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Sana’a strikes back: How Yemeni military’s lightning advance redrew the Red Sea’s strategic map

Territory liberated by Yemeni Armed Forces during the recent operation, including the ports of Al-Mokha, Dhubab, and Al-Khokha, and towns such as Hays and Maqbanah.
By Mohammad Molaei | Press TV | September 12, 2026

In the span of roughly one week, the Yemeni armed forces accomplished what eight years of attritional warfare had failed to achieve.

In a military operation officially named “God Is Strongest in Might and Severe in Punishment,” the Yemeni military, backed by the Ansarullah resistance forces, liberated more than 5,400 square kilometers of territory along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, capturing strategically vital ports, towns, and geographic features that Saudi-backed forces had seized and held since 2017 and 2018.

The speed, coordination, and depth of the advance stunned military and security observers, shattered a carefully constructed Saudi media narrative, and fundamentally altered the strategic geometry of the war imposed on Yemen.

The ports of Al-Mokha, Dhubab, and Al-Khokha fell. Key towns, including Hays, Maqbanah, and Al-Mafraq, were liberated. The entire Jabal Habashi region came under Sana’a’s control.

These were no minor outposts but positions that the former Saudi-backed regime had spent four months capturing during the so-called “Golden Arrow” operation in 2017 and an entire summer offensive in 2018, backed by heavy Saudi air support and financial resources.

The intelligence that started it all

The roots of the operation lie in a body of intelligence and an assessment reached in Sana’a months before the first shot was fired. It was believed that Saudi Arabia, in coordination with the United States, was preparing to launch a major offensive under the diplomatic pretext of securing international navigation in the Red Sea at some point in the near future.

The Saudis aimed, first, to create operational space for Washington to assert dominance over the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a strategic waterway whose leverage Ansarullah-backed Yemeni military had wielded with increasing effect since joining the Gaza solidarity front two years earlier.

Second, they sought to neutralize that leverage by igniting a land conflict along the western coast and driving northward toward Hodeidah, effectively diverting the Yemeni military’s attention from maritime operations and drawing it back into a costly ground war.

The broader context matters. Since early 2016, Saudi Arabia had gradually sidelined the UAE across provinces outside the Yemeni government’s control, consolidating its influence over the mercenary coalition nominally operating under the banner of the Saudi-recognized regime.

By this stage, the Emiratis had been largely pushed to the margins of the ground equation. Washington, having failed to achieve decisive results in either the Strait of Hormuz or Bab al-Mandab through its own military aggression, appeared to be recalibrating around Riyadh as its primary instrument.

For Saudi Arabia, specifically, a single operation on the western coast offered the prospect of three simultaneous gains: accelerating the US push for Red Sea control; transforming what had remained an internationalized war into a fratricidal intra-Yemeni war by stoking internal fronts; and consolidating Riyadh’s dominance over the fractious coalition of Yemeni military factions, many of them previously under UAE command, by bringing them together under a unified operation.

The Saudi Maneuver and Miscalculation

Saudi preparations had begun well in advance, reportedly even before the Yemeni operation to break the siege, which was launched following the funeral ceremony of a martyred leader in Sana’a. The plan envisioned opening three simultaneous fronts in Al-Jawf, Ma’rib, and along the western coast. It immediately ran into structural problems.

Southern factions within the Saudi-backed coalition refused to commit their forces to battles in the north. This single factor created a fracture line through the entire scheme.

Riyadh’s mercenaries, many of whom were fighting for locally defined interests rather than any coherent national project, could not be so easily redirected. The Saudis responded by redeploying forces from eastern Yemen northward and shifting the primary axis toward the western coast, where the geographic and symbolic stakes were highest.

Meanwhile, Riyadh worked the diplomatic track. A host of mediators – Egypt, Turkey, and most prominently Oman – were mobilized. Sana’a, not yet ready to foreclose negotiations entirely, granted a brief reprieve, holding off on launching the second phase of its operations.

None of this changed the military reality. While negotiations proceeded, Saudi Arabia sought to reinforce its mercenary positions and replenish ammunition stockpiles. Sana’a concluded that the window for a negotiated outcome had been deliberately exploited to buy time, not to buy peace.

The intelligence war

What followed was not a conventional military offensive launched from a standing start. It was the terminal phase of a carefully sequenced preemptive campaign that had been underway for approximately four weeks before the main ground advance.

Yemeni military’s intelligence apparatus, operating under the direction of Abu Ali al-Hakim, demonstrated a level of precision that repeatedly left the Saudi-backed coalition wrong-footed.

Newly established mercenary positions were destroyed before they could be consolidated. Ammunition depots were located and struck. Command centers and operations rooms were systematically degraded. The cumulative effect was a coalition whose combat readiness had been substantially hollowed out before the ground offensive even began.

The resulting weapons shortages were severe enough that Riyadh dispatched ships carrying arms to resupply its forces, seeking to close the gap before the main battle.

But the ships, arriving at the port of Mokha, were treated as targets, much like the trucks moving through the Al-Wadiah and Al-Abr crossings. The resupply effort largely failed.

The intelligence picture was so consistently accurate that speculation arose that UAE-aligned elements, still resentful of Saudi dominance over coalition affairs, may have contributed to the flow of intelligence to the Yemeni military. Whatever the source, the Yemeni military’s penetration of the coalition’s operational security was demonstrably deep.

The spark on the Taiz Axis

The specific trigger for the ground offensive came in early September, when the Yemeni military launched a first strike against a Saudi-backed position, anticipating an offensive push northward.

The preemptive strike sparked clashes across four axes simultaneously. The result was not a cascading, domino-like collapse of positions. What the Saudis had intended as the opening move of their western coast offensive instead became the opening phase of their humiliating retreat.

Over the following days, Riyadh attempted to activate additional fronts in Al-Bayda, Al-Dhale’e, and Al-Jawf in an effort to stretch the Yemeni military forces thin across multiple theaters.

Saudi airstrikes intensified across Yemen. Saudi officers reportedly promised direct ground support to coalition factions to incentivize them to hold their positions. The Yemeni military’s own assessment of the dynamic was clear: the Saudis had previously tried activating 52 fronts simultaneously, and each time the result had been further Yemeni military advances, rather than a reversal.

The media war

As the Yemeni military advances accelerated, a parallel battle unfolded in the information space. Saudi-aligned media channels worked to construct a counter-narrative, circulating footage of mercenary vehicle convoys, highlighting minor territorial gains in areas already under Saudi coalition control, and projecting an image of momentum that bore little resemblance to the battlefield reality.

The narrative briefly gained traction by drawing, inaccurately, on the recent Syrian precedent. Some observers speculated that Sana’a might face a “Damascus moment”: a rapid, unexpected collapse of authority under a fast-moving offensive.

The comparison was analytically flawed. The structural, operational, and social conditions that led to the fall of Damascus bear little resemblance to those in Yemen. Sana’a’s military organization, popular base, intelligence infrastructure, and decade-long experience of sustained warfare against a better-resourced coalition have produced a very different kind of fighting force from the one that crumbled in Syria.

The battlefield results made it clear. The “Damascus moment” narrative did not survive contact with the liberation of the islands, the western coast, and the string of ports that followed.

Sana’a’s logic of escalation

Throughout the campaign, Ansarullah-led Yemeni military forces have maintained a consistent list of demands directed at Riyadh: the complete lifting of the air and naval blockade on Yemen; payment of civil servant salaries; an all-for-all prisoner exchange; reopening roads between provinces; Saudi withdrawal from Yemeni territory; and the complete cessation of funding and material support to anti-Sana’a factions.

