by fraud of millions of dollars in diamonds while on consignment with Jadelle, per a U.S. attorney filing.
In 2021, Rechnitz played a central role in the promotion of EthereumMax, a cryptocurrency alleged to be a pump-and-dump scheme. According to a class action lawsuit, Rechnitz provided EthereumMax insiders access to high-profile celebrities willing to promote the token in exchange for payments, allegedly making hundreds of thousands of dollars by liquidating his EMAX tokens when he knew celebrity promotions would temporarily inflate the price. One confidential witness in the lawsuit alleged that Rechnitz “confirmed to CW1 that EthereumMax was a scam.” Celebrity co-promoters included Kim Kardashian, Floyd Mayweather, and Paul Pierce.
Separate from EthereumMax, Rechnitz allegedly organized a ticket resale scheme around the Mayweather vs. Logan Paul fight in June 2021 and subsequent boxing events. Rechnitz solicited a $1.4 million investment from neighbor and landlord Joe Englanoff, promising up to 10x returns from ticket markups, then repeatedly delayed payment and reinvested without authorization into successive fights. In a striking detail documented by the Atavist, Robert Rechnitz placed his hand on a Torah scroll to personally guarantee payment—which never came. Englanoff filed a 2022 lawsuit against both Rechnitz and Mayweather for $15 million in breach of contract.
The Mayweather lawsuit against Rechnitz is the latest in a decade long pattern. Rechnitz has faced lawsuits from jewelers, real estate investors, boxing event organizers, and now Mayweather himself, all alleging similar schemes of gaining trust, redirecting funds, and failing to pay back victims. Despite pleading guilty in 2016, being sentenced in 2019, and re-sentenced in March 2026, he has still not begun serving his sentence.
This uncanny legal immunity underscores the formidable institutional protections that shield figures embedded in Jewish networks. Mayweather spent a lifetime mastering the art of the bob and weave, yet he proved utterly defenseless when faced with the machinations of a Jewish schemer like Jona Rechnitz. Despite his vocal support for Israel and attempts to curry favor with the Jewish establishment, Mayweather found that in this high-stakes game, the house always wins and the age-old axiom holds true: with Jews, you lose.
Ex-Mossad chief threatened ICC prosecutor over Israel war crimes probe
Press TV – May 26, 2026
Former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Fatou Bom Bensouda, says former head of the Israeli spy agency Mossad, Yosef Meir Cohen, had threatened her over her investigation into Israeli war crimes against Palestinians.
Bensouda, who served as the ICC’s chief prosecutor from 2012 to 2021, revealed on Tuesday that Cohen pressured her to abandon a war crimes investigation targeting leaders of the occupying regime.
She stated that between 2017 and 2021, Cohen met with her twice, once in Munich and once in New York City, where he explicitly demanded that she halt the probe.
According to Bensouda, Cohen subjected her to “threats and pressure,” which also extended to members of her family.
She added that she did not receive sufficient support from ICC member states to withstand Israel’s pressure. The situation later escalated, she said, to include indirect threats against her family, including the tracking of her husband and the collection of information about him in an attempt to influence her decisions.
Bensouda reported the Israeli threats to Dutch authorities but said she did not receive adequate protection.
She stressed that the ICC must continue its work despite pressure from the United States and Israel, insisting that justice should not be shaped by political interests.
On November 21, 2024, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former war minister Yoav Gallant over war crimes and crimes against humanity committed against Palestinians during the regime’s genocide in Gaza, which began on October 7, 2023.
On February 6, 2025, the administration of US President Donald Trump sanctioned several ICC officials over the court’s investigations into war crimes committed by US forces in Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021, as well as war crimes committed by Israel in Gaza since October 2023.
‘Unacceptable’: Islamabad won’t normalize with Israel, defense minister says despite Trump’s push
Press TV – May 26, 2026
Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Asif has asserted opposition to his country’s normalizing relations with the Israeli regime after US President Donald Trump called on regional states to enter rapprochement deals with Tel Aviv.
Speaking to Pakistani broadcaster Samaa TV on Monday, Asif said Pakistan should not support agreements that conflict with the country’s “fundamental ideologies.”
