Censored Lavrov article Politico refused to publish (FULL TEXT)
RT | June 18, 2026
The pro-establishment, Brussels-based publication Politico Europe, owned by Germany’s Axel Springer SE, has refused to publish an exclusive article written by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.
Lavrov’s article was initially planned for publication in the Brussels-based Politico Europe, but due to a “last-minute decision by the outlet’s editorial team,” the publication was canceled, the Russian Foreign Ministry said on Friday.
In the article, Russia’s highly experienced top diplomat outlined Moscow’s view of the Ukrainian conflict, Europe’s role in escalating the crisis, and the broader implications for global security. Lavrov accused European leaders of using diplomacy as a cover for NATO and EU expansion, while arguing that the West has sought to turn Ukraine into an anti-Russian foothold. He also warned that the EU’s growing militarization, including discussions about nuclear deterrence and “strategic autonomy,” could increase the risk of a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia.
Below is the full text of Lavrov’s article, as published on the Russian Foreign Ministry website:
Some reflections on resolving the Ukrainian crisis, Europe and global security
At a meeting in London on 7 June 2026, the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany, as well as Vladimir Zelensky, laid out five preconditions for Russia to secure a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine. United Europe now presents this list of demands as the basis for dialogue with Moscow.
Background
More than two decades of negotiations with Europe, as part of the collective West, lead to only one conclusion: engaging Russia in dialogue has served as a diplomatic smokescreen for the geopolitical expansion of Western institutions, above all NATO and the European Union, eastwards, right up to Russia’s borders.
Europe’s complicity in fueling the Ukrainian crisis is undeniable. Together with the United States, European countries orchestrated the Orange Revolution in Kiev in 2004. To create an anti-Russian bridgehead in Ukraine, they spent years buying off politicians and entire parties, rewriting history and educational curricula, cultivating and nurturing Ukrainian nationalism, and going to great lengths to pull Ukraine away from Russia.
In 2013, the European Union outright rejected our proposal for a compromise on the association agreement – a deal Brussels had long been pressing Viktor Yanukovich to sign. It is worth recalling that Ukraine was offered unilateral market opening without reciprocal commitments – terms that would have proved incompatible with Kiev’s continued membership in the CIS free-trade zone. When Viktor Yanukovich requested a deferral, the Europeans incited street riots that swiftly escalated into a coup d’état in Kiev in February 2014.
Germany, France, and Poland then proved themselves to be equally treacherous. Having guaranteed that the agreement reached between the opposition and Viktor Yanukovich would be honored, they washed their hands of it the moment that same opposition, their own handiwork, took power. “Democracy,” they shrugged, “takes unexpected turns.”
Europe thereafter lent its backing to the new authorities. In Odessa on 2 May 2014, the burning alive of dozens of innocent supporters of closer ties with Russia did not draw a single word of condemnation from European capitals.
As co-guarantors of the 2015 Minsk Agreements, France and Germany effectively encouraged the Ukrainian regime to sabotage its own commitments. As Angela Merkel and François Hollande later conceded – after the special military operation had already begun – Kiev’s implementation of the Minsk Agreements, unanimously approved by the UN Security Council, was never genuinely intended. The objective, they admitted, was merely to buy time: to shore up the Armed Forces of Ukraine and flood them with Western weaponry.
Russia, for its part, explored every diplomatic avenue to defuse Europe’s security crisis. However, in January 2022, the United States and NATO rejected Russia’s proposal for legally binding mutual security guarantees. European NATO members actively endorsed that rebuff.
Following the launch of the special military operation, United Europe threw its support behind the British prime minister’s efforts to sabotage the Istanbul negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Boris Johnson’s appeal to Kiev – “don’t sign anything, just fight” – slammed the door on genuine diplomacy for the foreseeable future.
Current situation
So what has prompted European leaders to suddenly shift their rhetoric and start talking about negotiations, and what are they aiming to achieve with these statements? For instance, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has stated that the purpose of any dialogue with Russia is to dictate Europe’s terms. These include paying “reparations” to Ukraine; withdrawing troops from Transnistria and the South Caucasus; abolishing the “foreign agents” law; and accepting strict limits on the size of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces. In her framing, “there can be no just and lasting peace without accountability for Russia.” During the UN Security Council session on 19 May 2026, an EU representative made the point unequivocally: “Supporting Ukraine militarily does not contradict the pursuit of peace, but rather serves as a fundamental prerequisite for any credible, good-faith negotiations.”
Europe’s plan is to talk with Russia while simultaneously pressing ahead with a campaign of legal warfare orchestrated through the Council of Europe. Within this once-respected organization, an entire infrastructure is being assembled for the express purpose of “holding Russia accountable”: a Register of Damage, a Claims Commission, and a Special Tribunal.
The European Union has also given the green light to detaining merchant vessels on the high seas. Several incidents have already taken place in the Baltic and the Atlantic. At the same time, the West studiously averts its gaze from the terrorist acts of sabotage perpetrated by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Black and Mediterranean Seas.
The real objective of Europe’s leaders, then, is not to negotiate with Russia. It is to shore up the Zelensky regime and preserve it as a launchpad for continued confrontation against Russia. With this in mind, European leaders are scrambling to secure a ceasefire as quickly as possible and for one reason only: to prevent the collapse of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the battlefield. The plan is to “freeze” the conflict without addressing its root causes, and then rapidly deploy military contingents from the Anglo-French “coalition of the willing” onto Ukrainian soil.
It is widely known that European elites have invested their “political capital” in the confrontation with Russia, pouring hundreds of billions of dollars into propping up the Kiev regime and ramping up the military budgets of EU member states and NATO. Europe now aims to achieve “defense readiness” against Russia by 2030. Until then, they mean to buy time by whatever means are available. In a strikingly candid remark this April, Belgium’s chief of staff put it bluntly: “We still have a few years. Thanks to the courage and blood of the Ukrainians, who are buying us that time.”
United Europe continues to dream of expansion. It intends to absorb Ukraine and Moldova while pulling Armenia into its sphere of influence. NATO has already expanded eastward, swallowing up Finland and Sweden. As for Ukraine, it is increasingly being eyed as the “striking fist” of a future European military force, independent of the United States and independent of NATO.
Risks to global security
This state of affairs poses serious threats to global security. A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia could rapidly escalate into an exchange of nuclear strikes, with catastrophic consequences.
Under the banner of “strategic autonomy,” Europe is witnessing a significant build-up of its military capabilities, including in the nuclear sphere. Paris’s intention to extend its “nuclear umbrella” to several EU and NATO member states is a source of deep concern. This will do nothing to strengthen the security of France itself or of the recipients of its so-called protection.
For all that, Europe’s political and military establishment continues to attribute aggressive plans to Russia – plans that, they claim, reach far beyond Ukraine. The Russian president has stated on numerous occasions that all of this is nonsense, provocation, and disinformation, aimed solely at extracting budget funds for the fight against Russia. That is scarcely the climate for substantive dialogue.
Russia’s position
As for negotiations, Vladimir Putin reiterated at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum that Russia is not opposed to contacts with any party. We see Europe, however, as a party bent on Russia’s defeat – a stance the Europeans themselves openly avow. Dialogue with Europe, therefore, cannot be conducted as though it were an impartial third-party observer.
Russia would prefer to achieve the goals of the special military operation through diplomacy.
That requires reliably guaranteeing security along Russia’s western borders and ensuring respect and dignity for our citizens and compatriots, including the right to speak their native Russian language and practice the Orthodox Christian faith. Further military, political, and economic expansion by the West is unacceptable: it runs counter to the imperatives of a multipolar world.
European leaders should recognize that the model of regional security built in Europe over decades, ever since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, has been destroyed by their own hands. And it will never be restored. We must now move toward creating a continent-wide security architecture open to all Eurasian countries and reflective of today’s multipolar reality.
The principle of equal and indivisible security, trampled upon by the Euro-Atlanticists, can be embodied within a new Eurasian architecture. When the time is ripe, Europe too will be able to join this great effort.
The key point is that meaningful dialogue requires the restoration of trust, shattered by the anti-Russian actions of the West, and Europe as part of it, in the post-Cold War era. Trust can be recovered only through concrete steps that demonstrate a sincere commitment to moving away from using diplomacy as a cover for expansionist ambitions. Trust cannot be restored, nor can dialogue be resumed, through ultimatums such as the one issued to Russia in London on 7 June 2026.
P.S. It is noteworthy that the London ultimatum was unequivocally reaffirmed by the ambassadors of Britain, France, and Germany at the meeting at the Russian Foreign Ministry on 11 June 2026 – a meeting they had so insistently requested. That was the sole purpose of their visit to the ministry.