The strategic logic underlying the current operation can be summarized in three interlocking equations that Sana’a appears to be establishing simultaneously:

The first is Siege for Siege: The imposition of a naval blockade on Saudi Arabia stretching from Bab al-Mandab across the full length of the Red Sea, mirroring the blockade Riyadh maintains on Yemen.

The second is Preemptive Action: Continuous surveillance and interdiction of mercenary logistics and troop movements from eastern to western Yemen, preventing the reconstitution of forces that have already been degraded.

The third is Direct Deterrence: The targeting of Saudi military bases, military airports, and Aramco infrastructure in southern Saudi Arabia in direct response to any Saudi violation of Yemeni airspace or attacks on Yemeni territory.

The endgame

Sana’a has officially announced the conclusion of the operation and directed its forces toward consolidating the liberated territories. The reasoning behind stopping the advance at this stage, rather than pushing farther, reflects three overlapping calculations.

The first is the immediate military imperative of securing and clearing 5,400 square kilometers of newly captured terrain, a task that demands both manpower and time and must be completed before any counteroffensive can be mounted effectively.

The second is the existence of other fronts requiring attention. Ma’rib retains significant economic importance because of the Safer oil-field infrastructure. Taiz carries major political weight for Sana’a’s long-term governance ambitions. Yemeni forces cannot allow gains on the western coast to come at the cost of deterioration on these other critical axes.

The third consideration is strategic restraint, an awareness that actions crossing certain thresholds could trigger a qualitatively different response and draw in actors whose involvement would complicate the current trajectory.

Arab media reports indicate that tensions inside mercenary formations in Taiz have already escalated sharply in the wake of the coastal losses. A critical highway remains in play; delaying withdrawal from the city could leave those forces cut off from a viable exit route, a development that could dramatically accelerate Taiz’s fall without requiring a further ground offensive.

Regional ripples: Tehran, Riyadh, and beyond

The operational dimensions of this campaign extend beyond Yemen’s borders. Saudi Arabia has engaged directly with Tehran in an effort to halt flights to Sana’a since the Yemeni attacks resumed. Pakistan, meanwhile, is reportedly working to include Yemen in a new ceasefire framework, not unlike its role during the previous round, when Islamabad’s diplomatic activity coincided with and helped shape the Saudi naval blockade ceasefire process.

Saudi officials have a documented pattern of denying involvement in Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon even while conducting active operations across all three theaters. Following its setbacks on the western coast, Riyadh may seek to recover leverage through alternative pressure points, with Lebanon and Iraq among the most likely arenas. That possibility warrants close monitoring.

American support for the Saudi-backed mercenary coalition has continued, but Washington has so far stopped short of direct combat involvement or assuming battlefield command.

Whether that calculus holds in the face of continued Yemeni military advances, or whether disillusionment with Saudi performance drives Washington toward renewed engagement with the UAE, remains one of the most consequential open questions as the war enters its next phase.

What comes next

If Saudi Arabia declines to meet Sana’a’s demands, as its past behavior suggests is the most probable near-term outcome, the Yemeni armed forces retain a substantial menu of escalation options. These include expanded strikes on Saudi supply chains, production and processing facilities, and oil-export infrastructure, with Yanbu and the East-West pipeline specifically on the table.

Operations in the Arabian Sea targeting foreign vessels with Saudi connections represent another avenue. Ground operations in southern Saudi territory constitute a further option that Sana’a has explicitly retained.

Crucially, the balance of internal coalition dynamics has shifted. Over the past two weeks, the Yemeni military has substantially neutralized one of Riyadh’s key remaining leverage mechanisms: its ability to activate internal Yemeni fronts. The collapse of the mercenary coalition and deepening factional rifts have made it increasingly difficult for Saudi officers to reconstitute any credible offensive capability in the near term. That fundamentally alters the timeline calculations for both sides.

The strategic implications of the Yemeni military now holding the coastline overlooking and approaching the Bab al-Mandab Strait are substantial and will require sustained analysis as the situation develops. Control of that coastline does not simply mean territory. It means depth, positioning, and, in the language of maritime chokepoints, leverage.

Yemeni military’s consolidation of Yemen’s western coast represents the acquisition of geographic depth at one of the world’s most consequential maritime chokepoints. Previously, its coastal positions remained vulnerable to suppression. That calculus has now changed.

Al-Mukha, Dhubab, and the surrounding coastline, now under firm control, give Sana’a the ability to position layered anti-ship and air-defense systems across a continuous 200-plus-kilometer stretch. The islands amplify this advantage further, functioning simultaneously as forward sensors and firing platforms, enabling earlier target acquisition, reducing the stand-off advantages of opposing forces, and potentially denying the flanks of the strait to any force attempting to escort commercial shipping.

The relationship with the Strait of Hormuz is noteworthy as well. A dual-chokepoint architecture, with Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab simultaneously subject to hostile pressure, creates a co-equal second front.

A single carrier strike group cannot cover both. Reinforcing one theater necessarily draws resources from the other, complicating the Pentagon’s traditional force-posture hierarchy, which has historically treated Bab al-Mandab as manageable through periodic shows of force.

For Saudi Arabia, the loss is asymmetric in a specific way. Riyadh could previously threaten ground pressure on Ansarullah and the Yemeni military while remaining comparatively insulated from reciprocal pressure on its maritime lifelines. That insulation is now gone.

Red Sea export terminals and the Yanbu complex sit within a substantially more threatening strategic envelope. The Yemeni military can potentially transition from a land-based force with maritime ambitions into a coastal-defense and power-projection actor. That changes the strategic character of any future negotiation and the architecture of any subsequent security ceasefire.

September 12, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on Sana’a strikes back: How Yemeni military’s lightning advance redrew the Red Sea’s strategic map

YAF secure Bab al-Mandab, advance toward Dhubab

Al Mayadeen| September 11, 2026

The Yemeni Armed Forces have advanced into Dhubab on the western coast, reaching the area overlooking the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait, Al Mayadeen’s correspondent reported on Friday. The advance follows their taking control of al-Mokha and other positions along the Red Sea coast, as normal life returns to the area and government institutions resume their work.

The Saudi-backed government confirmed that the Yemeni Armed Forces had completed their control over the Bab al-Mandab Strait and taken control of the strategic Mayyun Island, AFP reported, citing a local Yemeni official.

Two officials in the Saudi-backed government also told Reuters that the Saudi-backed forces had withdrawn from Perim Island, located in the Bab al-Mandab Strait.

Saudi-backed forces face encirclement

Saudi-backed forces also told AFP that the YAF were besieging their forces on the Greater and Lesser Hanish Islands.

“We do not know the fate of our forces, numbering more than 2,000 personnel on the islands,” the sources said. “As far as we know, the Houthi enemy has called on them to surrender.”

A senior military official told AFP that the besieged forces had appealed to the authorities to “rescue them, send food and water, and lift the siege,” adding that this would require air support.

‘A strategic disaster for Washington and Riyadh’

The Yemeni Armed Forces had taken control of the Yemeni city of al-Mokha on the Red Sea. Reuters quoted a military official in the Aden government and witnesses as confirming the development, noting that the YAF were advancing toward areas adjacent to the strategic Bab al-Mandab Strait.

