Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has warned that failure to hold the US and Israel accountable for their aggression against Iran would undermine international law and put every country’s security at risk.
In an article published by Kyodo News, Araghchi reiterated that the US-Israeli attacks against Iran “constitute a clear violation of the prohibition on the use of force and an infringement of Iran’s sovereignty”.
“The US military attack on Iran had no authorization from the Security Council, nor can allegations of possible future threats, in themselves, provide a sufficient legal basis for invoking self-defense,” he added.
The minister warned that implications of such a violation of international law extend “far beyond Iran’s security or the balance of power in the Middle East”.
“What is ultimately at stake is the credibility of an international legal order designed to prevent states from resorting to force at will,” Araghchi said.
“If power is permitted to prevail over law, Iran will not be the only casualty. The foundations of the international legal order, and the authority of the UN Charter itself, will also be at risk.”
Iran’s top diplomat warned that if aggressor states are not held accountable, “no country’s security can be taken for granted”.
He stressed that the prohibition on the use of force is “a binding obligation that applies equally to all states” and not a concession that powerful states make to weaker ones.
Araghchi also emphasized that the US must end its aggression against Iran, respect Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and provide reparation for the damage caused by the unlawful, unjustified strikes.
They are “matters of legal obligation, not political goodwill”, he stated.
Referring to attacks on schools, sports stadiums, civilian infrastructure, and nuclear facilities subject to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards in Iran, Araghchi said these attacks must also be examined in light of the rules of international humanitarian law.
“Parties to an armed conflict are required to distinguish between military targets and civilians, refrain from disproportionate attacks, and take all feasible precautions to minimize harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure.”
He also stressed that Iran “retains the right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter in response to an armed attack”.
The US and Israel launched another round of aggression against Iran on February 28, some eight months after carrying out unprovoked attacks on the country.
Iran swiftly retaliated by launching barrages of missiles and drones at the Israeli-occupied territories, as well as US bases and interests across the region.
Apparently, it takes the prospect of ending the war on Iran to get the blood running hot in aging and otherwise reclusive neoconservatives — particularly those whose tenures as key architects of the 2003 Iraq invasion and subsequent occupation were both short-lived and disastrous.
Douglas Feith, who served as undersecretary of defense for policy (2001-2005), and Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Vice President Dick Cheney’s powerful national security adviser and chief of staff (2001-2005), co-authored an op-ed published Monday by the Washington Post entitled “’Endless wars’ is a catchy phrase, not a reason to shift policy.”
Evoking the wartime steadfastness demonstrated by Abraham Lincoln in the Civil War; Winston Churchill – naturally, these are neoconservatives, after all — against the Nazis, Dwight Eisenhower in Korea; and Ronald Reagan in concluding the Cold War, the duo urged America to steel itself for more war.
“None of these leaders wanted endless sacrifice and risks, but none buckled for fear of them,” they wrote, suggesting a parallel with the current war on Iran. “Each understood that an enemy’s willingness to endure a long struggle does not make one’s own ‘endless’ resistance foolish.”
In assessing the wisdom behind their words, some context may be in order.
First, the authors, both proteges of the “Prince of Darkness,” Richard Perle, who served as chairman of the Defense Policy Board in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion, are dyed-in-the-wool, hard-core neoconservatives in that they believe as much, or perhaps more, in Israel’s exceptionalism as they do in America’s. Their Middle East policy preferences have long paralleled those of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing Likud Party.
Their institutional associations since their departures from government in 2005 tend to confirm their Israel-centrism. Feith has been a senior fellow at the neoconservative Hudson Institute, while Libby, who was also based at Hudson for many years, is currently serving as a distinguished fellow at the Foundation of Defense of Democracies (FDD).
A survey by RS of four commonly used AI programs in April found that both organizations were among the five think tanks that were “the most prominent in promoting military action” against Iran across mainstream and social media in the six months leading up to the current war that was launched by massive air strikes against key targets across Iran on February 28. FDD, whose original submission to the IRS when it was founded in 2001 described its mission as “enhance(ing) Israel’s image in North America…,” ranked number one in promoting military action in all four programs.
Second, both Feith and Libby may be best known for their roles in shaping, manipulating, distorting, leaking, and promoting fabricated intelligence – often in close cooperation with Iraqi expatriate Ahmad Chalabi and his Iraqi National Congress — that would justify the invasion and occupation of Iraq and rally public opinion behind that enterprise. Feith created offices in the Pentagon whose missions were to collect and disseminate any information that suggested a cooperative relationship between Saddam Hussein’s regime and al-Qaida and major advances in Iraq’s alleged (but non-existent) nuclear-weapons program.
As Cheney’s chief adviser and enforcer – “Dick Cheney’s Dick Cheney” – Libby provided a direct channel to the White House for the “intelligence” produced by Feith’s office and Chalabi’s purported “defectors,” much of which then appeared in speeches by the vice president and other top administration officials, without being vetted through the normal intelligence processes. Libby became notorious in the intelligence community for his frequent visits to CIA headquarters to question – some say harass – analysts about their work, culminating in frantic, last-minute efforts to include a particularly dubious piece of intelligence linking Saddam to al-Qaida in Secretary of State Colin Powell’s infamous address to the U.N. General Assembly on the eve of the invasion.
Third, both authors left their government service under a cloud, if not in disgrace. Libby’s was the most spectacular fall. In October 2005, he was indicted by a federal grand jury resulting from an investigation into the leak of the covert identity of a CIA operative, Valerie Plame, as part of an apparent effort by Libby and his boss to discredit her husband, a former U.S. ambassador who had publicly exposed the falsity of a key administration claim regarding Saddam’s alleged nuclear-weapons program. Libby resigned his positions immediately following his indictment, was subsequently convicted by a jury of making false statements and sentenced to 30 months in prison, which President George W. Bush later commuted. He received a full pardon from President Donald Trump in 2018.
