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How Indonesia’s tilt toward the US left it stranded in the Strait of Hormuz

People line up for gasoline at a Pertamina’s gas station in Sukoharjo, Central Java, Indonesia, on March 26, 2026. [Agoes Rudianto – Anadolu Agency]

By Bhima Yudhistira and Dr. Muhammad Zulfikar Rakhmat | MEMO | March 29, 2026

In today’s fractured geopolitical landscape, energy flows are no longer governed by markets alone. They are shaped—often decisively—by politics. Nowhere is this clearer than in the unfolding crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, where Indonesia finds itself on the wrong side of a strategic divide.

As tensions escalate in the Middle East, Iran has adopted a selective approach to maritime access through the strait, one of the world’s most vital energy chokepoints. Rather than a blanket closure, Tehran has opted for a calibrated policy: friendly nations may pass; others must wait.

The consequences for Indonesia are immediate and stark. While countries like Malaysia, Thailand, China, India and Russia have secured safe passage for their tankers, two Indonesian vessels remain stranded. This is not a logistical hiccup. It is a geopolitical signal.

Iran’s own officials have made the logic explicit. Access is granted based on diplomatic alignment and strategic trust. Nations perceived as cooperative—or at least non-hostile—are accommodated. Others are left navigating uncertainty.

Indonesia, it appears, has misread the moment.

For decades, Jakarta prided itself on a doctrine of “free and active” foreign policy—non-aligned, pragmatic and flexible. That posture allowed Indonesia to engage multiple power centers without becoming entangled in their rivalries. But recent policy choices suggest a drift away from that equilibrium.

By signing the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (ART) with the United States and joining the Board of Peace (BoP), Indonesia has moved beyond nominal non-alignment into visible proximity to the US orbit.

The ART is not merely a trade deal; it reshapes tariffs, supply chains and regulatory frameworks in ways that bind Indonesia more closely to U.S.-led economic and security systems.  Meanwhile, the decision to join the BoP—widely criticized at home as a strategic misstep—signals alignment with Washington’s Middle East posture, particularly in the context of Gaza.

In Tehran’s eyes, these moves blur the line between cooperation and alignment. In a conflict environment defined by binary loyalties, even economic agreements and diplomatic platforms are read as strategic signals. In that context, perception is policy.

The cost of that perception is now measurable.

First, energy security. The Strait of Hormuz handles a significant share of global oil shipments, and disruptions there ripple across supply chains worldwide. If Indonesian tankers cannot pass freely, the country must source crude and liquefied petroleum gas from alternative routes—longer, riskier and far more expensive.

Shipping costs rise. Insurance premiums spike. Subsidy burdens swell. In a country where energy prices are politically sensitive, the fiscal implications are profound. What begins as a diplomatic miscalculation quickly becomes a budgetary strain.

Second, competitiveness. Malaysia and Thailand, having secured passage, are better positioned to maintain stable energy inputs and export flows. Their manufacturing sectors—already integrated into global supply chains—gain an advantage over Indonesia’s.

This is not just about oil. It is about the broader architecture of trade. Delays in energy supply affect production timelines. Disruptions in shipping lanes threaten exports of automotive components, industrial goods and commodities. In a tightly coupled global economy, reliability is currency—and Indonesia risks devaluation.

Third, macroeconomic stability. Higher import costs feed directly into inflation. A widening subsidy bill pressures public finances. And as external balances deteriorate, the rupiah faces renewed volatility. These are not abstract risks; they are the building blocks of economic stress.

All of this stems from a single, uncomfortable reality: geopolitics has overtaken economics.

Iran’s policy in the Strait of Hormuz underscores a broader shift in global order. Strategic chokepoints are no longer neutral spaces. They are instruments of leverage. Access is conditional. Neutrality, if not actively maintained, is easily questioned.

Indonesia’s response so far—continued negotiation and diplomatic outreach—may yet yield results. But negotiation from a position of ambiguity is inherently difficult. Other countries have secured passage not merely through dialogue, but through clear, consistent alignment in the eyes of Tehran.

Jakarta must therefore confront a difficult question: can it afford its current trajectory?

Recalibrating foreign policy does not mean abandoning partnerships or retreating into isolation. It means restoring balance. Indonesia’s strength has always been its ability to engage across divides—to be trusted by competing blocs precisely because it was not seen as belonging to any of them.

That credibility now needs rebuilding.

The immediate priority is practical: secure the release and passage of Indonesian vessels, stabilize energy supply and prevent further economic fallout. But the longer-term task is strategic. Indonesia must reassess its positioning in a world where neutrality is no longer assumed, but demonstrated.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis is a warning. It reveals how quickly global alignments can translate into tangible costs—and how vulnerable even large economies can be when geopolitical signals are misread.

For Indonesia, the lesson is clear. In an era of weaponized interdependence, foreign policy is no longer a distant abstraction. It is an economic imperative.

And getting it wrong is no longer affordable.

March 29, 2026 Posted by aletho | Economics, Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, War Crimes | China, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, Middle East, Russia, Thailand, Zionism | Comments Off on How Indonesia’s tilt toward the US left it stranded in the Strait of Hormuz