The Yemeni Armed Forces also took control of al-Khokha and Hays, south of the coastal Red Sea province of Hodeidah, as well as al-Wazi’iyah in Taiz.

As part of international and regional assessments of these developments, The Guardian described the Yemenis’ control of the Red Sea coast as a “strategic disaster” for the United States and Saudi Arabia.

Meanwhile, Israeli media outlets continued to follow developments in Yemen, with Israeli Channel 14 stating that the “Houthis’ control of the city of Mokha constitutes a strategic event that could have far-reaching repercussions.”

YAF prepare to announce a large-scale military operation

The YAF advances come as the Saudi aggression across Yemen continues, with the aim of supporting and reinforcing Saudi military mobilizations on the ground.

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia is carrying out airstrikes targeting several provinces, including Marib, al-Jawf, Taiz, and Hodeidah.

In this context, the Saba News Agency reported on Friday that Saudi Arabia had carried out two airstrikes on al-Mokha Airport, west of Taiz province in southwestern Yemen.

Meanwhile, the Yemeni Armed Forces are expected to issue a statement today announcing a large-scale and qualitative military operation.

YAF take control of key areas, military sites in Mokha, west of Taiz

The Yemeni forces have taken control of key areas and military positions in the coastal district of al-Mokha, west of Taiz Governorate, Al Mayadeen’s correspondent reported on Thursday.

In detail, our correspondent revealed that the Yemeni Armed Forces have taken control of Khalid Camp Base and Jabal al-Nar Camp, which serves as the command headquarters for military forces on the western coast.

This development comes as the YAF made advances in several areas, taking control of al-Wazi’iyah, al-Khokha, and Hays, before reaching the outskirts of the city of al-Mokha.

It is worth noting that the area of the districts of Hays and al-Khokha to the south of the coastal Hodeidah governorate on the Red Sea exceeds 1,050 square kilometers, local sources told Al Mayadeen.

The accelerating developments follow the Yemeni Armed Forces’ announcement in July that the 2022 truce with Saudi Arabia had collapsed following Saudi Arabia’s aggression on Sanaa International Airport.

September 11, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , , , | Comments Off on YAF secure Bab al-Mandab, advance toward Dhubab

Ansar Allah’s Victory Is A U.S. Defeat

By Justin K.P. | The Dissident | September 10, 2026

Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, which has controlled the country’s capital, Sanaa, and the majority of the country where Yemeni’s live since 2014, has recently made some major advances into the rest of the country controlled by Saudi Arabia-backed proxies.

From 2015 to 2022, the U.S. supported Saudi Arabia’s war in Yemen following Ansar Allah’s seizure of Sanaa in 2014 with intelligence and weapons, which killed 377,000 people when direct and indirect deaths are included.

The U.S. supported Saudi Campaign in Yemen included a brutal blockade of fuel, blocking clean water and sanitation, leading to the world’s worst cholera outbreak in modern times, and forced millions into “famine-like conditions” by blockading food.

More recently, both the Biden and Trump administrations took part in direct strikes against Ansar Allah in Yemen after the movement stood up in solidarity for the Palestinians undergoing a genocide in Gaza, and put a blockade on Israeli-linked ships crossing the Red Sea, in an attempt to pressure the U.S. and Israel to end the genocide.

This year, Saudi Arabia began to restart its war on Yemen after it bombed the Sanaa International Airport in July, the“only airport providing international flights to and from Houthi-controlled territory,” as well as a “critical entry point for humanitarian personnel and aid,” in an effective attempt to reinstate the blockade.

The strike was reportedly greenlit by the U.S.

Following this strike, “Saudi-backed forces reportedly began mobilizing inside Yemen in preparation for a possible invasion.”

In response, Yemen fought back to take back the rest of Yemen from the Saudi Proxies.

Ansar Allah was able to seize the strategically important city of Mokha as well as its port from Saudi Proxy forces, an important development given its proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait at the southern end of the Red Sea.

Ansar Allah has stated that this development is not intended to block international shipping, but to take Yemen back from Saudi proxy forces it believed were planning an invasion.

Member of Ansar Allah’s Political Bureau Hizam al-Assad said that “the ongoing battle along Yemen’s western coast is an internal operation aimed at restoring Yemeni territory and does not threaten maritime navigation” and that “the western coastal areas are Yemeni territory and that Yemenis have the right to reclaim them from Saudi-backed forces.”

The capture however, gives Ansar Allah a major leg up over Saudi Arabia in it’s renewed war on Yemen, given that “Saudi Arabia pivoted to the Red Sea to export most of its oil” after the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

This is not only a major defeat for Saudi Arabia, but for the U.S. as well.

Behind the Saudi plan, according to recent CNN report, was a team of “more than 100 US military advisers” on the ground.

According to the report, “The US military personnel are working as part of a newly-established joint forces command, which was formed in recent weeks,” which was “focused on ensuring Saudi Arabia’s operations run smoothly and professionally”.

In other words, Saudi Arabia’s renewed campaign in Yemen was backed by a team of “US military personnel” established weeks before the gains made by Ansar Allah.

Therefore, Ansar Allah’s seizure of Mokha, and likely ensuing seizure of more Saudi-occupied territory, is not only a defeat for the Saudi’s, but for the U.S., which was apparently advising Saudi Arabian plans on the ground going back weeks.

September 11, 2026 Posted by | Illegal Occupation | , , | Comments Off on Ansar Allah’s Victory Is A U.S. Defeat

The Saudi cutout and the CIA shadow over 9/11

As Riyadh fights 9/11 families in US courts, buried intelligence testimony points beyond the kingdom to a far more protected hand.

By Kit Klarenberg | The Cradle | September 10, 2026

On the eve of 9/11’s silver anniversary, it was widely reported that a forthcoming New York District Court civil case brought against notorious Saudi government operative Omar Bayoumi would deliver “smoking gun” proof tying Riyadh directly to the attacks. Yet evidence alleging that Saudi intelligence managed two future hijackers as potential assets and did so through a “liaison relationship” with the CIA has lain largely unexamined in plain sight. As scrutiny of Riyadh grows, the agency’s shadow remains almost entirely outside the frame.

Bayoumi has long been accused by major news outlets and US officials of maintaining an intimate and suspicious relationship with hijackers Nawaf Hazmi and Khalid Mihdhar, immediately upon their arrival in the US in January 2000.

A subsequent FBI investigation, dubbed Operation Encore, concluded there was a “50/50 chance” Bayoumi (and the House of Saud by extension) had detailed advance knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. This explosive finding was not publicly divulged until March 2022.

Far less attention followed a year later, when a bombshell filing lodged in the Office of Military Commissions – the military court system overseeing prosecutions of 9/11 defendants – surfaced publicly.

The document summarizes classified government discovery disclosures and private interviews conducted with anonymous high-ranking US intelligence officials. Its contents set out confidential-source allegations that the CIA sought to recruit at least Hazmi and Mihdhar, if not others who later participated in the 9/11 attacks, “via a liaison relationship” with Riyadh’s General Intelligence Directorate.

The declaration also alleges that the 9/11 Commission was deliberately sabotaged by its chief Philip Zelikow, who personally endeavored “to blunt” inquiries “into Saudi involvement with the hijackers.” Concurrently, senior FBI officials tasked with investigating the attacks were prohibited from interviewing Saudi nationals, despite “many” leads pointing directly to Riyadh’s Washington, D.C., embassy. According to the filing’s sources, probing those connections risked exposing the Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID) as a CIA “cutout” in its clandestine dealings with the future hijackers.