US, EU authorize production of ‘deep strike’ missiles inside Ukraine
Western allies are using the diplomatic progress from a possible Iran peace deal to intensify an economic blockade against Russia
The Cradle | June 17, 2026
On 17 June, G7 leaders announced that US and EU arms makers will start manufacturing advanced long-range weaponry “under license” in Ukraine, as western stockpiles dwindle, aiming to industrialize the frontline and sustain pressure on Russia.
A diplomatic source at the summit in Evian-les-Bains clarified that the push involves “not just air defense systems, but deep strike capabilities,” allowing Ukraine to threaten targets much deeper into Russian territory, Le Parisien reported.
The official noted that local production is essential as Ukrainian forces currently deploy approximately 20 Patriot missiles to counter every massive Russian offensive, straining global stocks.
The move effectively entrenches a permanent industrial infrastructure for offensive warfare capabilities within Ukrainian territory.
In a joint statement, G7 leaders from Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, the US, and the EU expressed their “readiness to grant Ukraine licenses enabling it to increase its military production.”
German Chancellor Friedrich Merz explained that US firms will grant these licenses to European and Ukrainian manufacturers to address current industrial shortages.
Merz stated he was “grateful to [US] President [Donald] Trump for this great willingness to cooperate,” adding, “We are all currently producing too little, and this can be compensated for by granting licenses to companies that have these production capacities, including European and Ukrainian companies.”
This military support coincides with a G7 agreement to escalate economic pressure on Moscow by tightening sanctions on the Russian oil and gas sectors, with leaders citing the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz following the Iran–US memorandum of understanding (MoU) as the catalyst for these measures.
“We consider this the right moment to proceed with additional measures, as President Trump has delivered a deal that we support in reopening the Strait of Hormuz,” the leaders declared.
The move follows the US reinstatement on Tuesday of oil sanctions that had been temporarily suspended during the war on Iran, which now may end with the signing of the MoU on Friday in Switzerland.
The summit highlighted a shift in US foreign policy. Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney described the new US stance as “harder toward Russia and more realistic, in our view, of the situation on the ground of the war.”
Trump, who told assembled leaders “I’m the boss,” pledged to “do everything” to help end the conflict.
While Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed the “important results” regarding the military contracts, he remained cautious following a February 2025 meeting with US Vice President JD Vance and a demand that Ukraine provide resources as “compensation” for aid.
French diplomatic sources added that G7 members now “acknowledge that there is momentum on the ground” in Ukraine’s favor.
The new western military push comes after the EU had approved an approximately $105 billion loan for Ukraine on 22 April to fund critical defense needs and financial assistance.
The funding was released following a months-long deadlock after Ukraine resumed Russian oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline to Hungary and Slovakia.
Hungary had vetoed the loan, accusing Kiev of using “technical repairs” from a drone strike as a pretext to weaponize energy and exert political pressure.
Pax Iranica? The end of uncontested U.S. military hegemony
By Raphael Machado | Strategic Culture Foundation | June 17, 2026
Anyone would be skeptical about the sustainability of the “peace” taking shape in the Middle East from the Memorandum of Understanding to be signed between Iran and the United States in a few days. It is plausible that it may not even be signed. And even if it is signed, considering that it involves a gradual, phased unfolding of a peace process that would last at least two months, it is hard to believe that everything will go as intended by the parties and the Pakistani mediators.
Nevertheless, in the terms that this “peace” is presented and which have been accepted by the U.S., we are facing an overwhelming victory for Iran. Even if the diplomatic process is derailed, nothing will change the fact that the U.S. accepted peace with Iran on terms unilaterally favorable to the Persians, leaving Tehran in a much stronger position than before the war began.
First of all, the U.S. failure should be seen as obvious and rests on a very simple assessment: Washington failed to achieve any strategic objective in the conflict with Iran: the “regime” was not overthrown, the nuclear program was not destroyed, military capabilities were not eliminated, support for the Axis of Resistance was not liquidated, and finally, it was not possible to reopen the Strait of Hormuz by force.
The U.S. committed the most basic error of any conflict: misjudging the balance of power. And in this, naturally, the U.S. was led into error by Israel and its allies within the U.S.. From the start, reports indicate that the Pentagon opposed military action against Iran, for good reasons.
Even considering the tactical and operational dimensions, the U.S. was unable to impose itself as intended. The U.S. failed to achieve air superiority over Iran and resorted to launching missiles from outside Iranian airspace. Most times the U.S. penetrated Iranian airspace, they encountered anti-aircraft systems capable of shooting down even F35s. The U.S. also could not take advantage of its regional military bases, which were harassed and operationally neutralized by barrages of missiles and drones, complicating U.S. logistics and forcing them to use increasingly distant bases. Iran also managed to force U.S. aircraft carriers to keep their distance, with one returning to port for maintenance. Furthermore, the U.S. demonstrated that it is not yet ready to face a war in which drones play a central tactical role. But perhaps the most significant embarrassment was the fact that Iran forced the U.S. to confront its own industrial shortcomings—the U.S. expended large quantities of Tomahawks, Patriots, and other types of offensive and defensive missiles, which are produced at a trickle. The fact that U.S. missile stocks plummeted rapidly without any objective being achieved was certainly decisive for U.S. reluctance to restart the conflict.
There was also the poorly explained situation involving the destruction of several aircraft and helicopters in an alleged attempt to rescue a downed pilot (a pilot who was simply never seen again and was not even reliably identified). The fact that the ceasefire came just days after this alleged rescue operation suggests that the story is very poorly told and that perhaps that was a failed special forces operation to seize Iran’s enriched uranium.
That is precisely why reducing the issue to “control of the Strait of Hormuz” is nothing short of amateurish, since control over the Strait itself was only possible because Iran surprised the U.S. tactically through its ability to present challenges for which the U.S. had no answers and to deny the U.S. certain important military advantages on that terrain.
Naturally, control of the Strait of Hormuz had a significant impact on the conflict, making it more complex and a global issue. Carrying out attacks against Arab Gulf countries rather than just U.S. and Israeli targets followed the same logic of demonstrating power and turning the conflict into a broader, more complex problem. This stance alone forced Qatar to concede and seek a separate peace and rapprochement with Iran.
Now, if pointing out the U.S.’s inability to achieve its objectives, as well as its tactical difficulties, is not enough to demonstrate its defeat by Iran, then the imbalance of the Memorandum of Understanding, which represents a draft peace treaty, is certainly sufficient proof.
The Memorandum is scheduled to unfold in three phases. The first immediate result is the end of military actions on all fronts and the end of the U.S. naval blockade. The situation in Lebanon is already extremely uncertain due to the “Joker factor” that is Israel. But the end of the naval blockade, which is already a reality, has left the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian control, and even if Iran does not charge a “toll,” it is already charging a “service fee” to authorize ship transit.
The next phase, lasting 30 days and beginning after the Memorandum is signed, involves a U.S. promise not to increase its military presence around the Persian Gulf, the return of $12 billion in frozen assets to Iran, the immediate removal of sanctions on Iranian oil, gas, and petrochemical exports, confirmation of joint management of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and Oman, and a U.S. promise to pressure Israel to withdraw from Lebanon. In return for all this, Iran promises not to seek to develop or acquire nuclear weapons.
And in the final phase, expected to last at least 60 days, the return of the remaining $12 billion in frozen assets, the granting of $300 billion for the reconstruction of Iran (equivalent to reparations), and the beginning of the process of removing all remaining sanctions. In return, Iran promises to agree to discuss its uranium enrichment.
In short, Iran’s obligations under this Memorandum are minimal, while the commitments undertaken by the U.S. are disproportionate. Why take on all these commitments and accept all these conditions if the U.S. “won“—as Trump says—and could “destroy Iran at any moment”?
The reality is that between an international oil crisis, low missile stockpiles, the resilience of the Iranian population, and difficulty dealing with hypersonic missiles and drones, the U.S. suddenly found itself in a potential quagmire capable of causing infinitely greater harm than any conceivable benefit. Perhaps finally aware of the mistake of starting this conflict, with very low popularity, hosting a World Cup, and worried about a myriad of internal and external crises, Trump seems eager to get rid of the “Iranian issue.”
What is proven here is that although the U.S. remains a military superpower, it is possible to defeat them under certain specific conditions and with sufficient preparation. We are not saying here that any country could defeat the U.S. in a war, but that regional powers of a certain scale, immunized against color revolutions and with years of military preparation and investment in technologies capable of negating the potential of the U.S. Navy and its air superiority, can defeat them in a defensive war.
Having recently gone through the “unipolar moment” of uncontested U.S. superiority in the post-Cold War era, whose highest expression was the rapid destruction of Saddam Hussein’s regime, clearly the world is no longer the same, which in itself is proof that we are in a phase of geopolitical transition toward multipolarity.
Weakened in the Middle East, Iran is left in control of the Strait of Hormuz. Its ability to simultaneously confront all the Arab Gulf countries has been proven, and Israel’s inability to defeat Iran without U.S. help has been as well. This opens up for the Middle East the possibility of a regional pax Iranica, though much water will yet flow under this bridge.