Feith — who, besides his collaboration with Chalabi, had overseen a number of other fiascoes during his tenure, including the disastrous de-Baathification program in Iraq — resigned in August 2005, by which time it had become clear that the occupation faced a serious insurgency. He may be best known, however, for the characterization applied to him by then-U.S. Central Command chief Gen. Tommy Franks, who led the invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq, as “the f*cking stupidest guy on the planet.”
Given that context, it’s no wonder that both men appear to have preferred the relative tranquility and obscurity of those Washington “think tanks” where their colleagues share the same or very similar world views, and “groupthink” rules the roost, much as it did during the heyday of neoconservative power during Bush’s first term. Perhaps somewhat chastened by their failures, they have seemingly been reluctant to engage in the public square in recent years.
Indeed, over the past decade, Libby had published only one op-ed in any of the country’s three most influential national newspapers, and that was back in 2021 on the evils of China’s “Covid wrongdoing,” as the Wall Street Journal’s editorial page editors called it. As for Feith, he hadn’t published a single op-ed in the Journal, the Washington Post, or the New York Times since 2015.
Libby was not as prolific. But on September 18, he co-authored an op-ed in the Post calling, among other things, for the destruction of “Iran’s major oil production and export facilities, as the Allies did to Germany and Japan in World War II” and for “ground troops” to seize Iran’s “coastline or the regime’s enriched uranium stockpiles…”
And now, on the very eve of Veterans/Armistice Day, these two strategic geniuses have taken once again to the Post’s op-ed page to earnestly warn us against listening to those who have grown weary of “endless wars.”
It’s time to thank them for their service.
Jim Lobe is a Contributing Editor of Responsible Statecraft. He formerly served as chief of the Washington bureau of Inter Press Service from 1980 to 1985 and again from 1989 to 2015.
The US military dismissed an Israeli broadcaster’s account of preparations for renewed attacks on Iran, describing the report as “pure speculation”, Anadolu reported
The dispute centers on claims by Israeli public broadcaster KAN that Washington alerted regional partners to the possibility of another round of operations while deploying additional military assets.
Among the reported deployments were approximately 200 aerial refueling aircraft stationed across Europe and the Middle East. KAN also said the aircraft carriers USS George Washington and USS George H.W. Bush were already in the region, with a third vessel, identified as the USS Roosevelt, expected in the Arabian Sea soon.
Asked by Anadolu about the report, a US Central Command (CENTCOM) official said there were no updates to the positioning of American forces in the Middle East.
KAN alleges warnings delivered through military channels
Beyond its deployment claims, KAN cited an unnamed US official as saying that CENTCOM advised “Israel” to prepare for the possibility of military operations against Iran restarting soon.
According to the broadcaster, Israeli military representatives based in the United States received the message. It further alleged that Washington contacted Gulf countries through security channels with similar warnings.
Those reported communications and deployment figures formed part of KAN’s account, which CENTCOM subsequently rejected in its response to Anadolu.
A Franco-Palestinian association has asked a Paris court to ban an Israeli real estate fair scheduled for Sunday in the French capital, alleging that it promotes properties in occupied Palestinian territories, broadcaster FranceInfo reported.
The NIDAL association filed an emergency petition with the Paris Administrative Court seeking to prohibit the ninth Icube real estate and investment fair or, alternatively, bar exhibitors from promoting properties in the occupied West Bank and East Jerusalem.
The group pointed to the participation of Israeli real estate company BH Nadlan, which advertises apartments in both areas, and alleged that the event’s promotional materials offer financial incentives to people seeking to settle in the West Bank.
The association said it had previously requested intervention from the Paris police prefecture but received no response.
The fair is scheduled for Nov. 15 at the European Center for Judaism in Paris.
A court hearing was held Thursday, with a ruling expected before the event.
There has been much debate in Britain in recent years about symbols of empire – pulling down statues, or returning museum artefacts.
But we rarely talk about the fact that British foreign policy is still run by the same institutions which ran the empire.
The Secretary of State for Business and Trade is still called ‘President of the Board of Trade’, referring to an institution involved in the triangular slave trade.
Perhaps the most obvious remnant of the empire is Britain’s outsized military bootprint. Most countries with foreign bases largely have them in neighbouring territories; only Britain, the US and France have genuinely global militaries.
With at least 145 bases in forty-two countries, Britain likely has the second-biggest military footprint on earth. Many of these bases are in former or remaining colonies (i.e. British overseas territories).
Many of the most important ones are in small authoritarian monarchies, with royal families we’ve helped prop up for decades, a direct relic of the empire.
These bases are important outposts of the British state. And yet, there is almost no democratic scrutiny of how they are used. Indeed, many of them are officially secret, and remained so until the journalistic website Declassified revealed their existence. There may well be more.
Look at how they are used, and we begin to see that this large swathe of British state power, left over from empire, is used – often violently – to prop up a global system not of British dominance, but of US hegemony and the corporate control which comes with it.
Projecting US power
Bases on British overseas territories – namely, Gibraltar; Ascension Island; Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus; and Diego Garcia – play particularly important roles in projecting US power.
These bases are all vital nodes in the Pentagon’s global surveillance system. For example, there are four main ‘ground antennae’ in the Global Positioning System (GPS). Two of these are on US territory, in Florida and Hawaii, and two are on British territory, on Ascension Island and Diego Garcia, providing circumglobal spread.
Akrotiri and Dhekelia are a significant hub for UK/US surveillance efforts across the Middle East and North Africa, allowing GCHQ and the NSA to intercept phone calls, text messages and internet communications across the region. The US Air Force’s main intelligence squadron also has a base there, and throughout Israel’s genocide of Gaza, Britain sent surveillance flights over Gaza from these bases, likely spying for Israel.
Similarly, the bases have more direct military use. During the genocide, Cypriots reported a surge in flights from Akrotiri, and the government admitted many were heading to Israel. There was also a significant increase in the supply of arms coming into the bases. The US was almost certainly rearming Israel using British sovereign territory.
Likewise, Diego Garcia is the major US military base from which its attacks on the Middle East and South Asia are conducted – including, for example, the initial bombing raids on Baghdad in 2003.