High-ranking FBI officials quoted in the filing discuss how the GID was a longstanding CIA “proxy,” exploited by the agency whenever it was “unwise or not practical … to undertake an operation directly.”

This need was particularly pronounced in the context of cloak-and-dagger CIA connivances conducted “on US soil.” After 25 years, it appears Riyadh could finally take the fall for a dastardly CIA operation that one way or another resulted in 9/11. As planned, there is little chance of the agency itself landing in the dock.

‘CIA team’

Among the court filing’s most dynamite excerpts is the insider testimony of an FBI special agent, who was posted to Alec Station – the CIA’s Al-Qaeda tracking unit, ultimately responsible for recruiting Hazmi and Mihdhar as assets.

When, in January 2000, the special agent learned the pair –  known Al-Qaeda operatives under intensive CIA and NSA surveillance – had multi-entry visas to the US, they produced a report warning Bureau headquarters. Its dispatch was blocked by an unnamed CIA analyst.

According to the agent’s account, the same analyst directed the GID to make contact with Hazmi and Mihdhar upon their arrival, then falsely told subsequent US government inquiries that the FBI had been informed of the pair’s presence in the US.

The agent also alleged having witnessed CIA director George Tenet and operations director James Pavitt boast about how they “conspired to obstruct the 9/11 Commission” by concealing the analyst’s activities and identity from investigators.

In the process, an extraordinary, hitherto unreported component of Riyadh’s relationship with the hijackers remained determinedly unexplored. The FBI special agent alleged Hazmi and Mihdhar were explicitly provided US visas by the American consulate in Jeddah, “to facilitate the operation run by the Saudis’ GID and the CIA team.”

This disclosure is all the more tantalizing given that 15 of the 19 hijackers obtained a total of 18 visas in Saudi Arabia. Fourteen were issued at the US consulate in Jeddah, 11 of them by a single consular officer, Shayna Steinger. Many of the applications were incomplete or contained details that should have invited far greater scrutiny.

Steinger arrived at the Jeddah consulate in July 2000, fresh out of Columbia University, and went on to approve visa applications for 11 future hijackers. At the time, consular officers in Jeddah were divided over how rigorously Saudi applicants should be screened. Some argued that young Saudi men should be interviewed and required to demonstrate a clear purpose for travel, but the consulate generally followed a more permissive approach.

However, Steinger personally took it upon herself to reverse this policy. Moreover, she issued visas to future 9/11 hijackers despite their applications frequently being incomplete or error-strewn, based on forged documents, and their contents giving ample grounds for suspicion.

Steinger nonetheless interviewed Hani Hanjour, who purportedly piloted Flight 77, which struck the Pentagon. Afterward, she rejected his application for a three-year US visa, due to apparent doubts over his stated purposes in the country. Nonetheless, Steinger approved Hanjour’s renewed application two weeks later.

In ensuing official investigations, she offered wildly contradictory accounts of why the hijackers’ visas were granted. In Hanjour’s case, Steinger initially claimed he provided requested supporting documentation.

She subsequently admitted he actually hadn’t, but Hanjour’s “middle-class” background purportedly led her to conclude he was trustworthy.

If the court filing’s account is accurate, future 9/11 hijackers were granted entry to the US so the CIA could recruit them upon arrival, raising the troubling possibility that Steinger was acting on Agency instructions.

A network hidden in plain sight 

Once Hazmi and Mihdhar touched down in Los Angeles in January 2000, almost immediately they crossed paths with Omar Bayoumi at an airport restaurant. FBI reports cited in the court filing indicate a witness who observed their meeting saw Bayoumi “dropping a piece of paper” near the pair’s table, “then striking up a conversation with them” in a manner that appeared “unnatural.” The witness relayed this account to the Bureau in 2002, but it was never publicized.

In interviews with Operation Encore investigators years later, Bayoumi maintained that his meeting with Hazmi and Mihdhar was pure happenstance. The extraordinary assistance he gave them immediately thereafter – including finding them an apartment, co-signing their lease, setting up bank accounts for them, and gifting them substantial sums toward their rent – was simply charity for fellow Muslims who could barely speak English and were unfamiliar with western culture, Bayoumi asserted. But the filing offers numerous striking insights into the dark reality of his contact with the future hijackers.

For example, it appears Bayoumi was secretly instructed to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar at the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles by extremist cleric and Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs official Fahad Thumairy.

The filing cites evidence indicating Bayoumi was himself in California “to spy on local dissidents” of Saudi extraction. He was seen with the two 9/11 hijackers “on numerous occasions,” going to the extent of organizing “a social gathering for the hijackers.” We can only guess who may also have been in attendance.

Another stunning exposure in the filing concerns Hazmi and Mihdhar lodging with long-time FBI informant and asset Abdussattar Shaikh from September 2000 onwards. Shaikh failing to provide their surnames to his handler despite being asked has been known for many years.

The joint congressional and Senate intelligence committee probe into 9/11 ruled the pair’s stay with Shaikh was “the [US] intelligence community’s best chance to unravel the September 11 plot.” Insulating Hazmi and Midhar from Bureau scrutiny may have been his explicit objective.

The filing indicates he himself “was receiving funds” from Riyadh, while simultaneously serving as an FBI informant. “Prominent” Saudis “would stay at Shaikh’s boarding house while visiting California,” it states.

His mission was “to monitor the activities of [Saudi] citizens while they were abroad.” Hani Hanjour also stayed with Shaikh alongside Hazmi, after Mihdhar returned to Saudi Arabia in late 2000. It appears that at every stage Stateside, the hijackers were in intimate proximity with figures connected to Saudi intelligence.

If the filing’s account that the GID was acting on the CIA’s behalf is accurate, this contact raises the obvious prospect that the agency – via its Riyadh “proxy” – was directly monitoring the movements of Hazmi, Mihdhar, and Hanjour – if not other Saudi-born hijackers – from the moment they entered the US at the agency’s direction, until 9/11 itself.

How far the CIA could have tracked or influenced their actions and movements remains unknown. The proximity described in the filing nevertheless demands an explanation.

The files Langley kept from the FBI 

The established record shows that Alec Station repeatedly withheld the presence of Hazmi and Mihdhar in the US from the FBI until it was too late. The filing records how in June 2001 Station representatives showed senior Bureau officials photographs of three Al-Qaeda operatives, including Hazmi and Mihdhar.

However, the CIA refused to answer questions about the individuals in the photos, or provide identifying information. Had it done so, the FBI could have readily found Hazmi and Mihdhar’s names and addresses listed in San Diego’s local phone directory.

This was a flagrant dangle, obviously intended to gauge the Bureau’s knowledge of the identities of the individuals pictured, and their presence in the US. The filing also indicates the FBI conducted a dedicated counterintelligence investigation into Bayoumi prior to 9/11, due to suspicions that “he was operating as an intelligence officer.” Yet, when the Bureau contacted the CIA for information on Bayoumi, they were told the agency “held no files” on him at all – a “falsehood.”

In reality, the CIA maintained plentiful “operational” records on Bayoumi, which were “never passed to the FBI.” Such brazen stonewalling persisted long after 9/11. Upon learning tens of thousands of dollars had been sent from Haifa bin Faisal, wife of Saudi ambassador to the US Bandar bin Sultan, to Bayoumi’s wife, the Bureau attempted to subpoena their financial records from Washington, D.C.’s Riggs Bank. Per the filing, “officials at Riggs thwarted the FBI’s efforts to obtain the records for a year.”