Israel, however, remains a problem. Driven by a messianic ideology and accustomed to being treated with privileges derived from the influence of its diaspora, Israel does not appear willing to respect the terms of the Memorandum, nor to give up trying to establish a Greater Israel by force of arms. It is the Israeli factor that makes it difficult to fully realize a peace agreement between Iran and the U.S..
Ukraine as a laboratory of ‘techno-fascism’
By Dmitri Kovalevich | Al Mayadeen | June 14, 2026
In June 2026, the Russian military continues its slow advances against the Ukrainian military in the Donbass region and elsewhere in the former eastern Ukraine, amidst the NATO proxy war being waged against the Russian Federation. Russian forces are grinding down the dwindling ranks of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
For its part, the government in Kiev, whose mandate has expired, is focusing on drone strikes against oil refineries and shipping terminals in Russia. This fits into the overall strategy of the Western, NATO powers to deprive their economic competitors of oil supply in the struggle to maintain global hegemony. This can also be seen further in the continued, debilitating attacks and sanctions aimed against the peoples of Iran, the Middle East as a whole, and Venezuela and Cuba.
In late May, Ukrainian President Volodomyr Zelenskyy issued a five-page, open letter to US President Donald Trump dated May 26, requesting that more missiles be supplied as soon as possible. As noted by the Ukrainian analytical Telegram channel Rubicon on May 30, “While arms deliveries were previously discussed rather privately, now everything is taking the form of public appeals of ‘Donald, help us, and fast!’.
Rubicon writes, “The goal of this move by Zelensky is not only to needle Trump’s pride but also to elegantly shift blame onto the White House for recent missile and drone strikes by Russia on military sites in and around the Ukrainian capital. Washington has been slow to condemn these attacks and slow to continue its supply of missiles to Ukraine’s armed forces.”
A former lawmaker from Zelensky’s party-machine, Alexander Dubinsky, wrote on Telegram May 31 that overall, Zelensky’s letter amounts to an ode to himself, as in: ‘I allow you to touch my greatness and become part of it by allocating more money and missiles.’
The US government did not respond publicly to Zelensky’s letter. The Ukrainian opposition Telegram channel Kartel comments on May 31, referencing the high-profile corruption scandal involving Zelensky’s friend who has since fled to “Israel”: “Let us recall that Zelenskyy’s friend Timur Mindich stole over $1 billion allocated for weapons production, as uncovered by NABU [National Anticorruption Bureau] investigations. So it’s no surprise that after exposures of such corruption, the Americans would choose to ignore Zelensky’s outburst.”
Zelensky’s letter also demands that the US grant licenses for the production of Patriot missiles in Ukraine. But the US military has been proven unwilling to share production of its known and tested military technologies. It has shown willingness to share new weapons systems, evidently as part of ‘testing’ programs.
The letter by Zelensky criticizes the slow pace of Patriot missile production in the US itself, adding that this could lead to crises in various other parts of the world. According to the letter, Ukraine-produced weaponry could help protect US allies in the Middle East. In other words, the man is proposing that the US also continue selling or supplying missiles and other weapons to “Israel” and the United Arab Emirates for use against Iran.
Despite Trump’s various, so-called peace initiatives to end the war in Ukraine, voiced for several years now, Victoria Fedosova, deputy director of the Institute for Strategic Studies and Forecasting at the Peoples’ Friendship University of Russia, believes that Trump is merely proposing a high-profile display of negotiations between Moscow and Kiev that would lead nowhere. In the meantime, Washington continues to supply Kiev with weapons and intelligence, some of which are being used against the civilian population of Russia. During the night of May 23 (Ukraine time), US-made Hornet drones struck a teacher college dormitory for women and girls in the town of Starobelsk in the Lugansk People’s Republic, which was annexed by Russia, killing 21 and wounding dozens more.
Despite all of Trump’s ostentatious rhetoric, there is no sign he intends to pressure Zelenskyy to end the proxy war against Russia. Moreover, Chinese media reported on June 2 that he has also asked Chinese leader Xi Jinping to pressure the Russian president to end the war; that is, end Russia’s responses to the NATO proxy war on the West’s terms.
Pete Hegseth, the US Secretary of War, has also stated that Washington will continue to find a way to help Ukraine ‘defend itself’ (code language for waging NATO’s proxy war). He made this remark at a meeting on Asian security issues in Singapore, according to Clash Report on Telegram on May 30. (Clash Report is an online news platform aligned with the views of the Turkish government.)
Hegseth also noted that the US continues to study and learn from Ukraine’s experience with the use of drones on the battlefield. He says it is vastly increasing its investments in this area. In other words, the continuation of the conflict in Ukraine benefits the US by serving as a laboratory to test new types of weapons and study the reactions by the Russian army, even though these often pose a threat to Ukrainians themselves.
As the Ukrainian Institute of Politics notes in this regard, Pete Hegset’s statements are particularly telling when viewed against the backdrop of earlier remarks by Donald Trump. In March of this year, following the escalation of the conflicts in West Asia, Trump claimed that the US had no need for Ukrainian expertise in the field of drones. However, “Judging by the current rhetoric of the U.S. Secretary of War, the situation has changed: Washington effectively recognizes the value of Ukrainian experience and is ready to scale it up in its own defense policy.
“This US approach fits directly into Trump’s business logic—war as a market where Washington ramps up production, sells weapons, and simultaneously strengthens its own technologies. In this model, Ukraine is already an asset that generates knowledge, tests technologies, and creates demand for the American defense industry,” writes the Ukrainian institute.
Ukrainian opposition blogger Myroslav Oleshko notes that Ukrainian drone dealer Oleksiy Babenko has openly stated on television that he wants the war to continue until 2030. He claims that drone manufacturers fear the onset of peace. Babenko heads Vyriy Industries, a company whose profits reach tens of millions of US dollars annually.
Ukrainian economist Oleksiy Kushch writes in a lengthy comment on Telegram on June 1 that until 2022, all military simulations were purely theoretical and flawed. Now, he writes, the interaction between satellite communications, AI-powered combat control systems, and massive deployments of ‘swarms’ of drones of all types (using machine vision) is being tested in real time. He emphasizes that Western military strategy was built on air superiority and expensive, high-precision weapons. The war in Ukraine has shown that a cheap FPV (First Person View) drone can destroy a costly, $10 million tank, while a relatively cheap missile can deplete expensive air defense reserves.
“The war in Ukraine is generating terabytes of unique data for AI projects. During the war, Ukraine has become the world’s largest ‘oil field’ of information for the global development of AI projects in the military industry,” writes the economist, emphasizing that it is now vital for Western, transnational corporations that this war continue.
Kushch goes on to argue that transnational corporations cannot give up physical oil in West Asia, but they also cannot give up virtual ‘oil’ in the form of information for the development of their AI projects. Therefore, major Western defense companies (Palantir, Rheinmetall, Shield AI) are currently seeking technological solutions and testing them in Ukraine, as they have no other ‘laboratory.’
“All such information must be translated into new NATO defense standards and then into new lines of weapons production. Ending the war now would freeze the Western defense industry at an intermediate stage of such development,” the economist believes.
Kushch believes that “the technological conclusion of the war is not possible before 2028–2030.” However, in his view, a political end to the war is possible if a political leadership in Ukraine were to decide to stop turning the country into a military laboratory.
American company Palantir, mentioned by Kushch, was behind the ‘brain’ controlling US-made or assisted drones, which killed the teenage girls and women at the aforementioned college in Starobelsk. The drones that were used were made in Ukraine, but Russian media reported on May 24 that pieces of Starlink satellite terminals were found among the wreckage. Starlink is the Elon Musk-owned satellite internet constellation used by Ukraine, with the approval of the Pentagon, to locate targets. Such atrocities can be expected to continue, because it is profitable for Western companies to test their technologies in live situations.
“Why doesn’t the conflict in Ukraine end? Because AI development companies are reaping superprofits and gaining the opportunity to advance technologically very quickly. Who would turn that down? They’re doing everything they can to keep the war going; they don’t care about people’s lives. Unfortunately, AI is increasingly playing the role of a human killer,” said Yuri Knutov, a Russian expert in air defense, on the Baltnews video news channel in late May.
One of the founders of Palantir, which has ties to “Israel”, is Peter Thiel, an uber-wealthy, far-right friend and ally of Trump. Artificial intelligence was also blamed for the US military strike on a girls’ school in Minab, Iran, on February 28 at the outset of the current US-Israeli war against Iran. The strike killed over 160 civilians, most of them schoolgirls. Mariana Bezuhla, a Ukrainian legislator from Zelensky’s team, notes also that Palantir’s technology is being used by “Israel” to kill members of the Hezbollah defense forces in Lebanon.