Beyond accountability
While the US has military bases on foreign soil across the planet, it needs to negotiate the domestic politics of most other states when it wishes to use them, and so becomes slightly accountable to global public opinion.
British territories, on the other hand, offer a space beyond accountability. Cypriots might protest against the US seemingly using Britain’s military bases to re-arm Israel, but they can’t vote out the regime allowing it.
Unlike the other overseas territories, the Cyprus military bases are run through the Ministry of Defence rather than the Foreign Office, and have no democratic structures. An administrator, officially appointed by the British monarch on the recommendation of the MoD, is in practice always the head of UK armed forces there, governing over Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
The 11,000 Cypriots who live on British sovereign land are subject to the old legal system imposed when Cyprus was a British colony, and effectively live under military dictatorship. Cyprus has repeatedly asked Britain to leave; Britain refuses.
For British voters, this is out of sight in some constitutional quirk. And when MPs do take an interest, the government can simply ignore them: in 2025, one frustrated MP told me, the government issued a block on MPs asking questions about the use of RAF flights to conduct surveillance in Israel and Gaza. It can do so, as my book Abolish Westminster explores in further detail, because it is operating under royal prerogative, not parliamentary authority.
Surveillance and shipping
Particularly significant is the role these territories play in signals intelligence, and the surveillance processes used by the US to project its global power and undermine self-determination and, sometimes, democracy around the world.
In the 1950s, British intelligence services developed a vast network of interception stations across the globe, tapping phone lines of anti-imperialist leaders and the like. As colonies started to win freedom, there was a panicked reaction about how to maintain this surveillance infrastructure. GCHQ solved this problem by maintaining control over overseas territories and footholds in informally dependent regimes in strategically important places.
Nowadays, because the internet relies on fibre-optic cables across the planet, this network has become more important than ever, providing the UK and US with the capacity to tap phone and internet communications across a large portion of the planet – and particularly in former colonies.
Similarly, these toeholds provide stopping points on many of the world’s most important shipping routes – such as Singapore and Bahrain – providing bases for the Royal Navy from which it can protect Britain’s oil industry, which is partly why Britain still hosts two of the world’s four biggest publicly listed oil companies.
This network is then justified by turning some of these territories – particularly the Falklands and Gibraltar with their whiter populations – into trinkets for Britons to remember their past power, and so demand an oversized military.
It’s often forgotten that the supposed justification for the onslaught on Iraq launched from one British overseas territory – and the disastrous war that followed – included a claimed threat to another British overseas territory: ‘the forty-five-minute claim’ screeched by The Sun, the Evening Standard and other establishment outriders was that, according to (they claimed) an intelligence dossier, Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction capable of deployment against British targets within forty-five minutes of an order to do so.
What many might not have realised from the headlines is that the British targets of these (as it transpired) invented weapons weren’t London. They were, at least according to some of the lie’s iterations, Akrotiri and Dhekelia.
Voters in the dark
The impact on the people who live under the dictators Britain props up to maintain this power is immense, while British voters have almost no say in what’s going on, and rarely even know about it: the British foreign policy machine largely continues its work, unfettered by democracy.
Oman and Bahrain, Singapore and Brunei – these aren’t formally British colonies, but their regimes are propped up by the British state, in ways that aren’t properly accountable either to the people of those countries, or those of the UK.
While the MoD refuses to disclose figures, the cost of maintaining this bootprint is one of the reasons Britain has the world’s fifth-highest total military expenditure. Only Russia, China, India and the US spend more. Apart from the US, virtually the only democracies that spend more of their GDP on the military are those fighting wars within or on their borders. Britain spends more of its wealth on its military than any other Western European country.
This level of expenditure is partly accepted because of the impact of memories of empire on our national identity – a plurality of British people think we should ‘punch above our weight’. And it is partly self-perpetuating, in that it creates interests which then lobby for themselves.
Imagine a defence secretary suggesting at a departmental meeting that Britain cut military spending to the same level as Japan – from 2.3% to 1.6% of GDP – including axing military bases outside sovereign territory.
Would this be taken calmly? Or would there be leaks, denunciations from unnamed generals in the press, screams that our national security was at risk and rapid ministerial backpedalling?
The spending’s primary purpose, though, is to protect a mix of US global dominance, and the interests of a handful of vast corporations which are – only sort of – British.
Trita Parsi is the co-founder and Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Follow his excellent Substack: https://tritaparsi.substack.com/
00:00 The Current State of the Iran War
02:55 Escalation Risks and Political Dynamics
06:11 The Swiss Cheese Scenario
08:54 Iran’s Response and Regional Implications
11:51 The Dilemma of U.S. Sanctions
15:06 The Future of U.S.-Iran Relations
18:08 The Multipolar World and Sanctions Efficacy
20:56 Israel’s Position and Regional Stability
23:49 The Saudi-Yemen Conflict and U.S. Involvement
26:58 The Shift in U.S. Foreign Policy
29:50 Conclusion and Future Outlook
The growing debate in Iran over withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) reflects a fundamental question: What purpose does membership serve if the treaty offers no meaningful protection for a country’s peaceful nuclear facilities, even as it obliges that country to uphold its commitments?
The issue goes beyond Iran’s legitimate security concerns, striking at the credibility of the international nuclear order itself.
When an NPT signatory’s nuclear infrastructure can be subjected to unprovoked and illegal military aggression without any accountability for those responsible, the treaty’s underlying premise of reciprocal obligations and protections is called into question.
The Assembly of Experts’ latest call for a review of Iran’s defence doctrine, including consideration of withdrawal from the NPT, signals a significant shift in the country’s strategic debate that has been gaining momentum since the 40-day imposed war.
What was once largely confined to discussions among lawmakers and security officials is now increasingly being articulated as a broader national security concern, especially in the wake of continued sabre rattling by the enemy.
While Iran is expected to uphold its international obligations as an NPT signatory, its adversaries face absolutely no accountability for openly violating the most fundamental principles of international law.