Riggs Bank, which counted US presidents and CIA-installed Chilean dictator Augusto Pinochet as clients, collapsed amid major money laundering scandals in 2005. Post-9/11 investigations identified financial improprieties in accounts held by several wealthy Saudis – including a lack of required background checks and consistent failure to alert regulators over large transactions violating federal banking laws.

Riggs’s downfall precisely mirrors the unceremonious end of many confirmed CIA front banks past, such as Bank of Credit and Commerce International, which assisted criminal cloak-and-dagger connivances including Iran/Contra.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the filing records how “diplomatic pressure” was exerted on the FBI not to investigate Riyad’s myriad connections to 9/11. Bureau agents testifying to the joint inquiry into the attacks were moreover “instructed not to reveal the full extent of Saudi involvement with Al-Qaeda.”

Senior officials at FBI headquarters knew “of both Bayoumi’s affiliation with Saudi intelligence and … the existence of the CIA’s operation to recruit Hazmi and Mihdhar,” but “suppressed investigations” into these burning matters.

The filing concludes by noting Bayoumi was subsequently arrested in Britain on immigration charges immediately after 9/11, with authorities finding “extremist literature in his apartment.” The significance of this disclosure has gone entirely unnoticed since 2022.

Only now, as a result of the New York court case, has the media acknowledged how, within days of the attacks, “game-changing” evidence directly implicating Bayoumi in 9/11 was seized from his British home by counterterror police, then shared with the FBI, which British investigators say failed to provide crucial information in return.

The evidence Britain could not pursue

The seized material reportedly included a phonebook listing over two dozen Saudi government officials in the US and Saudi Arabia; flight simulator software; tickets and travel documents; and a notepad featuring a sketch of an aircraft.

An accompanying note from a British counterterrorism officer stated of the latter: “contains handwritten notes mathematical calculations re height of planes.” A member of the 9/11 families’ legal team behind the court action told BBC, “it’s the mathematical calculation of the [Pentagon] crash.”

By 22 September 2001, this seemingly incontrovertible windfall was in the Bureau’s possession. So too were highly illuminating home video tapes of Bayoumi roaming around Washington, D.C. in 1999, highlighting security measures in place at the Capitol building, openly discussing nearby Reagan National Airport, and referencing an unspecified “plan” on camera. Other tapes feature Bayoumi in close quarters with senior Al-Qaeda figures such as US-born cleric Anwar Awlaki, assassinated in a September 2011 US drone strike in Yemen.

While British detectives apparently believed the evidence could support an extradition request, the FBI did not supply the material needed to sustain one. Bayoumi was released after seven days without charge and later returned to Saudi Arabia.

The US response takes on darker significance alongside allegations that the CIA used its Saudi liaison to approach Hazmi and Mihdhar while withholding their presence from the FBI.

It does, however, strengthen the case for investigating whether an aborted recruitment operation was concealed after ending in catastrophe. Media reluctance to examine the filing’s “proxy” allegations ensures that question remains safely outside the courtroom.

We must ask ourselves whether the 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), which permitted the families of 9/11 victims to sue Riyadh in US courts, was purposefully passed to keep the House of Saud in line.

Successive Saudi governments have fought tooth and nail to overturn the legislation, while released correspondence indicates that Saudi representatives sought help from convicted sex trafficker Jeffrey Epstein to lobby for its repeal behind closed doors.

JASTA proved controversial in some quarters, with some critics warning it could trigger reciprocal legislation in foreign countries, given criminal US activities abroad. Legal experts argued it undercut the principle of sovereign immunity.

The plaintiffs’ evidence may yet establish that Saudi officials provided material support to the hijackers. The military filing raises a separate and more dangerous question: whether some of those officials were acting as a CIA cutout in their dealings with future 9/11 hijackers.

But the CIA is not a defendant in the civil action, and Bayoumi is not personally on trial. The state-secrets privilege has repeatedly shielded the agency’s clandestine operations from meaningful judicial scrutiny.

Unless the alleged liaison channel is examined, the Saudi case may expose one layer of the 9/11 support network while leaving the most protected layer untouched.

September 10, 2026 Posted by | Deception, False Flag Terrorism | , , | Comments Off on The Saudi cutout and the CIA shadow over 9/11

Yemeni Official Underlines Safety of Navigation after Expelling of Pro-Saudi Mercenaries from Coastal Areas

Al-Manar | September 10, 2026

The head of the national negotiating delegation, Mohammad Abdulsalam, confirmed that freedom of navigation and the flow of international trade in the Red Sea and the Bab al-Mandab Strait are safe and smooth, urging everyone not to be concerned.

In a statement, Abdulsalam explained that the ongoing operations have specific targets as previously announced and fall within a defensive framework. He noted that once the aggression against Yemen stops and the blockade is lifted, current operations will cease. He pointed out that the actions taken by the Yemeni Armed Forces in some coastal areas were a national operation aimed at enforcing Yemeni sovereignty and addressing challenges and ambitions that threaten internal peace.

He highlighted that a true, just, and honorable peace was and will remain their strategic choice, emphasizing that everyone must realize that choosing peace with Yemen is the least costly and shortest path toward reorganizing relations based on the principles of good-neighborliness, mutual respect, and shared interests.

He also stressed that the Republic of Yemen harbors no ambitions against any neighboring, Arab, Islamic, or other country worldwide, and has not aggressed against any state; rather, it is the party that was attacked in a manner contrary to Islamic and Arab brotherhood.

For his part, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and Expatriates, Abdulwahed Abu Ras, confirmed that maritime navigation is safe. In a statement to the Yemeni News Agency (SABA), Abu Ras said: “Maritime navigation is safe, and navigational security has no connection to the skirmishes that were quelled in the West Coast districts.”

Additionally, the Humanitarian Operations Coordination Center (HOCC) in Yemen announced to all international shipping companies that navigation in the Red Sea is safe for all companies, with the exception of the previous ban on Saudi vessels.

September 10, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Yemeni Official Underlines Safety of Navigation after Expelling of Pro-Saudi Mercenaries from Coastal Areas

Yemeni forces recapture strategic port city of Mokha from Saudi-backed troops

The Cradle | September 10, 2026

The Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) captured the southwestern port city of Mokha on 10 September, in a lightning advance that comes after heavy losses were inflicted by the YAF on Saudi Arabia and its proxies inside Yemen.

Reuters cited sources as saying that Mokha fell to YAF troops on Thursday.

Al Jazeera’s correspondent in Sanaa also reported that Ansarallah-led YAF forces have “achieved a stunning victory against the internationally recognized Yemeni government forces.”

“The city has been taken. [Internationally recognized, Saudi-backed] government forces have fully withdrawn all of their military divisions,” local sources told the correspondent.

The YAF now has “full advantage to prevent ships from crossing Bab al-Mandab and also … the ability to cut off three main supply lines to the government in the south of the country,” according to Al Jazeera’s correspondent.

Ansarallah-led forces lost Mokha in 2017 in battles against Saudi and Emirati-backed forces.

The recapture comes after a major YAF mobilization that began earlier this year, aimed at expelling Saudi-backed forces and what remains of Emirati-supported militias.

It also follows major losses inflicted on Saudi-backed troops in Yemen, belonging to the Saudi-backed, Aden-based Presidential Leadership Council (PLC).