Asif made the remarks after being asked about the possibility of Pakistan’s joining the so-called Abraham Accords – a set of Washington-facilitated détentes that have normalized relations between some regional countries and Tel Aviv – following reported pressure from Trump.
Questioning engagement with the regime, the Pakistani defense minister added, “How will you sit down with those people whose word cannot be trusted even for a single day?”
He also reiterated Islamabad’s longstanding position regarding the regime. “We have a very clear stance that this is not acceptable to us,” Asif said.
Referring to Pakistan’s passport policy, he added, “And secondly, on our passports, we are the only country whose passports don’t even include Israel’s name.”
Trump pushes for expansion of Abraham Accords
The remarks came as Trump called for more countries to follow the example of such states as the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain that have entered rapprochement deals with Tel Aviv.
He suggested that those countries join the “Abraham Accords” before conclusion of any agreement between Iran and the United States aimed at ending the cycle that has arisen out of Washington’s unprovoked aggression against the Islamic Republic.
Trump said expansion of the accords “should start with the immediate signing by Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and everybody else should follow suit.”
He also said that during discussions with leaders of Muslim and Arab countries, he stressed that “all of these Countries, at a minimum, simultaneously, [should] sign onto the Abraham Accords.”
He said “it should be mandatory” for those states to join the normalization deals “after all the work done by the United States to try and pull this very complex puzzle together.”
The US president did not clarify further, but observers commenting on his remarks said he was either trying to condition any agreement with Iran on realization of such détentes or portray a favorable picture of regional normalization with the occupying regime and Washington’s role in it.
Trump described the accords as beneficial for participating countries.
“The Abraham Accords have proven to be, for the Countries involved (The United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, Sudan, and Kazakhstan), a Financial, Economic, and Social BOOM, even during this time of Conflict and War, with the current Members never even suggesting leaving, or taking so much as even a pause,” he wrote.
Reports, including those provided by Francesca Albanese, UN special rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory, have shown how the countries in question, especially the UAE, have been deriving economic benefits from the normalization accords even as the Israeli regime would sustain its campaign of occupation and aggression against Palestinians, including its war of genocide on the Gaza Strip.
Palestinians and their supporters have vociferously denounced the accords, condemning their regional signatories for their betrayal of the Palestinian cause of confronting Israeli atrocities.
West planning to use former ISIS militants against Iran – FSB chief
RT | May 26, 2026
Western spy agencies are intending to use Syrian militants as a proxy force against Iran, Russian Federal Security Service chief Aleksandr Bortnikov has said.
The jihadists, who fought for Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS) and other terrorist groups, are being moved from their detention facilities in Syria to special camps in Iraq, Bortnikov said during a meeting of the security chiefs from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Russia’s Irkutsk Region on Tuesday.
“The history of Islamic State began with similar Iraqi prison complexes under the protection of Western coalition intelligence agencies,” he stressed.
The CIS was established in 1991, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, to promote economic, political and security cooperation between members. It currently includes nine nations: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Uzbekistan.
The actions of Western spy agencies also pose a danger to the members of the organization as the released militants, “include individuals from CIS countries who fought in the Islamic State and other terrorist groups and later ended up in Syrian prisons,” Bortnikov warned. They can be used not only across the Middle East, but also in their home countries, he added.
“Undoubtedly, the escalation of the Iranian conflict and the involvement of an increasing number of parties in it is threatening to destabilize the entire Islamic world,” the FSB chief stressed.
Indirect negotiations are currently ongoing between the US and Iran amid a fragile truce, which was established in early April after a month of intense hostilities initiated by the Americans and the Israelis. Meanwhile, Tehran continues to prevent the ships of Washington’s allies from sailing through the Strait of Hormuz, which accounts for some 25% of the global crude oil trade, while the US maintains its own blockade of Iranian ports.
On Monday, Iran’s top negotiator Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reportedly arrived in Doha for talks with Qatar’s prime minister on a potential peace deal with the US.
However, both sides downplayed hopes of a swift breakthrough, with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio saying that Washington was willing to give diplomacy a chance before deciding whether to deal with Iran in “another way.”