The repeated attacks on Iranian nuclear installations, assassinations of nuclear scientists and failure of international institutions to respond decisively have intensified questions about the effectiveness, fairness and credibility of the existing non-proliferation framework.
This is no longer a debate about the future of Iran’s nuclear program, which is entirely peaceful. It has evolved into a much broader question of national sovereignty, strategic deterrence, the credibility of international law and, ultimately, a state’s inherent right to defend itself against external aggression.
From nuclear safeguards to strategic vulnerability
Iran’s grievances did not emerge overnight. For years, its peaceful, energy-focused nuclear programme has been subjected to sabotage, cyberattacks, assassinations of scientists and, ultimately, direct military strikes against facilities under international monitoring.
This pattern long predates the two recent wars of aggression against Iran. In 2010, nuclear scientist Masoud Ali Mohammadi was assassinated in Tehran. Later that year, Majid Shahriari was killed in a bombing, while Fereydoun Abbasi survived an assassination attempt. Abbasi was subsequently martyred on the first day of the 12-day war in June 2025.
Dariush Rezainejad was assassinated in 2011, followed by Mostafa Ahmadi Roshan in January 2012. In November 2020, prominent nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was assassinated on the outskirts of Tehran. Israeli spying agency Mossad was involved in these attacks, with the stamp of approval from CIA.
During the 12-day war of aggression in June 2025, Israel assassinated several more of Iran’s leading nuclear scientists, yet the UN nuclear watchdog refrained from condemning these targeted killings. In fact, it was the politically motivated resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors shortly before the war that was instrumental in paving the way for the aggression at a time when Iran and the US were engaged in indirect nuclear negotiations.
The attacks have not been confined to individuals. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure has on numerous occasions been targeted through sophisticated sabotage operations, most notably the Stuxnet cyberattack against the Natanz enrichment facility in 2010.
The escalation reached an entirely different level in June 2025, when Israel, backed by the United States, launched an unprovoked and illegal military aggression against Iran, targeting nuclear installations alongside military and civilian infrastructure. Washington subsequently joined the war directly, bombing the three key nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan on June 22.
These were neither clandestine installations nor facilities operating outside the international nuclear framework. Iran’s nuclear program has for years been subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and verification arrangements.
The attacks thus raised a fundamental and logical question: if nuclear facilities under international monitoring can be bombed with sheer impunity, what practical protection does the safeguards system offer countries that remain committed to the NPT?
The IAEA itself confirmed the damage. Director General Rafael Grossi, who is now vying for the top UN post, reported that the above-ground section of Natanz’s pilot enrichment plant had been destroyed in the initial Israeli strikes. Following the US attacks, the agency confirmed that Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan had been hit, with extensive additional damage reported at the Isfahan complex.
The repercussions extended well beyond physical destruction. The IAEA subsequently suspended its field verification activities, while inspectors were withdrawn from Iran for safety reasons. In effect, military attacks on safeguarded nuclear installations undermined the very monitoring arrangements that the international community repeatedly demands Iran uphold.
This glaring contradiction lies at the heart of intensifying calls in Iran to withdraw from NPT. Iran is expected to honour its nuclear commitments even as the international framework designed to safeguard them offers no protection against external military aggression.
The IAEA’s credibility crisis
Iran’s criticism of the IAEA stems from a glaring double standard in its approach to nuclear security, compliance and accountability.
The agency has repeatedly demanded access and cooperation from Tehran, while its response to military attacks against Iranian nuclear installations has largely remained confined to tokenistic statements expressing concern and warnings about nuclear safety.
Grossi did state that nuclear facilities must never be attacked, regardless of the circumstances. He also warned that such attacks could have serious consequences for nuclear safety, security and international peace. However, the agency he heads did not produce a meaningful accountability mechanism capable of deterring or penalising those responsible for the unprovoked attacks.
The distinction between expressing concern and ensuring accountability is particularly important. The IAEA applies extensive mechanisms for inspecting nuclear facilities, verifying declared nuclear material and reporting safeguards violations. Yet it lacks the mechanism to hold rogue states accountable for attacks against nuclear facilities.
This exposes a structural weakness in the international nuclear order: compliance is rigorously monitored, but the security of compliant states is not equally guaranteed.
The timing of the June 2025 aggression made this contradiction even more glaring. Just a day before Israel launched its attacks, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution claiming Iran was in “non-compliance” with its safeguards obligations.
The move was politically motivated and reflected Israeli pressure on the agency and Grossi’s attempt to appease Washington with an eye on top UN position. The fact that the attacks followed almost immediately proved that diplomatic and monitoring mechanisms had become instruments of pressure on Iran rather than impartial safeguards.
There is also an important distinction here: the IAEA’s June 2025 finding concerned Iran’s safeguards obligations, not a finding that Iran had decided to build nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the episode reinforced the fact that Iran’s rights and obligations under the treaty were being interpreted selectively.
The credibility problem is further complicated by the nuclear status of the Israeli regime, which is not a signatory to the NPT and which possesses nuclear weapons, while maintaining a policy of nuclear ambiguity. Israel’s nuclear arsenal remains outside the treaty’s safeguards framework, while Iran, a non-nuclear-weapon state party, faces extensive inspections and international scrutiny for no reason.
Withdrawal from NPT becomes serious policy debate
Against this backdrop, calls for the Iranian leadership to reconsider the country’s NPT membership have gained momentum. Recent countywide polls, including those conducted by the state broadcaster IRIB, show an overwhelming majority of people in favor of the country’s exit from the treaty.
The statement by the Assembly of Experts, an 88-member constitutional body tasked with electing and supervising the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, is particularly significant because it elevates the issue beyond individual parliamentary interventions.
The body has called for a decisive review of Iran’s defence doctrine, consideration of withdrawal from the NPT and the establishment of the necessary deterrence capabilities. It has described these measures as an unavoidable necessity and an emerging national demand.
The statement also warned that any renewed aggression against the country would trigger an immediate and effective Iranian response without geographical limitations, echoing the position articulated by Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei in his meeting with top military commanders recently.