President of Yemen’s Sanaa government Mahdi al-Mashat released a statement hours before the recapture of Mokha, vowing amnesty for all Saudi-backed fighters who lay down their arms.

A statement on YAF official media, released early on Thursday, said Mashat issued “a presidential amnesty for all those who were deceived into fighting on the Western Coast fronts, provided they lay down their arms and return to their senses.”

The statement directed “the local authorities in the governorates of Hodeidah and Taiz to make the necessary arrangements to implement the amnesty.”

A day earlier, new Yemeni missile strikes hit Saudi military and energy infrastructure inside the kingdom. These sites have been under heavy Yemeni attacks in recent days.

Sanaa’s recent escalation of retaliatory operations was prompted by Saudi Arabia’s July attack on Sanaa International Airport, which has been under blockade by the kingdom for more than a decade since Riyadh launched its brutal war on Yemen in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition.

A 2023 Saudi–Yemeni peace process nearly resulted in an agreement between the two sides.

The peace talks stalled but prevented a major escalation from erupting. Yet the kingdom has continued attacks for years and its illegal and deadly blockade of Yemeni ports and airports.

Sanaa has been heavily mobilizing and has vowed to expel the Saudi-led coalition from Yemen.

“The continued Saudi aggression against Yemen will not go unanswered or unpunished. The Saudi enemy must bear the consequences of its crimes against the Yemeni people,” Yemeni army spokesman Yahya Saree said on Monday following several military operations.

September 10, 2026 Posted by | Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on Yemeni forces recapture strategic port city of Mokha from Saudi-backed troops

Pakistan threatens Yemeni strikes on KSA ‘could trigger’ Mecca defense pact

The Cradle | September 9, 2026

Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif threatened in comments published on 9 September that the Ansarallah-led Yemeni Armed Forces (YAF) attacks “could trigger” the Mecca Defense Pact between Riyadh, Islamabad, and Ankara.

The Pakistani war chief’s comments coincide with a massive YAF campaign of retaliatory strikes on Saudi Arabia and its assets in Yemen, as well as brutal Saudi bombing against the Arab world’s poorest nation.

“Under the trilateral agreement, any aggression against any of the three [countries] is regarded as an aggression against all. There is no ambiguity about that,” the Pakistani minister said in an interview with Geo News.

He added that the YAF retaliations “could trigger the pact” between the three states, which was finalized and signed last month.

According to Saudi authorities, over 70 people were wounded by YAF strikes on Tuesday, which targeted military and energy infrastructure.

The kingdom’s Energy Ministry acknowledged fires and a halt to operations at a number of sites on 8 September due to Sanaa’s attacks.

Pakistan’s threat against Yemen coincided with a statement by the YAF, condemning Saudi Arabia’s “attempts to evade responsibility” for war crimes against Yemen, including the kingdom’s Monday strike on a prison in Yemen’s Al-Jawf governorate.

The attack killed at least 16 people and injured scores.

“At 4:30 pm, an F-15SA fighter aircraft took off from King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait and carried out two airstrikes targeting the prison. It then returned to the same base in Khamis Mushait at 4:45 pm,” the Yemeni army said.

“The Saudi enemy’s attempts to evade responsibility for its crimes and aggression against our country will not absolve it of the consequences and repercussions of this aggression and criminal conduct, no matter how hard it tries to conceal or cover up what happened,” it added.

Saudi Arabia’s Khamis Mushait site was among those targeted by YAF ballistic missiles and drones this week. The new YAF statement on Wednesday came hours after heavy Saudi bombing targeted multiple governorates in Yemen. At least 32 Saudi airstrikes were carried out across Marib, Taiz, Hodeidah, and Al-Jawf.

Yemen’s retaliatory operations come as part of a string of recent Yemeni strikes in recent days, which inflicted heavy damage on Saudi-backed forces in Yemen.

The YAF announced several military operations on 7 September, including the destruction of weapons shipments coming in from Saudi Arabia.

Footage of the operation was released. It shows Saudi military equipment – en route to Riyadh’s proxies in Yemen – being struck and blown up by Yemeni forces.

The YAF recently released footage of multiple other attacks targeting Saudi-backed mercenary groups and forces loyal to the Aden-based Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), backed by the kingdom. The footage was captured by YAF drones.

Sanaa’s recent escalation of retaliatory operations was prompted by Saudi Arabia’s July attack on Sanaa International Airport, which has been under blockade by the kingdom for more than a decade since Riyadh launched its brutal war on Yemen in 2015 at the head of an Arab coalition.

A 2023 Saudi–Yemeni peace process nearly resulted in an agreement between the two sides.

The peace talks stalled but prevented a major escalation from erupting. Yet the kingdom for years continued attacks and its illegal and deadly blockade on Yemeni ports and airports.

Pakistan’s threats in defense of the kingdom’s brutal war on Yemen come weeks after a Reuters report cited sources as saying that Islamabad is concerned it may be “drawn” into the fighting between Riyadh and Sanaa.

September 9, 2026 Posted by | Militarism | , , | Comments Off on Pakistan threatens Yemeni strikes on KSA ‘could trigger’ Mecca defense pact

Yemeni drones reportedly struck Saudi oil, military sites

Al Mayadeen | September 8, 2026

The Yemeni Resistance, Ansar Allah, appears to have launched a major drone attack targeting sites in southwestern Saudi Arabia in recent hours, with reported strikes and fires detected around Jazan, Abha, and Khamis Mushait.

According to data compiled by Egypt’s Intel Observer, the operations appear to have affected several strategic facilities, including Aramco’s Jazan oil refinery and the Jazan Bulk Plant, where multiple hotspots were detected. Another hotspot was also identified near King Abdullah Airport in Jazan.

Reported strikes target oil and military facilities

Satellite data from NASA’s Fire Information for Resource Management System (FIRMS) VIIRS also showed multiple heat signatures at Aramco’s bulk plant in Abha, suggesting the facility was directly hit in a recent operation.

Additional hotspots reportedly appeared around oil and gas storage facilities at the Asir Central Power Plant in Abha. The facility supplies baseload electricity to the southern region of Saudi Arabia.

King Khalid Air Base also reportedly hit

King Khalid Air Base in Khamis Mushait also appears to have been targeted, with a fire hotspot detected at the site.

The satellite detections indicate possible fires at several locations, but they do not by themselves establish the cause of the heat signatures.

Saudi Arabia admits hits

The Saudi Ministry of Energy announced that a number of energy facilities and infrastructure in the southern region of the Kingdom were targeted this morning.

The ministry said the attacks caused fires to break out at several sites, resulting in the temporary suspension of some operations.

Meanwhile, the Yemeni Armed Forces announced early Tuesday that it is preparing a statement to “announce a large-scale military operation deep inside Saudi territory.”

Ansar Allah repels Saudi-backed advance in Yemen’s al-Jawf

At the same time, the Yemeni Armed Forces repelled an advance by Saudi-backed mercenaries toward the al-Labanat Mountains east of al-Jawf province, according to Mohammed al-Farrah, a member of Ansar Allah’s political bureau.

Al-Farrah said on Tuesday that Yemeni forces targeted reinforcements belonging to Saudi-aligned forces in al-Jawf with several ballistic missiles, destroying and disabling dozens of military vehicles and transport units.

He said the strikes also resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries among the Saudi-backed forces, including commanders.