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei said on Monday that the fact that the sides were able to reach common ground on some issue “does not mean that the signing of an agreement is imminent.”
ADL’s “Antisemitic Incidents” List Is Deeply Disappointing
By Kevin Barrett | American Free Press | May 26, 2026
According to Jewish mythology, Jews are the most persecuted people on Earth. Rabbis and Jewish historiographers alike speak of unending waves of expulsions, pogroms, and genocides afflicting God’s self-styled chosen people in virtually every part of the world they have lived, and perhaps even a few where they haven’t. As Congressman Randy Fine endlessly repeats, “Jews have been kicked out of every country where we’ve ever lived, and it’s never been our own fault.”
Given their literally unbelievable history of gratuitous persecution, and their claims that horrific anti-Jewish acts are happening with increasing frequency around the world and in the United States, I expected to be stunned and horrified by the Anti-Defamation League’s list of 6,274 antisemitic incidents of 2025. But when I finally summoned up the courage to examine their terrifying list of outrages, I was indeed shocked—not by the horror of thousands of disgusting and depraved crimes against poor innocent Jews, but by the mind-bending banality of the vast majority of alleged “antisemitic incidents.”
What’s more, it seems that the few genuinely serious “incidents” were not even antisemitic. For example, on New Year’s Day of 2025, 17 out of the 18 reported “antisemitic incidents” were nothingburgers—but one was truly horrific: A mentally unstable Black American veteran drove his pickup truck onto a crowded sidewalk in New Orleans, fired shots, and wound up killing fourteen people before being shot dead by police.
But there is no evidence that anti-Jewish prejudice played any role in the crime. The perpetrator never seems to have said anything about Jews. None of the victims were Jewish, but instead were Blacks, Whites, British, Muslim, or Hispanic. The killer “discussed the Islamic State (IS), his divorce and a desire to kill his family in videos he recorded while driving from Texas to New Orleans.” (Note that “Islamic State “is a false flag group of Israeli-American mercenaries posing as radical Muslims, which together with Al-Qaeda currently rules Syria after overthrowing that country’s legitimate government on behalf of Israel and the United States.)
The non-antisemitic truck attack is an anomaly. Almost all the “antisemitic incidents” on the ADL list are trifling, and hundreds if not thousands involve peaceful protests and political organizing.
One of the first “antisemitic incidents” of 2025 happened in America’s unofficial Jewish capital, Manhattan, New York City: “At an anti-Israel rally organized by groups including PAL-Awda, the Palestinian Youth Movement, the Party for Socialism and Liberation and Jewish Voice for Peace, protesters displayed signs with messages that included: ‘Smash Zionism and Imperialism Through Workers Revolution!’ and ‘Zionism is Cancer.’” Ouch! Though not exactly six million dead in gas chambers, protests against Zionism can undoubtedly hurt Jewish feelings. That must be why the ADL categorized this one as “Antisemitic Incident: Harassment.”
Jew-hatred at anti-genocide protests is apparently becoming a real problem. The ADL tells us that the very next day, “At an anti-Israel rally organized by South Jersey for Gaza, a protester held a sign that read: ‘No to Zionist Racism.’” So opposing racism is antisemitic! The next day: “At an anti-Israel rally… protesters chanted, ‘Long Live the Intifada.’” On January 9th, “Protesters associated with MLA Members for Justice in Palestine disrupted a conference, chanting, ‘From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free,’ a slogan commonly used to call for an end to the Jewish state.”
Shockingly unshocking “antisemitic incidents” were perpetrated by right-wingers as well as leftists. On January 2, 2025, the ADL tells us, a terrible antisemitic incident occurred in Greensboro, North Carolina: “Approximately eight individuals associated with Patriot Front, a white supremacist group, held a meetup and training event.”
When every left-wing protest or right-wing meetup is categorized as an “antisemitic incident,” it’s easy to see how the ADL could generate a total of over 6,000 such incidents annually. In fact, it’s deeply disappointing that there were not vastly more such “incidents.”