The message is twofold: Iran is reconsidering the assumptions underpinning its existing security arrangements, and it intends to ensure that any future attack carries consequences beyond the immediate battlefield.
The Assembly of Experts’ intervention follows similar remarks from senior officials and lawmakers. Major General Mohsen Rezaee, secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, also addressed the growing debate over the country’s nuclear doctrine recently.
On November 1, he acknowledged that public and political demands to reconsider the doctrine have emerged following attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities despite extensive IAEA inspections and monitoring. He clarified, however, that no official decision has so far been taken by the Supreme National Security Council to change the doctrine.
Earlier, on September 20, Iranian lawmaker Hossein Ali Hajideligani announced that a three-urgency parliamentary motion calling for withdrawal from the NPT had been submitted to the parliament’s presiding board. He said the proposal was awaiting permission to be introduced in an open parliamentary session.
He maintained that after repeated attacks against the country, including the nuclear sites, continued membership of the treaty was delivering more disadvantages than benefits.
These developments suggest that withdrawal is no longer merely an occasional political threat deployed during diplomatic confrontations. It has become a subject of institutional debate involving lawmakers, senior security officials and now the Assembly of Experts.
What does withdrawal from NPT actually mean
The NPT, which entered into force in 1970, is built around three central pillars: preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting peaceful nuclear cooperation and advancing nuclear disarmament.
Under Article IV, member states retain the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, provided they comply with their treaty obligations. Article III establishes the safeguards framework through which the IAEA verifies that nuclear material is not diverted towards weapons programmes.
Article X, meanwhile, explicitly recognises a member state’s sovereign right to withdraw. It states that a party may withdraw if it decides that extraordinary events related to the treaty’s subject matter have jeopardised its national interests. The withdrawing state must provide three months’ notice to all other parties and the UN Security Council, explaining the extraordinary events behind its decision.
This provision is particularly relevant to Iran’s current position. It could contend that repeated military attacks against its safeguarded nuclear facilities, the assassination of its scientists and the failure of international mechanisms to provide effective protection have fundamentally undermined the security rationale for continued membership.
In such circumstances, withdrawal becomes an exercise of national sovereignty under a provision explicitly written into the treaty.
Why Iran is reconsidering its defence doctrine
The debate over NPT membership is closely connected to a wider reassessment of Iran’s defence doctrine. For decades, it has maintained and demonstrated that its nuclear program is peaceful and that nuclear weapons have no place in the country’s defence strategy. Iranian officials have repeatedly invoked a decree by the martyred Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei against acquiring such weapons.
Iran reiterated this position in its submission to the 2026 NPT review process, describing the renunciation of nuclear weapons and the placement of peaceful nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as central elements of its commitment to the treaty.
However, the strategic environment has changed dramatically. The February 28, 2026, US-Israeli aggression against Iran, following the earlier attacks in June 2025, has reinforced the argument that the country’s existing deterrence arrangements need fundamental reassessment, especially amid continued threats from the US-Israeli war machine.
The central concern is that conventional military capabilities and international diplomatic commitments have not been sufficient to prevent repeated attacks against Iranian territory and strategic infrastructure. Hence, deterrence must be credible enough to convince adversaries that another military adventure would carry unacceptable costs.
This is the context in which Ayatollah Seyyed Mojtaba Khamenei’s warning about an immediate response without geographical limitations should be understood. It communicates that Iran would not necessarily confine its response to the location of an attack or accept geographical restrictions imposed by its adversaries in the event of new aggression.
The Assembly of Experts has effectively connected this deterrence argument with the NPT debate. Its position suggests that Iran cannot continue relying on an international framework that has failed to protect its security while limiting its strategic options.
The question is not simply whether Iran should acquire additional military capabilities. It is whether the country’s defence doctrine should be adjusted to reflect the realities of a regional and international order in which military force has increasingly been used against it despite the existence of diplomatic agreements and international safeguards.
Wider implications for international nuclear order
Iran’s potential withdrawal would have consequences extending well beyond West Asia. The NPT is often described as the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Its credibility depends not only on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons but also on maintaining confidence that member states can exercise their peaceful nuclear rights without becoming targets of military aggression.
If a state that has remained within the treaty concludes that membership offers inadequate protection against attacks on its safeguarded facilities, other countries may question the practical value of the existing arrangements. This would create a dangerous precedent.
The international community cannot consistently demand that countries accept intrusive inspections and comply with non-proliferation obligations while treating attacks against their peaceful nuclear infrastructure as an issue that can be addressed through tokenistic expressions of concern alone.
There is also a broader contradiction involving nuclear-armed states and those outside the treaty. Israel’s continued refusal to join the NPT, combined with its widely acknowledged nuclear arsenal, highlights the uneven application of international nuclear rules.
Meanwhile, the five states recognised as nuclear-weapon states under the NPT have not fulfilled the disarmament expectations embedded in Article VI to the satisfaction of many non-nuclear-weapon states.
This imbalance has long undermined confidence in the treaty’s underlying bargain: non-nuclear states agree not to acquire nuclear weapons, while nuclear-weapon states commit to pursuing disarmament and all parties retain the right to peaceful nuclear technology.
Iran’s current debate brings these unresolved contradictions into sharper focus. A withdrawal would not necessarily mean that Iran would immediately pursue nuclear weapons. Nor should such an outcome be presented as inevitable. But it would represent a serious setback for a non-proliferation framework already facing considerable challenges.
It would also complicate the work of the IAEA, reduce transparency and potentially create new uncertainties about nuclear material, verification and regional security.
For the United States and its European allies, as well as the Zionist regime, the prospect of Iranian withdrawal from the NPT should therefore be a warning about the consequences of relying excessively on sanctions, military threats and coercive diplomacy.
A test for international institutions
Ultimately, Iran’s NPT debate is about more than nuclear policy. It is a test of whether international institutions can uphold the principles they were established to defend.
The NPT cannot remain credible if its obligations are enforced selectively, peaceful nuclear facilities are exposed to dastardly military attacks and the perpetrators face no meaningful consequences.