Another Palantir co-founder, Alexander Karp, visited Ukraine in May. He subsequently stated that the Ukrainian Armed Forces use his company’s technology as an “operating system for war”.
Karp recently published a book in which he called for universal military conscription in the United States, and the militarization of Germany and Japan. He also claimed in the book that artificial intelligence could replace the factor of nuclear deterrence. Among his key ideas are a claimed need for the active involvement of the tech elite in strengthening national defense, and rejection of the policies of “equality of all cultures” and “empty pluralism”.
The Ukrainian publication Strana writes that Karp and Palantir as a whole represent a group of businesspeople whom their opponents have dubbed “techno-fascists”. Strana believes the practical implementation of their plans for ‘deterrence’ is highly doubtful, since the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons will always remain in place. “[Nuclear weapons deterrence] exists and nullifies any ideas of achieving (or maintaining) global dominance by military means, because if techno-fascist policy options create enormous threats to Russia and China, then the two countries will likely turn to nuclear weapons for sheer survival, threatening the Western powers with wars of mutual destruction,” writes Strana.
The publication emphasizes that the increase in U.S. military spending, as promoted by the likes of Palantir, along with the militarization of Japan and Germany amid rising public debt and low industrial competitiveness, will not serve as a stimulus for the Western economy. They will instead serve as its funeral march.
Furthermore, the cuts in social spending that are inevitably accompanying increases in military spending threaten to cause internal instability in Western countries. Social protests and riots will be suppressed using methods that are utterly inhumane, as was the case in the early 20th century, when live ammunition was routinely used to suppress strikes and other protests by working classes and other exploited social classes including peasants and farmers. Just as 20th-century classical fascism emerged as a reaction to political and social threats to Western capitalist and imperialist domination, so too will 21st-century ‘techno-fascism’ be a reaction to similar threats.
All that said, Ukrainian analysts at Strana believe the Western powers are not yet ready to shift into ‘war mode’ against their own populations—neither morally, nor politically, nor financially and economically. In this regard, many among the ruling classes in the West would like to see a normalization of relations with Russia, and this threatens Kiev with a loss of foreign support that could lead to defeat.
To prevent this, Strana writes, certain efforts are actively underway in Ukraine. These include deliberately provoking escalation of tensions in the relations between Europe and Russia, to the point of provoking a direct conflict that could escalate into a nuclear conflict. In other words, the goal of Zelensky and his lobbyists in the West is to provoke a global conflict—even if only to ensure their own survival while living in bunkers.
Desperate Starmer choosing piracy as distraction over UK crime crisis – Putin envoy

RT | June 14, 2026
Kremlin envoy Kirill Dmitriev has accused UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer of using the seizure of a supposed Russian-linked vessel to distract from domestic problems.
In a post on X on Sunday, Starmer announced that UK forces intercepted a tanker involved in ‘shadow fleet’ operations, which allegedly help Russia bypass Western sanctions on oil exports.
The Smyrtos was reportedly transiting the English Channel before it was boarded by UK marines. The UK Defense Ministry said it will be held and monitored off the south coast while its operations are investigated.
Starmer boasted that he personally directed the interception, calling it a “successful operation” that delivered “yet another blow to Russia.” He later posted footage purportedly showing armed marines boarding the vessel.
Dmitriev suggested that the operation was not about security or enforcing sanctions, but to manufacture a confrontation and distract the public from immigration problems and crime.
“Desperate Starmer, instead of intercepting HIS immigrants who rape, mutilate and behead British people, attempts to DISTRACT the UK with an escalation,” he wrote on X.
The UK faces tensions over immigration following a number of attacks and high-profile murder and rape cases involving migrants in recent years. This week, a 17-year-old girl was stabbed in the neck in northwest England by a 30-year-old man of Pakistani heritage. The most persistent issue remains migrants crossing the English Channel in small boats from France, with successive governments repeatedly promising and failing to reduce the arrivals.
Ukraine’s Western backers have long accused Russia of using a ‘shadow fleet’ to maintain oil exports, which they seek to restrict in order to weaken Russia amid the conflict with Ukraine. Russia has denied that it operates a shadow fleet and has condemned the seizure of vessels on the high seas.
The UK has been among the loudest advocates of tougher action against ships carrying Russian oil, while previously avoiding direct involvement. In March, however, London claimed that a legal review cleared UK troops to board the vessels. The Russian Embassy in London called it a “deeply hostile step,” accusing the UK of preparing “acts of piracy.”
Russia has long considered Britain a key force behind the Ukraine conflict, accusing it of directly assisting Ukrainian long-range strikes on Russian territory with UK-supplied weapons. Moscow has also accused Western governments of demonizing Russia to justify increased defense spending and to distract the public’s attention from domestic problems.
Israeli Ex-Navy Chief admits massive damage from Iran missiles
Al Mayadeen | June 12, 2026
Former Israeli occupation Navy Commander Eliezer Marom has acknowledged the growing threat posed by Iran’s missile arsenal, admitting that Iranian strikes have inflicted substantial damage on “Israel”.
Speaking to the Israeli newspaper Maariv, Marom said, “We have seen what even limited barrages of Iranian missiles can do. The damage here in Israel is enormous, enormous. A significant portion of this damage remains unseen and unknown to the public due to military censorship.”
He further warned that Iran is maintaining “an immense pace of ballistic missile production.”
The destructive potential of Iran’s missile capabilities
Marom’s remarks come amid increasing Israeli concern over the advancement of Iran’s military capabilities and the impact of its missile operations. His comments follow Iran’s retaliatory response to the Israeli aggression on Beirut’s southern suburbs last Sunday, during which Tehran launched strikes against a number of sensitive sites across northern occupied Palestine.
The latest escalation has underscored the destructive potential of Iran’s missile capabilities, with Tehran reportedly inflicting significant losses on the occupation entity in response to Israeli aggression against both Iran and the broader Axis of Resistance.
Despite the scale of the damage, Israeli authorities continue to withhold details of many losses under military censorship, drawing scrutiny over efforts to preserve public morale and sustain claims of strategic success.
The strategic arsenal US lost in war against Iran – and why replenishment will take years
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | June 13, 2026
The sheer scale of munitions consumed during the Third Imposed War is without modern precedent in American warfare. As reported by The New York Times, within just the first two days of the military aggression that began on February 28, an estimated $5.6 billion worth of precision-guided munitions were expended, a sum that exceeds the annual military budgets of most countries in the world.
Over the full 40-day war leading up to the fragile ceasefire in early April, US forces struck more than 13,000 targets, many of which required multiple munitions each. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the cost of the air campaign alone reached between $11.3 billion in its first six days and $16.5 billion by day twelve.
The total cost over 40 days of full-scale military aggression, followed by subsequent hostilities in the Persian Gulf region, amounts to a far greater sum. While the Pentagon has estimated the figure at around $25 billion, independent assessments place the cost closer to $100 billion.
These figures do not reflect a campaign defined by restraint or resource discipline. Rather, they reveal a military establishment that bet its most advanced precision arsenal on a war it expected to win quickly – only to find itself mired in a quagmire of its own making.
JASSM-ER: Draining the Pacific’s first line of strike
No single weapons system reveals the strategic recklessness of so-called “Operation Epic Fury” more precisely than the AGM-158B Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile Extended Range, known in Pentagon parlance as the JASSM-ER.
This is not a conventional cruise missile. It is a stealthy, air-launched precision strike weapon with a range exceeding 600 miles, purpose-built to penetrate the most sophisticated integrated air defense systems in the world.
Its operational logic is explicitly tied to high-end war scenarios – specifically, a potential confrontation with China in the Western Pacific, where the People’s Liberation Army has constructed the most elaborate anti-access/area-denial architecture in history. The JASSM-ER is the weapon Washington designed for its most serious adversary. And it is largely gone.
At the outset of the war of aggression launched on February 28, the United States held a JASSM-ER inventory of approximately 2,300 missiles. According to Bloomberg, citing a source with direct knowledge of the matter, US forces consumed more than 1,000 JASSM-ERs in the first four weeks of the campaign alone.
The New York Times, drawing on Department of War sources, placed total JASSM-ER expenditure over the full campaign at approximately 1,100 missiles. An additional 47 were fired in a separate operation to abduct Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro.
The order to drain Pacific stockpiles for the Iran campaign, stripping missiles from US facilities across the continental US and repositioning them to CENTCOM bases and RAF Fairford in the United Kingdom, was issued at the end of March, according to Bloomberg.
The arithmetic is unambiguous and brutal. Of a prewar JASSM-ER inventory of 2,300, approximately 425 remain available for the rest of the world, roughly 18 percent of the prewar total. In the shorter-range baseline JASSM variant, approximately two-thirds of total stocks across both versions were committed to the Iran campaign, according to Bloomberg.
CSIS calculates that around 25 percent of the total combined JASSM inventory was expended in just 40 days of combat.