There should have been 60,000 or better yet 600,000 or maybe even six million incidents of anti-Israel protests and meet-ups! After all, American taxpayers have been funding a slow-motion genocide in Palestine since 1948, and an accelerated genocide since 2023. We are paying Israel to blow up apartment blocks full of children and force the few survivors to dig through rubble with their bare hands to recover the dead. We are paying Israel to commit systematic torture, including training dogs to rape prisoners, as The New York Times recently discovered.
In total, we have spent somewhere in the neighborhood of ten trillion dollars on Israel. The vast majority of that sum, roughly eight trillion dollars, has gone for wars against Israel’s enemies, including Trump’s disastrous war on Iran. If people who protest these outrages are “antisemitic,” it is deeply disappointing that there is so little “antisemitism.”
A new regional logic? If Israel strikes Lebanon, Iran strikes back at the UAE
By Trita Parsi | May 25, 2026
Despite the ceasefire and tentative progress toward a memorandum of understanding between Washington and Tehran, the Persian Gulf has remained perilously volatile. In the past 24 hours alone, several rounds of fire have been exchanged between US and Iranian forces in the region. Though both sides appear to view the incidents — which may have killed as many as four IRGC naval personnel — as falling below the threshold that would shatter the ceasefire altogether, the clashes underscore the fragility of the current arrangement and the ever-present danger of renewed escalation.
Yet in recent days, it was not the Persian Gulf that emerged as the greatest threat to the agreement. It was Israel’s potential refusal to fully adhere to the regional ceasefire and halt its bombardment of Lebanon. That danger remains acute.
Iran has three principal reasons for insisting that any ceasefire be genuinely regional in scope — one that includes not only the United States and Iran, but also Israel and Lebanon.
First, solidarity with the peoples of Gaza and Lebanon is not merely rhetorical theater for Tehran; it lies at the heart of the Islamic Republic’s regional identity and strategic posture. Having already been perceived by some in the Arab world as abandoning these constituencies in 2024, Iran can scarcely afford another rupture that would further erode its credibility within the so-called “axis of resistance.”
Second, continued Israeli attacks risk reigniting direct confrontation between Israel and Iran — a dangerous cycle that has already erupted twice since October 7, 2023. The linkage between these theaters is neither imagined nor incidental. It is openly acknowledged in Western discourse, which routinely portrays Iran as the central node of resistance to Israeli and American policies, operating through allied groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Yemen. From Tehran’s vantage point, a durable cessation of hostilities with Israel cannot be disentangled from ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. For Iran, this is not an aspirational addendum to diplomacy; it is a foundational condition.
But perhaps the most consequential issue is what Lebanon reveals about Washington itself. For Tehran, tying Israel to the ceasefire is ultimately a test of America’s willingness — and ability — to restrain its closest regional ally. If Trump either cannot or will not do so, then the value of any agreement with Washington comes sharply into question. A ceasefire that leaves Israel free to reignite hostilities at will — while the United States remains unable to prevent itself from being dragged back into conflict — offers little assurance of stability. Under such circumstances, the utility of a deal with Washington diminishes dramatically.
Trump could still choose to put American interests first and compel Israel to comply, much as Ronald Reagan did in 1982 when he pressured Prime Minister Menachem Begin to halt Israel’s devastating assault on Lebanon. Reagan reportedly expressed outrage at the bombardment of Beirut, warning Begin that America’s support could not be taken for granted. Within hours, the bombing stopped. Trump, by contrast, has thus far shown little ability to ensure sustained Israeli compliance with his demands.
A more plausible scenario may be a murkier and more dangerous one: Washington and Tehran reach an agreement, Israel initially abides by it, but over time gradually extricates itself from the arrangement and resumes strikes on Lebanon under the familiar banner of “self-defense.”
At that point, Iran would face a painful dilemma. Tehran would almost certainly pressure Trump to intervene and might even threaten to abandon the agreement altogether. But if Washington failed to act, would Iran truly sacrifice sanctions relief, economic recovery, and an end to open warfare merely to register its objections? Moreover, walking away from the deal might not compel Trump to restrain Israel. Iran could end up with neither an agreement nor a ceasefire in Lebanon. In fact, it would be an outcome Israel would welcome.