Nor can the IAEA maintain its standing as an impartial international watchdog if its ability to monitor nuclear activities is accompanied by an inability to meaningfully address threats to the safety and security of safeguarded facilities.
Washington and its European allies must recognise that military aggression against a member state’s safeguarded nuclear facilities fundamentally undermines the very non-proliferation system they claim to defend.
The IAEA, too, must demonstrate that its mandate extends beyond demanding compliance from non-nuclear states to consistently defending nuclear safety and the inviolability of peaceful nuclear installations.
Iran’s growing reconsideration of NPT membership is, in this sense, a consequence of a much deeper crisis of confidence. The international community now faces a fundamental question: Can the global nuclear order survive when compliance offers no credible protection against aggression, and when the institutions responsible for safeguarding it can’t ensure accountability?
If that question remains unanswered, Iran’s debate may prove to be part of a much wider challenge to the foundations of the international non-proliferation regime.
One of the main reasons Israel’s “Hasbara” has been so easy to debunk is the fact that Israelis in Hebrew widely showcase their genocidal hatred towards the Palestinian people for the world to see.
The latest example, uncovered by historian Zachary Foster, shows two hosts on the mainstream Israeli outlet Channel 14- the Channel most closely connected with the ruling Likud party- laughing at and celebrating the deadly floods in Gaza that have killed four children in the past few days.
In the clip, the sadistic Israeli hosts play a song with the lyrics “rain, rain is dripping, rain rain how fun”, over images of displaced Palestinians civilians dealing with flooding in refugee camps.
The hosts sadistically laugh at footage of a Palestinian woman desperately scooping water out of her flooded tent with a cup, saying “within six years you’ll get it all out of the tent”, while laughing hysterically at her suffering.
The two evil hosts continue to laugh and mock Palestinian suffering, suggesting that Palestinians “open a water park”, while displaying a superimposed image of a water park over the ruins of Gaza, caused by Israel’s ongoing genocide.
The two hosts continue to dance and sing as they speculate what to call this “water park”.
This sadistic display of mocking and celebrating Palestinian suffering is not an isolated incident and is just another example of the sadism broadcast daily on Israeli TV.
Channel 14, where this genocidal screed was broadcast, is not a fringe network within Israel either, and actually emerged as one of Israel’s “most-watched news sources” in 2024, even beating the more mainstream Channel 12 in ratings.
Indeed, it is exactly this sort of genocidal barbarism that makes the channel popular with the Israeli public, which overwhelmingly supports genocide of the Palestinian people.
In August 1949, three months after Israel joined the United Nations, Lebanon’s envoy in Washington sent his government a long report. Charles Malik, no firebrand, had signed the UN Charter and helped draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. His Report on the Present Situation lay largely unread until Dar An-Nahar printed it in 2002.
The Arabic text is online; the translations below are mine, with the book’s page numbers.
Malik calls Palestine “the gravest Arab question of all”, whose outcome “is the outcome of the whole Arab world” (p. 24). Then he warns:
“Everything that has happened so far in Palestine and concerning Palestine is only a beginning. As for the end, it may be either the crushing of the Arab world and its colonisation by the Jews, or its rising anew as a modern, respected world, sharing with the living civilisations in creating values and preserving them. Whatever happens, the near future will be darker than the present and more dangerous than the past.” (p. 27)
A word on Malik’s language. He writes “the Jews” where we would now write the Zionist entity and the organised bodies abroad that back it: the Zionist movement and the vast bulk of organised Jewry. The movement named itself that way: a Jewish Agency, a Jewish National Fund, a Jewish state. In the Levant, the conquest of Palestine was experienced as an attack by Jews. That describes a political project and its institutions. It is not a racial term, and it says nothing about Jews as a people, some of whom opposed Zionism then and oppose it now. Malik’s target is the movement and the state it had just built:
“… the Jews’ triumph in seizing the greater part of Palestine and building their state, … and Israel’s entry as a member of the United Nations: all this is not an act at which the ambitions of the Jews stop and with which their danger ends. The State of Israel, in its present condition and borders, is not a resting place for the invading Jewish force, but a centre where it gathers, a soil in which it grows, and a point from which it sets out across its borders and springs upon the Arab countries, the adjacent and then the distant: politically, economically and socially, and, if need be, militarily. And I think it will need to.” (pp. 27–28)
“The Zionists have succeeded in all this. But they will not be content with this partial success, nor satisfied with this measure of victory, because their ambitions do not end at the patch of Palestine they have seized, nor stop at the borders the world has recognised for them. … Zionist policy is, at its core, an ambitious expansionist policy. The whole of Palestine is not enough for the needs of the Jews, nor does it sate the appetite of their leaders. … Israel wants to dominate the Arab world; it wants to be the heir of all its previous eras. Just as it was once known, in whole or in part, as the Roman, Byzantine, Arab, Turkish or Mandate era, so Zionism wants it to be known in its coming era as the Israeli era. The Arab world is Zionism’s vital space.” (pp. 40–41)
“… They will succeed in persuading the West, and in persuading some of our own politicians and thinkers, that they are the intermediary between the West and the Near East, in economics and development, in culture and thought, and in politics, and that they are the ones fit to represent the Near East, its interests, its will and its forces, to the West. … A day will come, if it has not already come, when all economic and development projects and all rescue plans … rest at bottom on the Jewish will, aimed in their motives at numbing the Arabs and distracting them from the shame of Israel’s establishment in their midst, and in their end at forcing them to recognise it and cooperate with it. These projects will be built so as, first and foremost, to entrench Israel’s foundations and make it the cornerstone of the economic structure and the pillar of development in the Near East.” (pp. 43–44)
Now Benjamin Netanyahu. At the UN in 2023, he hailed a “visionary corridor that will stretch across the Arabian Peninsula and Israel” to “connect India to Europe”, and said: “Israel can become a bridge of peace and prosperity between these continents.” “Israel must be a power,” he told a Mossad gathering in 2015. “Not just a regional power, but in some spheres, a world power.” In December 2025, two years into the genocide in Gaza, he declared in the Knesset that Israel “is the strongest power in the Middle East, and in certain fields, it is a global power.”