The unit cost of the JASSM-ER is $1.1 million per missile. The JASSM baseline variant costs $2.6 million per unit at current procurement figures. The roughly 1,100 JASSM-ERs fired in the recent war, therefore, represent approximately $1.2 billion in precision strike munitions, consumed in a campaign that failed to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure, did not fracture its command structure, and did not alter the strategic balance in West Asia.
Replenishment will not be swift, as per experts. The US Air Force has procured JASSM variants at an average rate of nearly 500 per year over the past decade, and existing orders in the pipeline mean that JASSM inventories will recover more quickly than other systems; CSIS estimates “several months to a year” for baseline replacement.
However, this timeline assumes no new wars, no additional campaign consumption, and full US Congressional funding of the FY 2027 military procurement request, which has not yet been appropriated.
Tomahawk: A thousand missiles in the 40-day war
The BGM-109 Tomahawk Land Attack Missile (TLAM) is the oldest and most combat-proven precision strike weapon in the US Navy’s inventory, having been used in every major American military operation since Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
Its versatility, fired from surface ships and submarines, capable of loitering and retargeting in flight, with a range of approximately 1,000 miles, makes it the Navy’s primary instrument of long-range power projection.
The war against Iran consumed it on a historically unprecedented scale.
The Washington Post reported that US naval assets fired more than 850 Tomahawks in the first month of the third imposed war. The Wall Street Journal subsequently updated that figure to more than 1,000 over the full pre-ceasefire campaign period.
CSIS’s analysis of the first six days alone identified 319 TLAMs expended, representing approximately 10 percent of the prewar inventory in less than a week.
The prewar Tomahawk inventory stood at approximately 3,200 missiles. The expenditure of over 1,000, therefore, represents roughly 31 percent of the prewar total consumed in 40 days, more than ten times the annual procurement rate.
The Pentagon ordered just 190 new Tomahawks in 2026, a figure barely more than half the number fired in the first six days of the war. The US Navy has requested 785 Tomahawks in the FY 2027 budget, a substantial increase from prior years, but CSIS projects these will not begin arriving in US inventories until March 2030, after 34 months of production lead time.
US Tomahawk inventories will not return to prewar levels until late 2030 at the earliest.
The cost consequences compound the strategic ones. Each Tomahawk Block V costs approximately $1.87 million. The 1,000-plus Tomahawks fired in the recent war, therefore, represent approximately $1.9 billion in naval strike capability, consumed against a country that, at the ceasefire, retained its ballistic missile launch capacity, its underground missile production infrastructure, and its ability to control shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.
The allied dimension of the Tomahawk shortage adds a further layer of strategic damage. Japan, which recently completed modifications on a destroyer to fire TLAMs and had purchased 400 missiles as part of its historic shift toward a more robust conventional deterrent posture against Chinese pressure, has reportedly been told that its deliveries may be delayed indefinitely because the United States must prioritize refilling its own depleted stockpiles.
Australia has also purchased more than 200 Tomahawks, and the Netherlands has purchased 175. All of these allied orders now sit in a queue behind American replenishment needs, weakening the combined deterrent posture of the US alliance network in the Western Pacific at precisely the moment that network is under the greatest pressure.
The defensive arsenal: Patriot, THAAD, and interceptor crisis
While the consumption of offensive strike missiles has drawn significant analytical attention, the depletion of America’s missile defense interceptor inventory may carry even more severe long-term strategic consequences.
These systems, including the much-hyped Patriot PAC-3 MSE, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Standard Missiles SM-3 and SM-6, are not interchangeable with cheaper alternatives. They are the irreplaceable components of layered missile defense architecture, designed to defeat the ballistic and cruise missile threats posed by peer and near-peer adversaries.
In the Pacific scenario, they are the systems that would need to protect US forward bases, carrier strike groups, and allied territory from Chinese ballistic missile salvos in the opening hours of any war. Instead, they are being consumed in the Persian Gulf.
The Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptor, at approximately $4 million per unit, was among the most heavily used anti-missile systems in the recent war imposed on Iran.
The New York Times reported that over 1,200 Patriot interceptors were fired during the aggression. CSIS estimates that Patriot usage, combined with the ongoing supply of interceptors to Ukraine, has left prewar PAC-3 inventory at critically reduced levels.
The Army’s FY 2027 budget requests 3,203 Patriot missiles, a procurement figure that reflects the scale of the shortfall, but CSIS projects these will not begin delivery until May 2029, with full replenishment of prewar levels taking three or more years from the present.
Current Patriot production stands at approximately 650 interceptors per year, with roughly half going to allied orders. Lockheed Martin intends to surge production to 2,000 per year, but achieving this capacity requires years of facility and tooling expansion.
In the interim, the United States faces a set of allocation decisions with no good options: prioritize replenishment of its own depleted stocks, continue supplying Ukraine, or fulfill the orders of the 17 other countries that operate the Patriot system and are now watching their own deliveries pushed back indefinitely.
Swiss authorities have already threatened to cancel their Patriot purchase and seek an alternative supplier after being informed of delivery delays. The bilateral friction this production shortfall is generating with allied governments has been explicitly acknowledged by CSIS and represents a tangible erosion of alliance cohesion at a moment of acute strategic uncertainty.
The THAAD situation is, by CSIS’s assessment, the most critical of all. THAAD is the upper-tier component of the US missile defense architecture, designed to intercept ballistic missiles at higher altitudes and longer ranges than Patriot.
Its interceptors are expensive, scarce, and – as of the ongoing fragile ceasefire – severely depleted. CSIS estimates that between 52 and 81 percent of the prewar THAAD interceptor inventory was expended in the recent war and related offensives, building on roughly 150 THAAD interceptors already consumed during the 12-day war in June 2025.
There have been no new deliveries of THAAD interceptors since August 2023. Deliveries are not scheduled to resume until April 2027 at the earliest. The US Army’s FY 2027 budget requests 857 THAAD interceptors, which CSIS projects will not complete the replacement of the usage during the recent war against Iran until the end of calendar year 2029.
Compounding the interceptor shortage is the damage or possible destruction of multiple AN/TPY-2 radar systems – the targeting backbone of THAAD batteries – during Iranian retaliatory strikes on US facilities in the region.
Only 13 AN/TPY-2 radars have been delivered to the United States in total. The loss or degradation of even two or three of these systems represents a qualitative capability gap that cannot be papered over by procurement requests. The US has also maintained only eight THAAD batteries in total, a number that was considered inadequate for simultaneous deployment in multiple theaters even before the war on Iran consumed the interceptors from those batteries at a rate far exceeding production capacity to replace them.
The ship-launched Standard Missiles present a somewhat less acute but still serious picture. CSIS estimates that SM-3 expenditure in the recent war ranged from 31 to 60 percent of prewar inventory, while SM-6 consumption ran between 16 and 32 percent.
Both missiles carry production lead times of 36 to 39 months from contract award to first delivery. Inventories will not return to prewar levels until early 2029 – despite their relatively lower usage in the 40-day war of aggression – reflecting the cumulative effect of years of inadequate procurement before the war began.
The cost ledger: What was spent and what was not gained
The aggregate financial cost of the munitions consumed in the recent war against Iran, calculated from unit costs and reported expenditure figures, represents one of the most expensive failed military campaigns in the history of modern warfare.
The principal expenditures, based on CSIS data and DOD reporting, break down as follows. Over 1,100 JASSM-ER missiles at $1.1 million each account for approximately $1.21 billion. More than 1,000 Tomahawk missiles at $1.87 million each represent approximately $1.87 billion. Over 1,200 Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors at $4 million each amount to approximately $4.8 billion. More than 1,000 Precision Strike Missiles and ATACMS, at between $500,000 and $1.5 million each, add a further $500 million to $1.5 billion.
THAAD interceptors, along with SM-3 and SM-6 expenditures, contribute several hundred million more at their respective unit costs. The aggregate munitions cost of the war runs to well in excess of $10 billion, and that figure covers only the missiles, not the operational costs of the platforms that delivered them, the intelligence infrastructure that supported targeting, or the diplomatic capital expended in securing basing and overflight rights.
War Secretary Pete Hegseth himself, in testimony before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, acknowledged that replenishment will take “months and years, depending on the weapon system.” CSIS’s assessment supports that timeline in its conservative form and exceeds it in the more pessimistic analysis.
The combined picture across all seven critical munitions categories is that the US will not return to prewar inventory levels for any of its most critical systems before 2028 at the earliest, with Tomahawk, THAAD, and Patriot taking three or more years from the present.
Building inventories to the levels that war planners have identified as necessary for a high-intensity peer war, levels that were already considered insufficient even before the Iran war, will take additional years beyond that.