One option increasingly discussed within segments of Iran’s security establishment is more ominous still: remaining within the agreement while imposing costs elsewhere — namely on the United Arab Emirates, one of Israel’s closest regional partners. This argument has circulated quietly within segments of Iran’s security establishment, though the extent of its support remains unclear. Yet given the growing sentiment among Iranian decision-makers that Tehran showed excessive restraint toward the UAE during the war, the notion of a “UAE for Lebanon” strategy no longer appears far-fetched.
The logic is brutally simple. If the broader US-Iran arrangement tolerates Israel attacking an Iranian ally in Lebanon, then Tehran may conclude that the same arrangement can tolerate Iran targeting an Israeli ally in the Persian Gulf. Under such a scenario, Iran could retaliate against Emirati territory or Israeli operatives based there for every Israeli strike conducted in Lebanon. Rather than collapsing the agreement outright, Tehran would seek to exact a calibrated price for Israeli noncompliance.
Such a strategy would carry grave risks. Emirati retaliation could follow, potentially igniting a wider regional confrontation. Yet it remains unclear whether Washington would rush to the UAE’s defense if doing so meant destroying the very agreement it had negotiated with Tehran. In that sense, the strategy would place the burden back on the United States: either restrain Israel or watch the conflict metastasize across the Persian Gulf.
The implications for the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council would be profound. Few Gulf states harbor deep affection for the UAE’s increasingly muscular regional posture, but even fewer desire another destabilizing regional war. Moreover, forcefully condemning Iranian retaliation against the Emirates would only throw into sharper relief the broader Arab silence surrounding Israel’s ethnic cleansing in southern Lebanon.
Hopefully, none of this comes to pass. A durable agreement between Washington and Tehran — backed by the overwhelming majority of regional states — remains possible. And Trump could yet decide that preserving regional stability requires compelling Israel to respect the terms of a broader ceasefire.
But the very fact that Tehran is contemplating escalation against the UAE if Israel escalates in Lebanon illustrates the degree to which the Emirates have made themselves needless targets in the larger Israeli-Iranian rivalry by signing the Abraham Accords.
The journey to the second liberation of South Lebanon
The spider’s web theory lives on
By Robert Inlakesh | Al Mayadeen | May 25, 2026
Twenty-six years on from the liberation of South Lebanon, the message has become clear: as long as the Israeli regime remains, peace will never be possible. This year’s Liberation Day anniversary will be observed by a population that is now fighting another struggle against occupation, one that will have implications beyond the freeing of Lebanese lands alone.
On May 25, 2000, the Israeli occupation forces withdrew from most of the Lebanese lands they had occupied illegally in 1982; a move that came following nearly two decades of brutal oppression and was triggered as a result of the fierce resistance waged by the local population. For the Arab World, and specifically for the Palestinian cause for national liberation, that day became a signal that resistance does work.
A day later, former Hezbollah Secretary General, martyr Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, delivered his famous ‘Spider’s Web’ speech from a small football stadium in Bint Jbeil, arguing that the Lebanese model of armed resistance is a blueprint for the Palestinian people. This address has haunted the Israeli senior leadership ever since.
What Sayyed Nasrallah laid out was the theory that the Zionist regime was frailer than a spider’s web, meaning that despite its exterior, internally it was weak and could easily be cut down. He paid particular attention, when stating this metaphor, to ensuring the public knew precisely what he meant, which was that the Israeli society was incapable of enduring the repercussions of the regime’s policies. Today, this speech could not be more relevant.
The Israeli military doctrine, since the entity’s founding, has been based on the concept of always fighting short wars and avoiding wars of attrition. David Ben-Gurion, the first Israeli Prime Minister, was the first to ensure that his settler project implemented this doctrine, arguing that because his military was more advanced, they could manage to inflict defeats on the enemies, but that the wars it fought had to be limited due to the overwhelming numerical advantages on the Arab side.
If you look back through Israeli military history, you will also notice a pattern of short wars, especially those in which the Zionist entity achieved significant gains. Their most successful war was the “6-Day War” for example. Even last year, their attack on Iran became the “12-Day War”.
The Israelis withdrew from South Lebanon because they understood that the fight they were facing was going to bog them down and drain them, especially as the Lebanese Resistance was gradually growing in strength. In the Gaza Strip, the same concept applied in 2005. They ran cost-benefit analyses and decided it was best to leave.