A page earlier, Malik had described what such a position would mean:
“For a day will come — and it may be near, if it is not already here — when nothing in the Arab world is loosed or bound except with the consent of the Jews. Then governments, regimes and individuals will be upheld or overturned according to the Jews’ approval or anger: a head of state or a head of government will rise or fall because Tel Aviv, and behind it world Jewry concentrated in New York and other Western capitals, wanted him to rise or to fall.” (pp. 42–43)
“I have repeatedly been given to understand that very important matters, such as development projects, international loans, and treaties and agreements for security in the Middle East, were left undecided or set aside because those with the power to decide on them had first consulted the Jews about them.” (p. 43)
The same line applies: Malik’s “world Jewry” is the organised Zionist movement in Western capitals, standing “behind” Tel Aviv. Read that way, the passage is prescient, as Israel’s record in Lebanon shows. Who today can say that this is far from the mark on the reality of contemporary political life?
A partial ambition
Malik’s “partial success” is the key. Zionist leaders always claimed more than they accepted at any moment. Acceptance was tactical.
At the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, the Zionist Organization proposed a northern border starting “south of Sidon” and an eastern line “close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway”, well east of the Jordan.
When the Peel Commission offered a small state in 1937, David Ben-Gurion told his son Amos why he would take it: “A partial Jewish state is not the end, but only the beginning … I am certain that we will not be prevented from settling in other parts of the country, either by mutual agreement with our Arab neighbors or by some other means.”
In June 1938, the historian Nur Masalha shows from the Jewish Agency Executive’s minutes, Ben-Gurion accepted part of the country “on the basis of the assumption that after we build up a strong force following the establishment of the state – we will abolish the partition of the country and we will expand to the whole Land of Israel.”
Ze’ev Jabotinsky, founder of Revisionist Zionism, had already spelled out the method in 1923: colonisation “must either stop, or else proceed regardless of the native population”, behind “an iron wall, which the native population cannot breach”.
Menachem Begin’s Irgun answered the UN partition vote of November 1947, as he recorded in The Revolt: “The partition of the Homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. … Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever.”
Lebanon
Malik’s sharpest fear was for Lebanon. He warned of “a secret agreement between Israel and some short-sighted Lebanese”, who would then “carry out a coup loyal to Israel”. It “would not be counted as aggression by Israel, but as a mere internal movement”, leaving the West no room to act. Yet such a coup “would inevitably lead to chaos, then Syrian Arab intervention, then Israeli intervention, and so to a new war, and Lebanon will not be the winner in it at all” (pp. 145–146).
He did not know what Ben-Gurion had written on 24 May 1948, in a diary now published by the Ben-Gurion Archive: “Lebanon is the weak link in the Arab coalition. The Muslim government is artificial and easy to destabilize. A Christian state should be established with the Litani [River] as its southern border. We’ll form an alliance with it.”
In May 1955, according to Moshe Sharett’s diary as translated by Livia Rokach, Chief of Staff Moshe Dayan said Israel need only “find an officer, even just a Major”, then “create a Christian regime which will ally itself with Israel” and annex “the territory from the Litani southward”. It is almost exactly Malik’s plot.
In March 1949, US records show, Malik had asked Dean Acheson for a declaration “that no further expansion on the part of Israel would be permitted.” None came.
Seventy-seven years on
Malik’s answer was Arab renewal. Without it, he wrote, “I am certain that our future is colonisation and enslavement by the Jews. And I am certain of more than that: I am certain that in that case no one will grieve over our enslavement” (p. 42).
Against the genocide in Gaza, the wars on Lebanon and the seizures of Syrian territory, the report reads as description. In August 2025 Netanyahu said he felt “very much” connected to the vision of Greater Israel. Malik would not have been surprised. The ambition was never dropped, only deferred until the force existed to pursue it.
Arabic original: Charles Malik, شارل مالك، إسرائيل… أميركا… والعرب: تنبؤات من نصف قرن – تقرير في الوضع الحاضر، 5 آب 1949 (Israel… America… and the Arabs: Prophecies from Half a Century – Report on the Present Situation, 5 August 1949), preface by Ghassan Tueni (Beirut: Dar An-Nahar, first edition August 2002; scan of the third printing, March 2003). Read it on archive.org or download the PDF.
Israeli aircraft bombed the Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip early on Thursday, killing at least five people and wounding more than 20, Al Mayadeen’s correspondent reported.
The strike hit the second floor of a building in the complex, west of the city, and caused major destruction. Rescue crews recovered five bodies and evacuated more than 20 injured people.
The hospital’s director said the strike came from directly above, causing heavy damage in the intensive care and surgery departments.
Civil Defense spokesman Mahmoud Basal told Reuters it hit the surgery department, and medics identified one of the dead as a surgeon, Rezik Abushira.
Anadolu reported that the building hit was the Al-Yassin building inside the complex. Nasser is the main hospital serving southern Gaza and carries the heaviest burden in treating the wounded and providing medical care.
Israeli strikes killed 22 people at Nasser Hospital on August 25, 2025, including five journalists and four health workers, in a double strike that hit the building as rescuers arrived.
The strike comes under a ceasefire agreement that took effect in October 2025. Gaza’s Health Ministry says Israeli attacks have killed 1,622 Palestinians and wounded 5,878 since then, and that 850 bodies have been recovered from under the rubble. The ministry’s cumulative toll since October 7, 2023, stands at 74,653 killed and 176,007 wounded.
On the very morning of the critical US midterm elections, President Donald Trump made what seemed like a shocking announcement: no more aid to Israel.
“Bibi Netanyahu and I have made a deal that we give Israel $4 billion a year, and we made a deal months ago that we’re stopping,” Trump toldFox News’ Fox & Friends.
He goes on to make two seemingly contradictory assertions: “We won’t be paying Israel,” and “We’ll help Israel if they need it.”