The China variable: A window of vulnerability measured in years
The strategic meaning of these numbers transcends the war against Iran in itself. The JASSM-ER was not designed to strike Iranian nuclear facilities but to defeat Chinese integrated air defense systems protecting military targets in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
The Tomahawk was not stockpiled to prosecute a campaign in the Persian Gulf but maintained as the Navy’s primary instrument of long-range strike in a Western Pacific contingency. The THAAD interceptors depleted over Iranian skies were the same interceptors positioned in South Korea and Guam to defend against North Korean and Chinese ballistic missile threats. They have been moved and their replacements are years away.
Even before the war against Iran, as assessments suggest, US munitions stockpiles were deemed insufficient for a peer competitor fight in the Western Pacific, based on the classified war-gaming conclusions of the House Select Committee on China.
That shortfall is now dramatically more acute. The think tank’s characterization that depleted inventories have created a “window of vulnerability” for a potential Western Pacific war is not alarmist rhetoric but a straightforward arithmetic conclusion drawn from the procurement timelines and inventory figures its researchers have calculated from publicly available budget documents.
The implications for Chinese strategic calculations are substantial and not easily dismissed. Beijing’s military planners have observed, in real time, that the US consumed its primary long-range strike inventory – the very capabilities designed to hold Chinese assets at risk in a Taiwan contingency – in a 40-day war that did not achieve its strategic objectives.
They have observed that the combined JASSM and Tomahawk inventories available for Pacific contingencies are now a fraction of their prewar levels. They have observed that THAAD batteries have been stripped from South Korea – degrading the missile defense coverage of a key US ally on China’s periphery – and that their replacement is years away.
And they have observed that American production capacity, constrained by decades of procurement at peacetime rates and manufacturing lead times measured in years rather than months, cannot rapidly reverse any of these deficits, regardless of how much money US Congress appropriates.
This is not the profile of a deterrent in robust health, but the profile of a military establishment that has consumed its premium, China-specific capabilities in a secondary theater without achieving the decisive outcome that would have justified the expenditure, and that now faces a multi-year period of structural vulnerability during which its ability to credibly threaten the use of force in the Taiwan Strait is materially diminished.
The CSIS report notes with the cautious observation that China is deeply aware it has no recent combat experience, while the US military has been engaged in wars on multiple fronts, and that this experiential differential may preserve deterrence until inventories are restored. This is a thin reed on which to hang the credibility of American extended deterrence across Indo-Pacific.
The deterrent value of operational skill is real, but it is not a substitute for the physical missiles that a deterrent posture requires, and Beijing’s strategic calculus is driven more by inventory mathematics than by assessments of American tactical proficiency.
The production constraint: Why money cannot buy time
The Trump administration has responded to the munitions crisis with a series of framework agreements with major contractors – Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing – committing to expand production capacity across the full range of critical munitions.
Lockheed Martin has agreed to quadruple THAAD interceptor production capacity from 96 to 400 per year. Raytheon has committed to increasing Tomahawk production to more than 1,000 per year and Patriot MSE output to 2,000 per year.
These are significant capacity targets that, if achieved, would substantially accelerate inventory recovery relative to current baselines.
But capacity is not production, and production agreements are not delivered missiles, according to military experts. The fundamental constraint is not financial but temporal. Manufacturing lead time for advanced missile systems – the period between contract award and first delivery – runs between 34 and 39 months for the most critical systems. Building new production facilities, qualifying new supply chains, training additional skilled labor, and resolving bottlenecks in specialized components such as guidance systems and rocket motors are processes measured in years, not quarters.
The FY 2027 defense budget, even if fully and promptly appropriated by a Congress that has not yet voted on it, will not produce a single additional THAAD interceptor or Tomahawk before 2030. The window of vulnerability is already wide open.
Hegseth’s own assessment before the Senate Armed Services Committee, that replenishment will take “months and years, depending on the weapon system,” represents, in the carefully hedged language of executive branch testimony, an acknowledgment that the US has accepted a period of strategic risk in exchange for a military campaign that did not deliver the outcome its architects promised.
The question that American strategic planners cannot answer to Beijing’s satisfaction is how long that window remains open – and what Beijing’s strategic interests, combined with this window of opportunity, might produce.
Ex-South Korean President sentenced for trying to provoke conflict with Pyongyang
RT | June 12, 2026
A South Korean court has sentenced former President Yoon Suk Yeol to 30 years in prison, Yonhap news agency has reported. Judges reportedly found that he ordered drones to be sent into North Korea in order to inflame tensions and create a pretext for his declaration of martial law.
Yoon declared martial law in December of 2024, citing legislative gridlock and what he described as a plot by pro-Pyongyang forces within the South Korean political establishment. The nation’s parliament formally overturned the decree within hours despite attempts by police and soldiers to stop lawmakers from accessing the National Assembly building.
Yoon was impeached just over a week later, suspended from office, and formally removed from power by the Constitutional Court months later.
On Friday, a Seoul court ruled that Yoon had abused his power and “benefited the enemy” with his drone plot, among other charges, and sentenced him to 30 years in prison. According to the Associated Press, the court also accused him of harming South Korea’s military interests by exposing its capabilities and prompting Pyongyang to take a stronger defensive posture.
Yoon’s former Defense Minister Kim Yong-hyun was also sentenced to 30 years in prison for his role in the plot, while former Defense Counterintelligence Command chief Yeo In-hyung received a 15-year sentence.
Friday’s sentence adds to Yoon’s growing list of convictions.
In February, he was sentenced to life after being convicted of attempting to orchestrate an insurrection and seize power. In April, an appeals court increased his sentence for abuse of authority and obstruction of duty.
Yoon’s downfall follows a long pattern of legal persecution of former South Korean leaders.
Four of his predecessors had received prison sentences after leaving office. Among them were Chun Doo-hwan, Roh Tae-woo, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, although several were later pardoned.
US publishes docs on ‘dangerous’ Ukrainian biolabs

RT | June 12, 2026
US Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Tulsi Gabbard has released new evidence that US-funded biological laboratories in Ukraine were researching dangerous pathogens. Washington previously denied any role in running these labs.
Published on Friday, the declassified documents reveal that the US “built and supported” 40 biolabs in Ukraine, which worked with “especially dangerous pathogens” including anthrax, avian flu, Ebola, plague, and tuberculosis. At least 12 of these laboratories were carrying out human research.
Some of the laboratories were engaged in so-called ‘gain of function’ research, a controversial practice whereby animal viruses are modified to increase their virulence and transmissibility to study their effects on humans.
The partially-redacted documents state that the US paid for the construction and equipping of at least four laboratories, at a total cost of more than $9 million. They also reveal that these laboratories carried out research on behalf of and in collaboration with the US Department of Food and Agriculture, the US Army, the World Health Organization, the UN, and multiple US universities. Metabiota, a biotech company part-owned by Hunter Biden’s investment firm, is also listed as a partner.
What did Russia say about the biolabs?
As Russian troops entered Ukraine in February 2022, the Russian Defense Ministry claimed that Vladimir Zelensky’s government in Kiev ordered the “emergency destruction” of pathogens at multiple US-funded laboratories in Ukraine. The ministry accused Kiev of ordering the destruction in an attempt to hide its role in an American biological weapons program.
Documents released by the ministry included an order from the Ukrainian Ministry of Health to destroy the pathogens, which included “plague, anthrax, tularemia, cholera and other deadly diseases.”
After reviewing thousands of pages of documents seized from labs in Donetsk, Lugansk and Kherson, Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov of the Russian Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces concluded in 2023 that “the US, under the guise of ensuring global biosecurity, conducted dual-use research, including the creation of biological weapons components, in close proximity to Russian borders.” Kirillov led Russia’s investigation into the labs until he was assassinated in 2024, allegedly by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU).
Among the facilities mentioned by the ministry was the Institute of Veterinary Medicine in Kharkov. The Russian military accused Ukraine of researching potential biological weapons in the institute’s basement. According to Gabbard’s documents, the facility did have a basement level, where anthrax and brucella bacteria were stored. Both are considered bioweapons due to their extreme infectivity and capacity to cause debilitating illness.
Did the US deny that the biolabs existed?
Back in March 2022, then-US Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland admitted under oath that “Ukraine has biological research facilities.” However, Nuland denied that these facilities worked on biological weapons, and insisted that “the United States does not own or operate any chemical or biological laboratories in Ukraine.”
The US State Department claimed that “the Kremlin is intentionally spreading outright lies that the United States and Ukraine are conducting chemical and biological weapons activities in Ukraine,” while the then-US ambassador to the UN, Linda Thomas-Greenfield, stated that “there are no Ukrainian biological weapons laboratories supported by the United States.”
What is Tulsi Gabbard doing about the biolabs?
“Despite the obvious potential for catastrophic global impact research on dangerous pathogens in biolabs can have, politicians, so-called health professionals like Dr. Fauci, and entities within the Biden administration’s national security team lied to the American people about the existence of US-funded and supported biolabs, and threatened those who attempted to expose the truth,” Gabbard said in a statement on Friday.