Over the years, having only fought short wars against militarily inferior opponents, the Israeli society was able to live in its own bubble world. The consequences of their actions were a small price to pay, especially if these consequences were only felt during shorter periods of time. Other than this, they maintained belligerent occupations, meaning that their army was transformed into more of a riot police force than a proper standing army.
During the Second Intifada, which began in 2000, only months after the liberation of South Lebanon, the Israelis then transitioned into a method of warfare that depended more heavily on “targeted assassinations” and special forces raids. They implemented this strategy, alongside their counterinsurgency approach to warfare, and specialized in occupying civilian populations.
In 2006, they encountered a new obstacle, sustained rocket fire on their settlements, managing to blast as deep into occupied Palestine as Haifa. Later on, the Palestinian Resistance would develop its own rockets and eventually reach Tel Aviv and beyond. However, due to Gaza’s resistance being significantly weaker than Hezbollah, they settled for limited wars of aggression where they would implement the infamous “Dahieh Doctrine” – targeting the civilian population as a means of achieving future “deterrence”.
Lebanese Hezbollah managed to deter the Israelis for 17 years, even managing to force the Zionists to accept an agreement demarcating Lebanese maritime borders. However, the October 7 Al-Aqsa Flood operation jolted the Israelis into a reactionary and accelerationist mindset; they were no longer willing to slowly achieve their goals; instead, they had to do things at a pace in their minds.
But they fell into a trap; they were dragged into a war of attrition. In Gaza, this was something they could survive because the rocket fire gradually dwindled, and their soldiers refused to actually fight the Palestinian Resistance head-on. Instead, they carried out a genocide from a distance, mainly, with their main goal being to destroy buildings.
Which brings us back to South Lebanon. As you read this, the second guerrilla war of liberation is being waged, aiming at achieving an even bigger goal than was achieved in 2000. Hezbollah is now facing a similar predicament to what occurred in 1982 when the Israelis declared a “security zone” in southern Lebanon, which they maintained until the formal occupation was declared in 1985.
The major difference is that the Lebanese Resistance was still in its infancy in the 1980s, and the Palestinian Resistance had left in 1982. This time, the Israelis have been drawn into a trap, one that they cannot easily get out of. It is the beginning of the spider’s web theory proving itself in real time.
Although the war is being fought at a somewhat lower intensity since the announcement of a temporary ceasefire, the invading Zionist militants are being dealt blows on an hourly basis in the south and northern occupied Palestine. You need only look at their media to realize that Israeli society is under pressure in the north already, and the war of attrition has just begun.
The people of Lebanon and Palestine, who form the backbone of their national liberation movements, have proven themselves hardy and capable of enduring the hardships of war, while standing behind their Resistance fighters who come from amongst them. In the case of the Zionists, their army is formed of their public, who are conscripted into it, meaning it is a settlers’ armed forces, but they are a fundamentally weak society.
For the Israelis, they are more interested in living a Western European style of life and aren’t willing to make the necessary sacrifices to win wars of attrition, despite the superiority of their military equipment and intelligence services. A few occasional rockets are enough for tens of thousands to flee their homes, while a Lebanese farmer will remain in his fields as the bombs drop on his village. Right after the so-called ceasefire of November 2024, the people of the South immediately returned home; the settlers did not.
The Israeli army is also suffering a manpower shortage, has drawn back its presence in South Lebanon already due to the FPV drone threat, and has to score fake symbolic victories, such as planting flags in Bint Jbeil, while failing to properly maintain control of the area where Hezbollah fighters continue to watch and target them.
While the initial period between 1982 and 1985 was simple for the Israelis in the way of securing their occupation of the South, this time they are already being battered and have not achieved one goal yet. Desperately, they cling to their targeted assassinations, believing this will transform the battlefield. Another mistake born out of arrogance.
South Lebanon’s liberation in May 2000 birthed the Spider’s Web Theory of Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. In May 2026, that theory is being put to the test. So far, we see that the fighters on the ground are proving Sayyed Nasrallah correct.