In truth, there was little euphoria among those who have long campaigned against US funding of Israel. The lack of enthusiasm can be explained by two factors: few take Trump’s pledges seriously, and his remarks were widely understood as a desperate attempt to stave off what was shaping up to be a disastrous election outcome.
The election ultimately delivered one of the most humiliating defeats in Republican Party history, with Democrats capturing both the Senate and House of Representatives and making sweeping gains across the country.
Republicans quickly turned against Trump, who made the unusual admission that the war on Iran had contributed to their defeat.
Vice President JD Vance, widely considered a potential presidential contender in 2028, was more explicit. “The reason we lost is the war,” Vance tweeted on 4 November, calling for Republicans to “change our relationship to Israel.”
Though Vance was criticised by some within his party for naming Israel, the clearest indication that unconditional US support for Israel had become a major political liability came from Trump himself.
First, his rushed Election Day announcement was an unmistakable attempt to influence voters before they cast their ballots. Trump failed, but in doing so, he revealed that he and his party understood Israel had become a major factor in their political predicament.
Indeed, Trump described the $4 billion payment as “a bad talking point,” complaining that critics were using it against Republicans.
Second, Trump’s acknowledgment that the Iran war had hurt Republicans exposed the very Israel connection that Vance was prepared to articulate more openly.
The war on Iran was not America’s war. It was Netanyahu’s war, pursued as part of his longstanding quest to dominate the Middle East, with Washington paying the military, economic and political price.
This is hardly hyperbole. Netanyahu has repeatedly presented Iran as an existential enemy, while his far-right allies have openly celebrated American military involvement.
Ironically, Washington’s own 2026 National Defense Strategy had identified defending the US homeland and asserting American interests throughout the Western Hemisphere as its foremost priorities. Yet the administration plunged into another devastating Middle Eastern war.
Thanks to independent journalists and analysts operating outside mainstream media, Americans have become increasingly aware of the damage this relationship has inflicted on their country’s economy, military standing and international reputation.
According to Quinnipiac University, 48 percent of registered American voters now believe the US is too supportive of Israel, compared with just 16 percent in January 2017.
This growing awareness, coupled with the seismic shift in Congress following the midterms, is still not enough to guarantee tangible and irreversible change.
The midterm results nevertheless offer a major ray of hope that America is not a lost cause after all, and that ordinary people possess enough knowledge and determination to challenge the powerful interests, mega-donors and shadowy agendas shaping their country’s foreign policy.
There is a fundamental lesson here: Americans can no longer be satisfied with empty promises. And this brings us back to Trump’s announcement.
Israel has been the largest cumulative recipient of US foreign assistance, with the Council on Foreign Relations estimating that American aid since 1948 has exceeded $300 billion, adjusted for inflation.
That staggering figure, however, hardly tells half the story. Washington has consistently found ways to finance Israel’s wars beyond the declared annual military assistance of $3.8 billion.
For example, in April 2024, President Joe Biden signed emergency legislation providing Israel with an additional $8.7 billion in direct military assistance, separate from the regular annual allocation. The money included $3.5 billion in additional Foreign Military Financing and $5.2 billion for missile defense programs.
These extraordinary funding mechanisms demonstrate how Washington can continue financing Israel’s military even when regular assistance becomes politically controversial.
And that is only part of the picture.
Congress has been considering proposals to expand US-Israeli defense technology cooperation, potentially shifting more spending into Pentagon research, development and procurement accounts.
In essence, Israel could continue benefiting from billions in American military spending without those expenditures being labeled conventional foreign aid.
What Trump appears to be offering, therefore, is a sleight of hand: remove the politically damaging label of aid while preserving, and potentially expanding, the military relationship itself.
A Democratic-controlled Congress could block some of these initiatives. But many Democrats remain committed supporters of Israel, and the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, AIPAC, will continue to spend heavily to influence congressional elections.
True, association with the lobby has become a political liability for some candidates. But AIPAC and its allies can be expected to seek alternative strategies, political vehicles and alliances to preserve their influence.
The election results are certainly a major step in the right direction, but America’s political civil war is only beginning: progressive Democrats against the party establishment, disillusioned Republicans against MAGA loyalists, independent media against mainstream institutions, and so on.
The good news, for now, is that the tireless work of generations of conscientious Americans are finally paying off. Thanks in no small part to their efforts, millions of Americans are beginning to recognise that Israel is not a friend of their country, and that this sinister relationship must end once and for all.
Traditional food was food. Not organic food. Not slow food. Not wellness food. Food. Bone broth was food. Raw milk was food. Fermented vegetables were food. Butter was food. Eggs were food. Honey was food. Liver was food.
Weston Price travelled from 1931 to 1936 across fourteen populations — Swiss villagers in the Lötschental valley, Gaelic communities in the Outer Hebrides, Inuit in Alaska, Native Americans in northern Canada, Māori in New Zealand, Masai in Kenya, Melanesians in the South Pacific, Peruvian Indians in the Andes. He photographed their faces. He measured their dental arches. He weighed their vitamin and mineral intake. He published the results in 1939 in Nutrition and Physical Degeneration. The pattern was consistent across every population. The generation raised on ancestral foods had broad faces, straight teeth, strong bone structure, and virtually no chronic disease. The generation raised on refined flour, refined sugar, and canned goods did not.
What has not been treated at book length, until now, is the whole shelf — the twenty works that, taken together, describe what the traditional kitchen was, what industrial food replaced it with, and what the body does when the replacement runs for a century.
The Food Book reads twenty of those works as a single library: Weston Price and Sally Fallon on the tradition that was lost; Francis Pottenger on what cooking does to a species over four generations; Sandor Katz on fermentation as an ecology; William Dufty on the two-and-a-half-century history of refined sugar; William Campbell Douglass on raw milk; James DiNicolantonio on the inversion of the salt argument; Max Gerson on cancer; Ulric Williams on medicine as a cartel; William Engdahl on seed sovereignty; Stephen Harrod Buhner on what plants do, chemically, that pharmaceuticals disrupt. … continue
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