Gabbard said that she has issued new guidance to US intelligence agencies on collection of data from the laboratories in Ukraine, and from the broader network of US-linked biolabs around the world. At present, her office is collecting “new details on clinical trials that are underway at these facilities, raising significant ethical, financial, and security concerns,” her statement read.
However, Gabbard will not be in a position to act on this intelligence for much longer. Following her husband’s diagnosis with a rare form of bone cancer last month, Gabbard announced that she would retire at the end of June. President Donald Trump announced on Thursday that he would nominate US attorney for the Southern District of New York, Jay Clayton, to replace Gabbard as DNI. Clayton has never commented publicly on the biolabs issue.
Trump’s ERAM cruise missiles for Ukraine blow up his peace overtures to Russia
By Finian Cunningham | Strategic Culture Foundation | June 12, 2026
At the Anchorage summit last summer between U.S. President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, there was some optimism that the conflict in Ukraine might be resolved through diplomacy.
There appeared to be an atmosphere of bonhomie between the two leaders, and in particular, an openness on the American side to listen to Russia’s historic grievances about NATO’s enlargement, presenting a national security threat.
Only days later, however, Trump’s administration quietly approved the supply of new cruise missiles to Ukraine. After months of delay, those new types of weapons are now on their way to Ukraine. This firepower will give a deeper reach into Russia, which is already being assailed by long-range NATO drones.
The summit in the Alaskan capital in August 2025 was dubbed the “spirit of Anchorage.” The meeting was supposed to signal Trump’s commitment to finding a diplomatic settlement of the conflict, taking into account Russia’s historic territorial claims. There appeared to be a recognition on the American side of addressing Moscow’s concerns about the “root causes of conflict” from decades of NATO encroachment on its borders.
But nearly a year on, the diplomatic track has failed to gain any traction, as Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov acknowledged this week.
Trump has, of course, become embroiled in a disastrous war against Iran, one that is endangering the whole Middle East and the global economy.
So much for the “peace presidency” that he had promised. Still, one might expect him to at least pay some token attention to pushing diplomacy in Ukraine. No. Like a kid bored with a new toy, Trump has backed away, which makes all his past angst to stop the slaughter in Ukraine something of a superficial theater.
What is still going ahead, though, is the supply of over 3,300 U.S.-made cruise weapons, manufactured under a program called the Extended Range Attack Missiles (ERAM). The ERAM program began production in April 2025 of two new cruise missile designs.
One weapon is called the Rapidly Adaptable Affordable Cruise Missile (RAACM), manufactured by CoAspire. It has a range of 450 kilometers.
The other design, known as Rusty Dagger, has a much longer range of over 900 km, and is produced by Zone Five Technologies. Both companies are based in the U.S.
The ERAMs are much smaller than Tomahawk cruise missiles in terms of overall size, weight, and explosive warhead. But they were engineered to give Ukraine a cheaper option for deep strikes in Russian territory. They also do not have the iconic image of the Tomahawk and, therefore, can be supplied without arousing the same provocation.
They are designed to be deployed as air-launched weapons using F-16 fighter jets or MiG-29s, both of which are flown by the Ukrainian armed forces.
European NATO states – Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway – are picking up most of the tab for the $825 million cost of supplying the ERAMs to Ukraine, according to the Pentagon.
It is being reported, although not officially confirmed, that the Rusty Dagger ERAM, the longer-range version, has already begun operations in striking Russia. The claims are based on the alleged recovery of missile debris, showing navigation equipment belonging to Five Zone Technologies.
Since the Anchorage summit last year, President Trump has sought to cast the Kiev regime and the European NATO leaders as unhelpful to his efforts to make a peace deal with Russia. There has also been a belief on that Russian side that Trump is genuine in his expressions of wanting to find a diplomatic resolution to the more than four-year war in Ukraine – the biggest in Europe since World War II.
Moscow has tended to rebuke the Zelensky regime and its European patrons for being intransigent and acting to undermine Trump’s peace diplomacy. There is no doubt that this criticism of European Russophobia blocking diplomatic engagement has some merit.
Nevertheless, a reality check is due on what Washington’s abiding agenda is.
Washington has led the long-term strategic policy of confrontation with Russia using the NATO alliance and Ukraine as a proxy. This has been Washington’s systematic policy under successive U.S. administrations, from Clinton in the 1990s to Bush, Obama, Biden, and Trump.
It was under Trump during his first administration in 2018 that the U.S. broke the taboo of supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. Those munitions included $47 million worth of Javelin anti-tank missiles. Russia warned at the time that such arming of Ukraine would lead to open conflict. That prediction duly culminated in February 2022 during the Biden administration when Russia invaded Ukraine to defend Russian-speaking people who were being attacked and killed by the NATO-backed NeoNazi Kiev regime.
Indeed, Trump has boasted at various times about how he was the first president to send lethal weapons to Ukraine, while at the same time trying to blame the Biden administration for starting the war.
In his second administration, from January 2025, Trump has balked at supplying Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine so as not to provoke Russia after Moscow gave stern warnings against such a move. And he has talked up his supposed desire to end the slaughter, at one point claiming he could achieve that in 24 hours.
Trump has also scaled back sending U.S. tax dollars as military aid to Ukraine, which might suggest that he is serious about winding down the conflict.
A more nuanced view is that what transactional Trump seems more concerned about is not so much reducing the supply of U.S. weapons to Ukraine but rather getting the Europeans to pay for it.
This is evident from the expected supply of over 3,300 ERAM cruise missiles to Ukraine, which Europe is financing. Trump has approved that delivery.
Unmistakably, this represents a grave escalation in the war against Russia, whereby the U.S. and its European NATO partners are making a concerted effort to weaponize the Kiev regime to strike deeper. The new cruise missile arsenal dovetails with the ramping up of European-supplied and financed long-range drone capability.
Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that Washington’s agenda of hostility towards Russia has not changed fundamentally. It has merely become nuanced with duplicity about seeking diplomacy, a charade in which Washington is supposedly thwarted by a recalcitrant Kiev regime and European Russophobes.
This same duplicitous charade is played with regard to Iran. Trump makes out that he wants to find a peace deal with Tehran, but that his efforts are continually sabotaged by Israel and its “crazy” prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, whom he gets on the phone to shout at, we are told. This, from a U.S. president who started a war of aggression against Iran 100 days ago on February 28 by murdering Iran’s supreme leader while he was saying prayers in his Tehran home, and on the same day killing 168 schoolgirls in a multiple air strike on a college in Minab.
The reality is that the United States could bring the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East to a rapid end by stopping the supply of weapons.
Trump’s so-called peace diplomacy is a con to cover up for the fact that U.S. warmongering is the root cause of conflicts, and this warmongering is not going to stop until it is defeated.
Report: US military building new base near Gaza border to support post-war plan
MEMO | June 12, 2026
The US military has begun constructing a large base near the Gaza border that is expected to serve as a headquarters for military and civilian personnel involved in implementing President Donald Trump’s Gaza plan, according to a report by the Israeli newspaper Israel Hayom.
The newspaper reported on Wednesday that construction is underway near the Israeli community of Re’im, close to the Gaza Strip.
According to the report, the facility is intended to function as a central command and coordination hub for international organizations, civilian personnel and military forces expected to participate in the implementation of the next phases of Trump’s plan for Gaza.
“We have learned that the US Army has begun constructing a massive base on the Gaza border, not far from Re’im,” the newspaper reported.
Israel Hayom said the new installation is expected to replace the multinational headquarters currently operating from Kiryat Gat in southern Israel.
According to the report, the Kiryat Gat facility previously hosted representatives from more than 24 countries, including several Arab states, who participated in international coordination efforts related to Gaza.
The newspaper said many of those representatives left following the outbreak of the conflict involving Iran earlier this year.
US ‘limited war’ strategy against Iran deepens its strategic quagmire as Tehran’s deterrence grows
Press TV – June 11, 2026
In the early hours of Thursday, the US once again attacked southern Iran. The official narratives in Washington are already spinning – surgical strikes, proportionate response, mission accomplished. But beneath the fog of disinformation and the whine of cruise missiles and fighter jets lies a deeper strategic truth.
This was no isolated act of aggression but a calculated move in a long, undeclared, and unprovoked war – one that bears an eerie and unsettling resemblance to the Third Imposed War, which began on February 28 and halted only after the American side blinked first.
Yet this round of military aggression is not a replay of the 40-day war. It is something more insidious, more desperate, and ultimately more fragile.
This time, the American war machine relies on calibrated military pressure, psychological warfare, and controlled escalation to force Iran into a political settlement on American terms – without entering a full-scale war that it no longer appears willing, or able, to sustain.
The 40-day imposed war was fundamentally aimed at weakening, destabilizing, or even collapsing the Islamic Republic itself. By contrast, these limited strikes aim to force Tehran into a political agreement engineered around American strategic demands.