September 8, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Militarism | , | Comments Off on Yemeni drones reportedly struck Saudi oil, military sites

Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza

Palestinian Information Center – September 6, 2026

GAZA – Eight Arab and Muslim countries have condemned remarks by far-right Israeli ministers Itamar Ben Gvir and Israel Katz on plans to forcibly displace Palestinians from the Gaza Strip.

The foreign ministers of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, Pakistan, Türkiye and Qatar said in a joint statement released on Sunday that such Israeli plans violate international and humanitarian law and pose a direct threat to the Palestinian people’s legitimate and inalienable rights.

The ministers voiced rejection of any Israeli attempt to displace Palestinians from or within the occupied territory, warning against transforming extremist rhetoric on forced displacement into official state policy.

The ministers warned that the displacement of Gazans would destabilize the region and derail global peace efforts, undermining US president Donald Trump’s plan to end the Gaza war, which clearly rejects forced population transfers.

The ministers stressed that Gaza is an integral part of the occupied Palestinian territories, calling for preserving the unity of Gaza, the West Bank and east Jerusalem.

They reiterated their countries’ support for a two-state solution establishing an independent Palestinian state along the June 4, 1967 lines, with east Jerusalem as its capital.

They urged the international community and UN Security Council to oppose Israeli attempts to impose a new demographic or geographic reality in the occupied Palestinian territories.

September 6, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism, Illegal Occupation | , , , , , , , , , , , | Comments Off on Eight Arab and Muslim states reject Israeli displacement plans for Gaza

US approves $5 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia as it renews aggression against Iran

Press TV | September 5, 2026

Washington has approved a potential $5 billion arms package for Saudi Arabia that would sharply expand the kingdom’s precision-strike capabilities as the United States escalates its war of aggression against Iran.

The deal includes more than 10,000 guidance kits designed to convert conventional bombs into extended-range, steerable precision weapons.

The State Department cleared the sale on Friday. The package also covers more than 10,000 general-purpose bombs requested by Riyadh, both 500-pound (230 kg) and 2,000-pound (900 kg) variants.

These guidance systems would turn unguided “dumb bombs” into accurate munitions capable of striking targets at greater distances with far higher precision.

Washington claims the transfer serves US foreign-policy and national-security interests by strengthening Saudi Arabia, which it calls a major non-NATO ally and an important contributor to political stability and economic development in the Persian Gulf.

The State Department said the weapons would enhance Saudi Arabia’s ability to conduct airborne strikes against current and potential regional threats, improve the kingdom’s defensive capabilities, and increase compatibility between Saudi systems and those used by US forces and other Persian Gulf partners.

Boeing, the Virginia-based US defense contractor, has been designated the principal contractor for the potential sale.

The approval comes as Washington expands arms transfers and military cooperation across the Persian Gulf while renewing its illegal war against Iran.

On February 28, the United States and Israel launched another round of aggression against Iran, eight months after carrying out unprovoked attacks on the country. Iran swiftly retaliated with barrages of missiles and drones against Israeli-occupied territories as well as US bases and interests across the region.

A ceasefire took effect on April 7. On June 18, the presidents of Iran and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding to end the war and begin a 60-day diplomatic process to resolve outstanding differences.

Renewed US strikes have once again triggered Iranian retaliation.

September 5, 2026 Posted by | Militarism, Wars for Israel | , | Comments Off on US approves $5 billion arms sale to Saudi Arabia as it renews aggression against Iran

Saudi Arabia reaffirms no normalisation with Israel without Palestinian state

MEMO | August 27, 2026

Saudi Arabia has reiterated that it will not establish diplomatic relations with Israel without the creation of an independent Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, amid reports that US President Donald Trump is seeking to link a civil nuclear agreement with Riyadh to Saudi normalisation with Israel.

According to a report by The Wall Street Journal, Trump has referred the US-Saudi civil nuclear cooperation agreement to Congress for review but has stipulated that it will not take effect unless Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords.

“The president’s position has not changed, and the agreement will not move forward unless Saudi Arabia joins the Abraham Accords,” the newspaper quoted a US administration source as saying.

The reported condition follows the signing of the nuclear agreement last month by US Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman.

A Saudi source quoted by Israel’s Channel 12 rejected linking the nuclear agreement to normalisation, saying Riyadh’s position on relations with Israel remained unchanged.

“The Saudi position is clear, firm and unwavering,” the source said. “There will be no diplomatic relations with Israel without the establishment of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders with East Jerusalem as its capital.”

The source maintained that Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program forms part of its broader strategic partnership with Washington and should not be conditional on establishing relations with Israel.

August 27, 2026 Posted by | Ethnic Cleansing, Racism, Zionism | , , , | Comments Off on Saudi Arabia reaffirms no normalisation with Israel without Palestinian state

After 6 months of war, why aren’t oil prices even higher?

By Sam Fraser | Responsible Statecraft | August 25, 2026

For decades, the potential closure of the Strait of Hormuz has been considered the ultimate doomsday scenario for global oil markets. So, when Iran effectively closed the Strait earlier this year in response to the joint U.S.-Israeli assault, many analysts warned that oil prices could skyrocket to record highs.

The logic was straightforward. Prior to the war, about 20% of the global oil supply transited the Strait. A loss of supply on this scale could easily have pushed oil prices to $150 or even $200 per barrel — but it didn’t. Instead, prices peaked around $120 per barrel in April and have largely stayed below $100 since June.

To understand the dynamics that have so far prevented an even higher price spike, and to get a sense of where oil supply and prices may be headed as the conflict drags on, I spoke with Rory Johnston, a leading oil markets analyst and the author of the Commodity Context blog. Our conversation has been edited for length and clarity.

Sam Fraser: Let’s talk about why we haven’t seen the $150-200 per barrel oil prices that you warned about early in the war. You’ve pointed to a few reasons, including China’s massive import cuts. As we understand it, what has China done with their oil imports and how have they managed it?

Rory Johnston: It’s a bit of a mystery. At this stage, what we know for sure is that China reduced its crude oil imports by over five million barrels a day, roughly 45% of their total pre-war import appetite. For China, there’s two endpoints of that crude oil balance: into a refinery or into storage. We know that China had been building up a massive volume of strategic reserves prior to the war.

Essentially half of the 5 million barrels a day reduction can be explained roughly by reductions in refining runs in China. The remainder is a question of balancing in and out of stockpiles. Some of it would’ve been likely a drawdown of less visible or underground stockpiles. And the other portion of it is the halting of that prior pace of stockpile building. The main debate is how much each of these factors is contributing. If, let’s say, 80% of that remainder is a halt to prior purchases that were building strategic stocks, that is a bearish outcome for oil prices because it means that Beijing doesn’t need to replace those volumes anytime soon. But if they are aggressively drawing down less visible strategic stocks right now, that’s a much more bullish interpretation because it means they can’t keep going on forever and they’re going to need to replace those stockpiles.

On the refined product side, they cut refining runs by about 2.5 to 3 million barrels a day. What are they doing with that prior flow of diesel, jet fuel, et cetera? And that’s where we start to get even more speculative. Above-ground storage tanks for refined products don’t have floating roofs. We can’t independently verify their fill.

It comes down to the apparent consumption and the apparent available supply of these fuels within China. For gasoline and diesel, each of those supplies have apparently fallen by about 20%, which is a stark reduction. There’s no evidence that people in China are just driving a fifth less. If they aren’t actually cutting back that much on consumption, where is the fuel coming from? Prior to the war, we suspected that China was also building strategic reserves of refined fuels. Again, we can’t verify that, but if they had built that up, they could be drawing it down. We’re then faced with that same question as in crude oil, how much of this is a cessation of prior stock building and how much of this is the drawdown of existing stock?