The recent strikes against southern Iranian regions – following weeks of simmering tensions over the Strait of Hormuz and the broader regional confrontation – reveal a critical reality: Washington still wants to pressure Iran, yet desperately seeks to avoid the catastrophic consequences of a full-scale regional war it knows will not turn in its favor.
The American war machine finds itself trapped between multiple dangerous options, none offering a clear path to victory, or even a face-saving exit from this deepening quagmire.
To understand why, we must dissect the anatomy of the latest attacks, decode the psychological warfare that accompanies them, and examine the strategic deadlock that drove Washington to choose what can only be called “the fourth path” – a path leading not to Iranian surrender, but to America’s own strategic exhaustion.
Echoes of the Third Imposed War: The same logic, a different trap
Let us be clear about what happened last night. The enemy’s continued attacks on southern Iran are not random or disorganized acts of violence, but carefully calibrated instruments of coercion. The objective is not necessarily the degradation of Iranian military assets or sending a message, but to force the Islamic Republic of Iran into an agreement crafted in Washington, on Washington’s terms, at Washington’s preferred timing.
The immediate point of comparison is the Third Imposed War, when the US-Israeli coalition launched a full-scale military attack intended to topple the Islamic Republic. The similarity is not superficial. In both cases, the enemy has resorted to military tools as the primary mechanism to force Iran’s political submission. Yet the scale and goals differ sharply.
The latest round of aggression is not – at least not directly – about so-called “regime change.” It is about imposing a specific agreement. The United States does not seek to occupy Iran this time, and it lacks both the appetite and the military capability for that.
Instead, the primary objective is to force Iran to sign on the dotted line: an agreement that would impose unreasonable curbs on Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, restrict its regional influence, and legitimize a new order of American domination.
This strategy is built around short, localized, carefully calibrated attacks designed to increase pressure on Iran without crossing the threshold into full-fledged war. The underlying calculation is that sustained military and psychological pressure may eventually compel Tehran to make concessions that large-scale imposed war could not achieve.
Yet the very adoption of this strategy reveals an important strategic reality: time may no longer be working in America’s favor.
While the Third Imposed War aimed to annihilate the Islamic Republic, the latest attacks aim to chain it. If you cannot destroy your enemy, you try to cage him. And if you try to cage him through limited strikes, you admit that full-scale war is beyond your reach.
The theater of lies: Psychological operations as a weapon
The most striking feature of the latest round of American aggression is not merely the military dimension, but the massive psychological warfare campaign accompanying it.
No analysis of unfolding events would be complete without addressing the torrent of disinformation that preceded, accompanied, and followed the Thursday strikes.
In this regard, the enemy has learned nothing from the previous war. Extensive, intense, and deliberately misleading psychological operations remain an essential component of American warfare, essentially because other options have failed disastrously.
The aggressive, unhinged rhetoric of Donald Trump and senior US officials before the latest strikes – repetitive threats of overwhelming force, contradictory public statements, claims of secret contacts with Iranian officials, and declarations that military objectives had already been achieved – all form part of a broader attempt to shape perceptions rather than battlefield realities.
Before the latest strikes, Trump and his War Secretary Pete Hegseth adopted an angry, harsh, and openly threatening tone, designed not just to intimidate Tehran but to shape domestic American opinion. Then came the glaring contradictions.
Trump claimed – falsely, as Iranian officials immediately made clear – that Iranian officials had contacted him to beg for an end to the war. No such contact occurred. He claimed the confrontation had achieved all its military objectives – a standard refrain after every US strike, from Vietnam to Syria. And as always, Washington denied any enemy losses, despite mounting evidence to the contrary.
These are not minor rhetorical flourishes but deliberate tactics of deception and lies, strikingly similar to American psychological methods during the Third Imposed War.
The goal is twofold: first, to create an illusion of American invincibility and Iranian desperation; second, to muddy the information environment so that independent assessment becomes impossible. If you cannot win the actual war, you try to win the story.
But here is the irony: these attacks have become so routine, so hyperbolic, that they no longer deceive anyone with strategic awareness. The Iranian leadership and public have seen it many times before. When every US attack is declared a complete success, the term loses all meaning. And when every Iranian response is dismissed as negligible, the enemy blinds itself to the asymmetric retaliation that inevitably follows.
Why limited confrontation? The ‘Fourth Path’ emerges
This brings us to the heart of the matter. Why would the United States choose a limited, localized, short-term military confrontation, knowing full well that Iran has demonstrated, repeatedly and powerfully, its ability to respond with devastating effect against enemy bases and interests across the region? The answer lies in a strategic calculus of desperation.
The US war machine faces a classic deadlock, left with four options – none of which work well for it.
Option one is full-scale war. The Pentagon’s own war games consistently show that a comprehensive war with Iran would be catastrophic: hundreds of billions of dollars, thousands of casualties, regional conflagration, global oil shocks, and no guarantee of regime change. This option is effectively suicide for any American administration.
Option two is accepting an agreement on Iran’s conditions. This is politically impossible for Washington. After decades of “maximum pressure” policy, to suddenly accept Tehran’s terms would be a humiliating defeat, signaling the irreversible collapse of American deterrence from the Persian Gulf to the Pacific.
Option three is to continue the status quo. That means Iran maintains its de facto control over the Strait of Hormuz, maritime blockades persist, and the region simmers in perpetual low-intensity war. For the United States, this is also a form of slow-motion suicide – a steady erosion of whatever remains of its credibility, economic leverage, and military prestige.
Option four is limited, localized, non-comprehensive confrontation. This is what we saw last night and the night before. A strike here, a retaliation there. Manageable escalation and plausible deniability. The hope is that through calibrated violence, Iran can be coerced into accepting an agreement it has already rejected at the negotiating table.
The fact that Washington has chosen “option four” is, paradoxically, a confession of its weakness. It proves three things beyond a reasonable doubt. First, time is working against the United States. Iran’s steady and significant nuclear progress, growing regional alliances, and strategic patience are outlasting American attention spans.
Second, another full-scale war is not a desirable option for a host of reasons – economic, military, political, and reputational. Third, and most critically, the current draft understanding for ending the imposed war clearly favors Iran.
Tehran has already extracted concessions on sanctions, inspections, and regional architecture. The agreement, as currently being framed, is unacceptable to Washington. Hence the resort to reckless violence.
Asymmetric responses and Iran’s untapped leverage
But here is the fatal flaw in America’s “fourth path.” The entire strategy rests on a single, fragile assumption, which is that Iran will respond in predictable, proportionate, and non-escalatory ways. History – including the recent past – suggests otherwise.
Iran has already demonstrated, in previous confrontations, that its responses can be unpredictable, asymmetric, and devastatingly effective. When the enemy’s risk increases, when even a “limited” operation invites a response that burns bigger than the attack, then this fourth option rapidly becomes ineffective, invalid, and useless.
Consider what Iran has not yet done and could do anytime in the future. Withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) remains an option on the table. So does the intensification of conditions for ending the imposed war – demands that could include full lifting of all sanctions, binding guarantees against future attacks, and even compensation for damages. These are strategic levers that Tehran has deliberately kept in reserve.
Moreover, Iran has established a new rule in regional equations: the enemy front is now viewed as unified, and the Resistance Front is equally unified. The enemy understands that investing in limited confrontation may not only fail to produce the desired outcome, but it could, under this new equation, leave the American side in a far worse position than before.
Every strike against Iran is now met with coordinated responses from Tehran, Baghdad, Sana’a, and Beirut. The days of isolated retaliation and strategic restraint are over.
The exhaustion of American options
Let us step back and assess the broader arc. Iran has been remarkably successful in discrediting the enemy’s threats, one by one.
War? It faced two imposed wars in less than a year and emerged stronger each time. Sanctions? The crippling “maximum pressure” campaign failed to bring Iran to its knees. Blockade? Iran continues to control the Strait of Hormuz despite US maritime banditry. The enemy’s options are exhausted. They no longer possess their former effectiveness.
And now, even the limited confrontation option is showing signs of fragility. If the enemy intends to continue the unhinged behavior that it showed last night and if Washington still places hope in this equation, then it is deluding itself.
Asymmetric responses will now become even more critical. Unexpected and unpredictable Iranian behavior regarding the agreement could alter the equation overnight. Iran still possesses many options it has not yet acted upon.
So the fourth path is a path to nowhere. It is the choice of a power that cannot go forward, cannot go back, and cannot stand still. The US military is striking Iran now because it has run out of good options. But a bad option repeated only gets worse. And when Iran’s unpredictable responses raise the risk beyond tolerance, even this final gambit will collapse.
Then Washington will face the question it has been avoiding: accept an agreement on Iran’s terms, or admit that the era of military coercion in the Persian Gulf is over. Either way, the Islamic Republic is still calling the shots – and the enemy’s arsenal of threats is empty.