For reference, the last moment we saw anything like this in terms of apparent consumption collapse was COVID zero in 2022 when the country was entirely locked down.

Fraser: So we can say that stockpiles of refined products must exist, but we have no insight into their size or how much is being drawn down or how sustainable those drawdowns would be?

Johnston: Correct. There are mixed estimates, but I think they are at best estimates. It’s funny, I think in some ways the lack of verifiable data allows people to speak very confidently about what’s happening in China, because there’s no data to rebut virtually any argument. That’s just allowing people to run with it without any kind of real pushback.

Fraser: How have we seen the Chinese buying patterns change since the U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding and since it collapsed?

Johnston: What we saw following the MOU was a surge of exiting cargoes from Hormuz. The vast majority of that seems to have routed towards China. What we saw was that, at the very bottom, Chinese crude oil imports fell to around 6 million barrels a day in June. And then those spiked back up to more than 10 million barrels a day in July, or at least that was the high point in July. Roughly a month later, those imports are back down around six. You’ve seen a rollover back to where we stood pre-MOU.

Fraser: Do we know how long this import suppression can continue?

Johnston:. Let’s say this has been entirely a drawdown of stocks, which seems implausible. Even then, they have more than a billion barrels of crude oil stocks that we know about for sure. If they want to support the market to their maximum ability, they can do that for months further. But in doing so, they would deplete the entirety of the energy security blanket they’ve spent almost two decades constructing.

Fraser: Let’s move on to the strategic petroleum reserve releases by the U.S. and other partners. To what degree have those been instrumental in keeping prices from going a lot higher?

Johnston: It’s part of the suite that the world has kind of engaged in to blunt those effects. This is the largest release of strategic stocks on record. Depending on the exact month you’re talking about, it has potentially been over 3 million barrels a day of incremental supply coming from OECD SPRs. Without that, the market would’ve been much tighter and we likely wouldn’t have experienced the same relief even with China’s import cut at the same time.

Fraser: Last week the U.S. SPR dipped under 300 million barrels. There’s a lot of discussion of what the physical limits on those stockpiles are given that they’re stored in salt caverns. They need a certain amount of fill to maintain structural integrity. Are we anywhere close to pushing up against the U.S. ability to continue drawing down from those stockpiles?

Johnston: I do not believe we are. I think that you have probably at least another 200 million barrels that can be readily drawn down. With the required fill level, absolutely it would be a massive issue if you just drew it down and left a vacuum in there. It would implode on itself. But they don’t do that. They one-to-one replace a barrel of crude oil extracted with a barrel of saturated brine. So theoretically it should maintain the same fill. The issue for SPRs is not necessarily fill level, but number of refill and empty cycles. It’s the actual up-and-down motion that disturbs and further erodes the walls and structural integrity.

I think that the SPR caverns can get below 100 million barrels of fill before we run into any issues.

Fraser: So if we continued the current rate of drawdown, that would take us well into next year.

Johnston: Correct.

Fraser: Over the course of the war, Trump or someone in his administration will make a statement about how diplomacy is progressing or about how much oil is coming out of the strait. And even if those are quickly disproven, there is a downward impact on prices. So why do these traders keep listening to Trump? Has there been a change in the reaction of markets over the course of this war?

Johnston: You definitely get smaller drawdowns to these kinds of jawboning attempts today than you would have, say, in March and April, where there are multiple days that you saw $15 to $20 per barrel reductions in the span of a day.

When you look at the history of oil, there’s a tendency on these geopolitical events to overdo it. That’s a natural kind of fear-driven phenomenon. In some ways Trump has short-circuited that normal behavior in oil markets. Because while you’re right that it’s never coming true, the price action is coming true. At the end of the day, for prices to go higher, you need traders to bid higher. And if they bid higher and they get blown out of the water and they lose their jobs, they’re going to be replaced by someone that doesn’t bid higher on geopolitical risk. It has successfully arrested the upside volatility. But if we keep getting tighter, markets will continue to respond higher; we just won’t get those runaway phenomena that we would’ve seen historically.

Fraser: Since the start of the war, we’ve seen Saudi Arabia and the UAE successfully use pipelines as an alternative route to get oil out of the Gulf. How much oil are those getting out at this point? And has the Houthi blockade of Saudi shipping in the Red Sea had a meaningful effect on this?

Johnston: The total volume coming out of Emirates at Fujairah and then the west coast of Saudi Arabia and the Red Sea rose to about 6-7 million barrels. It was about 2-3 million before, so that was an incremental change of 4-5 million barrels.

To your question with the Houthis, it has absolutely been having an effect. As soon as they started attacking Saudi ships, the entire Red Sea fleet went dark. Everyone turned off their transponders, making it much harder to verify flows out of Saudi Arabia. Verifiable transits of Saudi tankers through the Bab al-Mandab have gone functionally to zero. They still are probably getting some out, but we’re also seeing evidence of flows north into the Mediterranean. Pre-war flows here were around a million barrels a day, give or take. That’s jumped over the past week or two to around 2.5 million barrels a day, presumed Saudi flow.

Over the past two weeks, we’ve also seen Saudi Arabia begin loading tankers in the Gulf again, which they hadn’t done since the collapse of the MOU. And the question is, does Riyadh know something? Is something big going to break in the Hormuz negotiations? Or are they being forced back into the Gulf? You’re seeing reports now that they are participating in the Emirati-led shuttle trade, ship-to-ship transfers in the Gulf of Oman. It seems likely that some of that is displaced barrels coming back from the Red Sea. So Saudi Arabia is needing to diversify away from its diversification. There’s a poetic side to it.

Fraser: Pulling all these factors together, where are we left in terms of a kind of global supply shortage? And what kinds of price impacts can we expect if that persists over the next few months?

Johnston: It’s very hard to estimate global balance right now. My bet would be 2-4 million barrels a day undersupplied on a global basis.

The rub on top of that is that we now have a parallel crisis that’s emerging on the refining side of the slate. So even if we’ve sorted out what was happening on the crude oil side, we have the Ukrainian hammering of Russian refineries, the attacks in the Black Sea, the reduction in U.S. exports now that stocks have drawn down, and China is not exporting refined products either. All together this further tightens global refined product markets.

If this persists and we keep drawing down crude oil stocks, the crude oil price is going to keep rising. On top of that, we could see refined product prices independently going higher. So that’s just an amplification. For consumers, it’s refined product prices and not crude oil that are going to drive those economic issues.

Fraser: So even though these factors we’ve discussed have kept oil prices down so far, and the biggest of these can persist for a while, we could still be looking at those extremely elevated prices by a few months from now.

Johnston: Easily. We’re already feeling it. Refined prices are already at demand-destructive levels. It’s just a question of whether they are at sufficiently demand-destructive levels. It’s the same fundamental concern I would’ve had back in April, playing out on a much longer timeline and now more on the product side than the entire oil complex.

Sam Fraser is a writer based in New York City. He holds a Master’s in International Finance and Economic Policy from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs, where his studies focused on the changing global trade system. Previously, Sam worked as Senior Communications Associate and Publications Manager at the Quincy Institute.

August 25, 2026 Posted by | Economics, Wars for Israel | , , , , | Comments Off on After 6 months of war, why aren’t oil prices even higher?

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